The Greek Thucydides, the greatest of all historians, suggested in the early passages of his work on the Peloponnesian War that it “will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.” The problem with Thucydides’ claim is that history rarely suggests exact patterns. At best, it can provide illumination to help in understanding the complex problems that confront today's policy makers and military leaders. The best one can hope for from history is that it will suggest the right questions, or how to think more coherently and intelligently about current problems.

This chapter examines the development of British intelligence over the course of the Second World War for insights into how America's present-day intelligence organizations might consider and address their own problems. Admittedly considerable differences exist between the challenges the British faced and those confronting Americans today. Yet, there are also similarities that may help address the complex and intractable problems of the twenty-first century. At the least, the success of British intelligence in the Second World War would seem to suggest lessons adaptable to today's conditions.