This book offers a comprehensive account of Kant's theory of freedom and his moral anthropology. The point of departure is the apparent conflict between three claims to which Kant is committed: that human beings are transcendentally free, that moral anthropology studies the empirical influences on human beings, and that more anthropology is morally relevant. Frierson shows why this conflict is only apparent. He draws on Kant's transcendental idealism and his theory of the will and describes how empirical influences can affect the empirical expression of one's will in a way that is morally significant but still consistent with Kant's concept of freedom. As a work which integrates Kant's anthropology with his philosophy as a whole, this book will be an unusually important source of study for all Kant scholars and advanced students of Kant.

Review of the hardback:‘Many recent works insist upon the importance of anthropology in Kant's thought: Frierson is the first to grasp fully and address directly the central problem posed by anthropology for Kant's metaphysically and morally robust account of moral freedom...This is a work that students on Kant's ethics will find instructive and stimulating, and that future studies of Kant's anthropology will have to contend with.’

Susan Shell - Boston College

Review of the hardback:‘… this book will be of considerable value to students of Kant's philosophy of religion… Much has been written on these topics in recent years, but Frierson managed to bring a fresh pair of eyes to them and to raise a series of penetrating questions about the interpretation and coherence of Kant's account.’

Source: Journal of Religious Studies