When I began writing this book I had an agnostic position towards popular theories of media malaise. The belief that political communications have contributed towards civic disengagement has become so prevalent among journalists and scholars, a mantra of pessimism repeated by media commentators, that the challenge for this book seemed to be to say anything new about this phenomenon. Whether the problem du jour was school shootings, world poverty, or cynicism about Congress, one branch or other of the media was, apparently, to blame. Journalists happily self-flagellated. Politicians contributed. After all, why not blame the media when, given a free press, we can do so little about it? A perfect do-nothing strategy. Yet as more and more evidence accumulated that proved contrary to prevailing expectations, I became increasingly skeptical and doubtful about the conventional wisdom. The literature, though plentiful in recent years, often slides too easily from discussing real changes in the news industry (which have occurred) to the assumed effects of these changes on public opinion (which have not). In searching for evidence to support or refute the thesis, several avenues that initially seemed promising eventually proved false leads. As with any study relying upon existing data, the available evidence was often limited. No single indicator presented in this book can be regarded as definitive. But by the end of the chase, the sheer weight of evidence that has accumulated over successive chapters, using a variety of surveys, in different years and in different countries, including the United States, has led to skepticism about the standard view of the impact of political communications on the public. It's just plain wrong.