In purely naval terms, the period from 1889 to 1906 is often referred to as the pre-dreadnought era. This tells its own story; it was the prelude to the dreadnought era and the lead-up to the First World War. As a prelude, it is often assumed that this period in history is less important than the dreadnought era that followed it, and has received less consideration from historians as a result. Where historians have written about the pre-dreadnought period, they have usually taken the Naval Defence Act of 1889 as their starting point. This book differs in that it examines the ten-year lead-up to the Act, with particular reference to the evolution of strategy and policy on the one hand and technology on the other and shows how this formed the basis for the ‘new navalism’ of the 1890s.

This book starts with an explanation of Britain's position in the world and Victorian perceptions of strategy from the era of Palmerston and Wellington to the Near East crisis of 1878. It is argued that the 1878 crisis and its aftermath in the Carnarvon Commission, initiated a profound strategic rethink in Whitehall. It is shown that those involved with the Commission considered that steam propulsion, particularly the introduction of the iron-hulled 12-knot ocean-going steamship, powered by the high-pressure compound steam engine, had radically altered the nature of naval warfare.