In the previous two chapters I sought to clear the way for substantive normative theory in international relations. I sought to do so by showing that the reasons often advanced (or assumed) for avoiding substantive normative theorizing within the discipline of international relations are not sound. Indeed, in the course of the discussion it became apparent that scholars in the discipline cannot but become involved in issues of a normative nature. Having completed this preliminary stage of the argument let us now begin with the more positive task of constructing a substantive normative theory.

A first step will be to identify some of the pressing normative issues facing actors and theorists in the sphere of international affairs. This immediately raises the question of how best to settle these issues. Finally we shall have to face the general question: “What is to count as a satisfactory normative theory?” I shall tackle these problems by arguing that the very statement of the list of difficult issues implicitly indicates the existence of an area of agreement between people – a domain of discourse – which gives us a basis from which we might construct an argument towards a substantive normative theory. I shall introduce and use, for this purpose, a method of argument first used in the context of jurisprudence.

But before going on to attempt the construction of such an argument we must first consider two objections to my contention that there actually is an area of agreement (domain of discourse) in international relations on the basis of which the difficult cases can be settled.