Reviewing a conference called to evaluate the state of presidential studies, George Edwards, John Kessel, and Bert Rockman note with somewhat acerbic wit,

It is plainly true that there are many ways to do good social science. Those who assemble data, those who conduct case studies, those who analyze others’ data, those who produce creative insights, those who take stock of what we know, and those who build theoretical models all make valuable contributions. “Theoretical” and “rigorous” are hardly synonyms for “good social science.”

Nonetheless, one of the goals of this book is to produce useful and interesting theory about the presidency in an age of divided government. The approach I take is characteristic of the new analytical or rational choice institutionalism. I focus on a specific, repeated, important phenomenon: veto bargaining. Then, I use rational choice theory to build several interrelated models of different aspects of the phenomenon. This approach is sufficiently novel – and controversial – in presidential studies to warrant an extended apologia.

WHY MODELS?

Solving puzzles is central to science. We see phenomena like those explored in Chapter 2, and ask why. Solving a puzzle means explaining it. Explaining it means finding and elaborating a causal mechanism for it.