IT is possible to regard the fall of James II as a triumph, on the plane of historical thought, for the concept of the ancient constitution. As we have already seen, in the microcosm of the Tower records office the Revolution meant the fall of Brady and the substitution of Petyt, who reigned there as a respected scholar to the end of his days; and he had opportunity to assist the House of Lords in their efforts to define what had happened in 1688 by laying his doctrines of English history before them. There is some record of this occasion, and the circumstances are of interest. The House had reached the point, in debating the resolution sent up to them by the Commons, where they were asked to agree that James had broken the original contract between king and people. They had recourse to the legal counsel appointed to advise them and inquired what this original contract might be, ‘and whether there be any such or not’. The greater part of this body of counsel—the six judges, Atkyns, Montagu, Dolben, Levinz, Nevill, Holt—were all of the opinion that the contract might be a most liberal and rational concept, but they could not find it in the laws of England. Two of the three additional counsel, Bradbury and Whitelocke, spoke in favour of the contract, but in vague and inconclusive language. Then came Petyt's turn. We have some notes of what he said.