Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7bb8b95d7b-l4ctd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-10-03T13:25:30.391Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

CHAPTER ONE - The positivist bias: a philosophical assumption which accounts for the dearth of normative theory in the discipline of international relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2012

Mervyn Frost
Affiliation:
Georgia Institute of Technology
Get access

Summary

Introduction

Actors in the realm of international relations are regularly faced with normative questions. They are often called upon to decide what, given the specific situation, would be the right thing to do. The problem is not, or not only, the one of deciding upon the best means to an approved of end; that is, the problem is not purely technical. The moral problem is to choose the ends to be pursued and to decide upon what means might legitimately be used in pursuit of those ends.

The kind of problem which faces actors in the realm of international relations is well illustrated in the present day Middle East. Israeli politicians have to decide on the right thing to do with regard to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Lebanese and Arab leaders, the governments of the United States and the USSR, each have to decide what rights, recognition and support (if any) ought to be accorded to the PLO. The normative nature of the problem is not dissolved by suggesting that the actors always do (and will) act according to their respective self-interests. What is to count as self-interest is partially determined by normative considerations. For example, where Israel defends a particular course of action on the ground that she is defending her self-interest, part of what is being asserted is that this particular interest ought to be recognized as a legitimate one, as one which ought to be defended.

Type
Chapter
Information
Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations
A Critical Analysis of the Philosophical and Methodological Assumptions in the Discipline with Proposals Towards a Substantive Normative Theory
, pp. 9 - 41
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×