In 1976, a few months after independence, an armed movement opposed to the ruling party of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) emerged from the province of Zambezia. Known as the Partido Revolucionário de Moçambique (Revolutionary Party of Mozambique, PRM), this movement was first led by Amós Sumane, a former member of Frelimo, and later by Gimo Phiri. The PRM quickly began to coordinate attacks on any and all areas that represented Frelimo's presence as a State structure. The local population's support was vital and decisive. The population fed the soldiers and also provided crucial information on the movements and positions of Frelimo troops. Frelimo, caught off guard by this development, was forced to acknowledge this collaboration. The same popular support was later on provided to the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (Mozambique National Resistance, Renamo) as they too began to attack Frelimo positions in the province of Zambezia beginning in 1982. This study also focuses on the messianic movements of the ‘Naparama’, also known as ‘Napharama’, and the ‘Mulelepeia’. These two last movements arose as a direct response to the Mozambican Civil War; their breadth and importance was felt mostly in the province of Zambezia.

The chapter advances the argument that Frelimo's hostility towards the people of Zambezia, as well as the marginalization of the province (one of the oldest areas colonized by the Portuguese) constitutes the foundation of the local population's support towards the anti-Frelimo movements. Conversely Frelimo was convinced that the anti-colonial fight in Zambezia did not achieve the same success as in other regions because of the local leaders’ continued support for Portugal as well as the widespread desertion of thousands of Zambezians who joined the ranks of the colonial army during the liberation struggle. Because Frelimo considered the success of the anti-Frelimo movements as being a direct result of the hostility Zambezians felt towards it, it adopted a very stern stance towards the province.

It should be noted, however, that this study of the civil war in Zambezia is not a pioneering study in the sense that other works have already been written on this province. Yet, departing from the previous studies, this work is based on previously unexploited documents, from various archives, particularly from the archive of the government of the province of Zambezia.