3 - Dubious Virtue Psychology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2009
Summary
In the previous chapter we considered arguments against a particular psychological or cognitive requirement for virtue. The virtues of ignorance count against a knowledge, or correct perception, requirement for virtue. If I am correct, to have some virtues the agent need not have knowledge of morally relevant facts. There are other very specific kinds of psychological states that have been viewed as necessary to virtue throughout the historical development of virtue theory. This chapter continues the assault on an internal requirement for moral virtue. I argue that any account of virtue that defines virtue in terms of some specific sort of psychology will fail because such an account will be too narrow.
THE VIRTUES AS CORRECTIVES
Facts about human psychology have frequently been considered crucial in defining virtue. For example, one popular view of the virtues, which can be traced back to Aquinas and has been recently developed by Philippa Foot, is that they work to “correct” for the baser human impulses and motives (Foot 1978). The idea is that humans are naturally self-interested and motivated by considerations of selfishness, by the desire to promote their own good, and by an aversion to whatever constitutes something bad for them as individuals. This type of view is articulated by Philippa Foot in Virtues and Vices. Virtues correct both for temptations that humans typically experience and for deficiencies of motivation to do good.
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- Uneasy Virtue , pp. 42 - 62Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001
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