Introduction

In any analysis of contemporary citizenship it is necessary to consider two conflicting ontological views on the character and importance of both the individual and the social worlds (communities) that they inhabit. The liberal position, with its emphasis on individual autonomy guaranteed by individually held rights, a universal conception of justice, and a ‘neutral state’, can be contrasted with that of its communitarian critics who stress the primacy of community and the social embeddedness of human actors. The philosophical debate between these two broad camps provides a backdrop against which it is possible to reconsider the differing notions of both community and state that liberals and communitarians hold, and any practical implications that this may have when developing ideal theories of citizenship. It should be noted that the aim here is not to set up two, over-simplistic, mutually opposed approaches and merely criticise. Indeed, it must be accepted that many conflicting opinions are held on both sides, and that away from the extremes of the debate it is possible to find some concessions across the divide. The primary purpose of the ‘liberal’ and ‘communitarian’ categories is to provide a starting point from which analysis may proceed. The use of such crude categories may also be defended because the taking of an essentially liberal or communitarian approach as an initial point of departure impacts upon the practice and scope of the citizenship later envisaged. Following on from this largely theoretical discussion of the individual subject citizen, the contested concept of community will be examined initially using Tonnies Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (1955) as a starting point. This chapter will also consider the extent to which the modern nation can be viewed as a community and the extent to which the modern state should intervene in the lives of its citizens.

The liberal individual

Liberal political theory covers a broad spectrum of ideas. A linear representation would probably have the libertarian liberalism of Nozick (1995), Hayek (1944) and Friedman (1962) at the opposite end of a line from the egalitarian approaches of Rawls (1995, 1971), Kymlicka (1995) and Dworkin (1995).