Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Notes on Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Welfare to Work, Social Justice and Domination: an introduction to an Interdisciplinary Normative Perspective on Welfare Policies
- PART I Legal Perspectives
- PART II Sociological Perspectives
- PART III Philosophical Perspectives
- Index
13 - Unconditional Basic Income and Duties of Contribution: Exploring the Republican Ethos of Justice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 March 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Notes on Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Welfare to Work, Social Justice and Domination: an introduction to an Interdisciplinary Normative Perspective on Welfare Policies
- PART I Legal Perspectives
- PART II Sociological Perspectives
- PART III Philosophical Perspectives
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Do welfare states violate principles of liberal neutrality when they demand that individuals must work in return for social benefits? Previous discussions on this issue are often structured around a clash between two diametrically opposed views: real freedom and productive reciprocity. According to the philosophy of real freedom for all, primarily associated with Philippe Van Parijs (Van Parijs, 1995; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017), the answer to the question is a clear ‘yes’.
Van Parijs links the justification of basic income to a certain category of assets to which nobody has a justified prior claim – gifts broadly conceived (‘gift equalization’). For example, nobody did anything to deserve their share of nature's wealth, or the assets passed on from previous generations. If justice demands equality of opportunity, regardless of family background, place of birth and other circumstances beyond our control, there is (leaving special needs aside) a presumption for accepting that all are entitled to an equal share of such a collective inheritance. At the same time, the state should not make people's access to inherited resources and similar ‘gifts’ conditional on the behaviour or attitudes of (potential) recipients, or earmark the use of such resources for particular purposes, because this would violate liberal requirements of respect for people's commitment to diverse conceptions of the good life (‘liberal neutrality’). Thus, Van Parijs’ conclusion is that people's fair entitlements should largely take the form of unconditional cash payments, preferably a basic income, ensuring that people enjoy real as distinct from merely formal freedom to do whatever they might want to do.
However, according to many of Van Parijs’ critics, tax-based redistribution in support of unconditional basic income amounts to a systematic, institutionalized violation of productive reciprocity. On this rival view, justice demands that we – as a matter of respect for the cooperative efforts of our fellow citizens – (demonstrate a willingness to) contribute productively in return for social benefits, at least when we are capable of doing so (White, 2003; Van Donselaar, 2009).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Welfare to Work in Contemporary European Welfare StatesLegal, Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives on Justice and Domination, pp. 281 - 306Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2020