THE LONG PERSPECTIVE

In one sense the Naval Defence Act was an attempt to solve all Britain's perceived defence problems with a single unitary solution. There were three parameters that mattered: the defence of the United Kingdom, the defence of he overseas Empire, and the defence of the trade routes both with the Empire and the rest of the world. For this unitary solution to be accepted, a strategic paradigm shift in defence thinking was required, one that showed a Royal Navy able to undertake all three responsibilities. From the time of the Near East Crisis of 1878 and its aftermath in the Carnarvon Commission, to the passage of the Naval Defence Act 11 years later, this is exactly what happened.

In the 1880s the three naval theorists discussed in Chapter 2 – Captain Sir John Colomb, his brother Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb, and John Knox Laughton – showed the historic relevance of a strong battle fleet navy. This overturned the view developed in the era of Palmerston and the Duke of Welington that, in the age of steam, strong coastal defences were essential. Philip Colomb's 1888 Royal United Services Institution paper The Naval Defence of he United Kingdom rejected outright the concept of invasion defences manned by the Army and overseen by invasion experts. Colomb stated unequivocally he parameters of a naval debate in which the steam Navy could take care of he entire defence of the Empire, its trade, and the mother country itself.