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  1. Home
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  3. Beyond Uncertainty
  • Cited by 21
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
August 2021
Print publication year:
2021
Online ISBN:
9781108582230
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108582230
Subjects:
Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
Series:
Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy
Information

Book description

The main aim of this Element is to introduce the topic of limited awareness, and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-making and uncertain reasoning. While it has long been of interest to economists and computer scientists, this topic has only recently been subject to philosophical investigation. Indeed, at first sight limited awareness seems to evade any systematic treatment: it is beyond the uncertainty that can be managed. On the one hand, an agent has no control over what contingencies she is and is not aware of at a given time, and any awareness growth takes her by surprise. On the other hand, agents apparently learn to identify the situations in which they are more and less likely to experience limited awareness and subsequent awareness growth. How can these two sides be reconciled? That is the puzzle we confront in this Element.

References

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