The British experience on the North-West Frontier had revealed some of the inherent tensions that accompanied the ‘political’ approach to pacification. Most obvious of these had been the rival perspectives adopted by civilian officials and administrators on the one hand and their military partners on the other. Lurking beneath had been the question of whether the specialists detailed for the purpose of engineering a relationship between the tribes and government were sufficiently qualified to undertake that task, and whether the process was controllable in the way that they believed. And of course there was the extent to which the government was able to place the broader pacification effort in its proper strategic context and whether it could resist the temptation to allow constant challenges to its authority in the tribal areas to distort its attempts to adopt a measured approach to protecting its interests there. The Algerian War of 1954–62 would see a similar range of challenges (re-)emerge, but in far starker, far more problematic and, in the end, far more extreme ways.