With the publication of Truth and Method, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics joined the conversation of continental philosophy. Of course Heidegger's use of hermeneutics in Being and Time continued to be discussed, but hermeneutics was not the central focus of Heidegger studies. So when hermeneutics was debated, the discussion usually concerned Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics.

In this concluding chapter we shall investigate four general criticisms of philosophical hermeneutics by examining one philosopher from each position before assessing the future of hermeneutics:

1. • E. D. Hirsch represents the traditional position of literary interpretation and philology, which developed from Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. The traditional position argues that the meaning of a text is determined by the author's intention.

2. • Jürgen Habermas argues that philosophical hermeneutics is unable to criticize tradition since Gadamer underestimates the power of reflection. Gadamer's hermeneutics must be modified to include a critique of ideology.

3. • Paul Ricoeur contends that hermeneutics must include both a theory of understanding, along the lines of Gadamer's theory, and a theory of explanation in order to validate interpretation. Because philosophical hermeneutics lacks a theory of explanation, Gadamer's hermeneutics results in relativism.

4. • Jacques Derrida's brief debate with Gadamer represents the general criticism of deconstructionists that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics remains trapped within metaphysics and thus is not radical enough.

We shall conclude that as long as there are texts that are read and discussed, hermeneutics will continue to be an essential topic in the philosophical conversation.