Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Cultivating Autonomy: The Normative Core of Democracy
- 2 Deliberative Democracy and Autonomous Decision-Making
- 3 Institutionalising Deliberative Democracy through Secondary Associations
- 4 A Dualist Model of Deliberative and Associational Democracy
- 5 Democratising Secondary Associations
- 6 Avoiding the Mischief of Factionalism
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - Avoiding the Mischief of Factionalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Cultivating Autonomy: The Normative Core of Democracy
- 2 Deliberative Democracy and Autonomous Decision-Making
- 3 Institutionalising Deliberative Democracy through Secondary Associations
- 4 A Dualist Model of Deliberative and Associational Democracy
- 5 Democratising Secondary Associations
- 6 Avoiding the Mischief of Factionalism
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
A dualist model of deliberative and associational democracy has been advocated and outlined. This involved secondary associations actively participating in the making of collective decisions. Many issues and problems with this model were addressed in the previous chapters, but a key one still remains: as with any model of democracy, the question arises, ‘how is it possible to “reconcile each individual's free pursuit of his own objectives with the common good?’” (Manin 1987: 351). This is of particular importance to a deliberative democracy, which has been justified on its ability to promote the common good (Cohen 1989; Bohman 1996; Habermas 1996a). Institutionalising deliberative democracy through secondary associations has been seen by many as unworkable because secondary associations tend to pursue narrow interests, promoting factions rather than the common good. If the common good is sacrificed, and narrow interests dominate in collective decision-making, then it is clear that only those whose narrow interests are ensured will have their autonomy secured. Madison provided one of the most famous, and longstanding, republican conceptions of factions. He warned that if deliberative assembles are captured by factions, then instability, increased conflict, disregard of the common good, disregard for justice and rights and coercive rule of majorities would follow (Madison 1966: 16). He defines a faction as:
A number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
(Madison 1966: 17)- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Towards a Deliberative and Associational Democracy , pp. 213 - 232Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2008