14 - Lies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
Summary
Kant's strict views on lying have been regularly cited as a reason for thinking there is something fundamentally wrong with Kantian ethics. Some of Kant's statements here seem so excessive that most Kantians who have dealt with the topic have tried to distance themselves from them, usually claiming that they do not (or need not) follow from Kant's own principles. In this chapter, I will do a little of that, partly by questioning whether the famous example of the “murderer at the door” really fits the principles Kant applies to it, but mainly by claiming that some of what Kant says about lying as a violation of an ethical duty to oneself should be taken as warranted rhetorical exaggeration rather than as literal doctrine. By and large, however, I will argue that Kant's views about veracity are reasonable or at least defensible, if not self-evident. This is mainly because I also think some of them – especially his position in the brief, late, and famous (or notorious) essay On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy (1797) – have been badly misunderstood. My first task will be to correct that misunderstanding.
Intentionally False Declarations
Let's begin with an elementary point of terminology. ‘Lie’ (Lüge, mendacium) is a technical term for Kant. It means: an intentionally untruthful statement that is contrary to duty, especially contrary to a duty of right.
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- Information
- Kantian Ethics , pp. 240 - 258Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007