Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 History and the Future
- 2 Thucydides and Clausewitz
- 3 Clausewitz out, Computers in: Military Culture and Technological Hubris
- 4 Changing the Principles of War?
- 5 Military Culture Does Matter
- 6 History and Strategic Planning
- 7 Thoughts on Red Teaming
- 8 The Distant Framework of War
- 9 The Problem of German Military Effectiveness, 1900–1945
- 10 Reflections on the Combined Bomber Offensive
- 11 The Air War in the Gulf
- 12 Thoughts on British Intelligence in World War II and the Implications for Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century
- 13 The Meaning of World War II
- Index
- References
4 - Changing the Principles of War?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 History and the Future
- 2 Thucydides and Clausewitz
- 3 Clausewitz out, Computers in: Military Culture and Technological Hubris
- 4 Changing the Principles of War?
- 5 Military Culture Does Matter
- 6 History and Strategic Planning
- 7 Thoughts on Red Teaming
- 8 The Distant Framework of War
- 9 The Problem of German Military Effectiveness, 1900–1945
- 10 Reflections on the Combined Bomber Offensive
- 11 The Air War in the Gulf
- 12 Thoughts on British Intelligence in World War II and the Implications for Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century
- 13 The Meaning of World War II
- Index
- References
Summary
The mere fact that the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense would have funded a contest as well as several conferences about whether the principles of war have changed now that the world has entered the twenty-first century says much about the “American way of war” – and not necessarily in a positive vein. It is not that I am against the idea of conferences or intellectual argument. Indeed, I am delighted to praise the office for its effort to spark intellectual debate in a town (Washington) of contentless briefs and irrelevant joint concepts.
Let me begin with the question as to whether there is any validity to the remake or even to the concept of what has traditionally been termed the “principles of war.” The “principles” have been around as a plaything for military academics and theorists for at least two hundred years. They have littered the landscape of supposed intellectual discourse about the employment of military forces for that entire time. Every military organization has possessed its own slightly different set of principles. Not surprisingly, generals have added their two cents to the discussion. Even that severe critic of military orthodoxy and iconoclast, the British general and pundit in the period between World War I and World War II, J.F.C. Fuller, could not resist the opportunity to come up with his own set of principles.
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- Information
- War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness , pp. 72 - 82Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011