20 results in The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy
3 - Battle of Lake Poyang (1363)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Summary
Small navies can often defeat large ones. Before the Ming dynasty could overthrow Mongol rule in China, it first had to defeat the other Han Chinese states rivaling it for power. The main battlefield was not on a river or at sea but was on one of China's largest fresh water lakes. The battle of Lake Poyang was fought from August 30– October 4, 1363 in Jiangxi province. The Ming fleet separated into squadrons, with the heavier ships at the center, and made a frontal assault on the Han ships. The Ming ships were lighter and smaller compared to the Han ships. By using fireships many Han ships were either damaged or destroyed. The Ming then blockaded the Han fleet for a month. On October 4, the final battle began. The Ming again employed fireships. In the midst of fighting, the Han leader Chen Youliang was killed, and the Han surrendered. The Ming victory unified opposition to the Mongols, which five years later resulted in the collapse of the Yuan dynasty in 1368.
Summary of the Battle of Lake Poyang
The Battle of Lake Poyang illustrates that a navy's size is not the only factor in warfare. Described as one of the largest naval battles in world history up until this time, this conflict pitted Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming dynasty, against the Han state commander Chen Youliang. At this point, the Mongols continued to rule China as the Yuan dynasty. A number of Han Chinese breakaway states, however, sought to consolidate resistance to the Mongols. The crucial battle occurred on Poyang Lake, the largest Chinese freshwater lake at that time, located in Jiangxi province just south of the Yangzi River.
The Han state initiated fighting when it attacked Nanchang, which was under the control of the Ming state. When the city resisted, fighting on Lake Poyang became the main focus of the conflict. The Ming fleet was made up of many small ships divided into 11 squadrons, while the Han fleet was composed of large ships (known as “tower ships” or lou chuan). While normally the larger fleet could easily dominate the smaller one, the water in Lake Poyang was at its normally low seasonal level, which allowed the smaller and more nimble ships to dominate fighting in shallow waters.
10 - Chongqing Mutiny Allowing the PLA to Cross the Yangzi River (1949)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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On February 25, 1949, the Nationalist flagship Chongqing mutinied. Prior to this event, it was widely assumed by many foreign commentators that China would be cut in half at the Yangzi River, just as Germany and Korea had been divided. Joseph Stalin hoped a divided China, with both parts of roughly equal size, would cancel each other out and leave China weak and easily influenced by the USSR. Once the rest of the Nationalist navy guarding the river also mutinied, however, this allowed the Communists to cross the Yangzi River into southern China. When the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, the Communists easily dominated all of Mainland China. After the PRC was created in 1949, within 10 years the larger-than-expected PRC was to turn from a Soviet ally to one of the USSR's greatest enemies.
Summary of the Chongqing Mutiny
The most famous twentieth-century Chinese mutiny was the case of the Nationalist flagship Chongqing, formerly the H.M.S. Aurora. The British government gave the 5,270-ton Aurora to China in May 1948. Far larger and more modern than China's other ships, Aurora was equipped with 6 six-inch guns, 6 twenty-one inch torpedo tubes, and manned by a crew of 450. Upon arrival in China, Aurora was renamed Chongqing in honor of the Nationalist's wartime capital. When Chongqing mutinied on February 25, 1949, it undermined Chiang Kai-shek's Mandate of Heaven. The rest of the Nationalist fleet soon followed. This gave the Chinese Communist forces an unforeseen and largely unhindered opportunity to cross the Yangzi River and consolidate power throughout southern China.
During 1948, Chongqing became the flagship of the Chinese navy and was assigned the task of standing guard against a possible Chinese Communist invasion across the Yangzi River into southern China. Although the Chinese government had spent an estimated ten million pounds to train the crew and deliver Chongqing to China, the poor treatment of the crew and arrears in pay led to numerous desertions. It was also reported that the popular captain of the ship was to be replaced in late February. Morale was low, even before Chongqing was assigned to the dangerous task of guarding the Yangzi River.
1 - Battle of Bạch Đăng River (938)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Chinese views on gaining and losing “face” can play an important role in warfare. In 938, the Vietnamese opposed a fleet sent by the invading southern Han Chinese state called Nan-Han. Ngô Quyên ordered iron-headed poles to be placed under the waters of the Bạch Đăng River, and he then lured the Chinese fleet upriver during high tide. When the tide receded, the enemy's ships were pushed downstream by the strong current and impaled on the poles. Three hundred and fifty years later, in 1288, a Mongol fleet was defeated in exactly the same way in the same place. This suggests that the Han Chinese naval officers did not tell their Mongol commanders about the earlier defeat, either because they did not know about it themselves or, more damning, perhaps considered it a “loss of face” to admit to the Mongols this earlier defeat at the hands of their former tributary, Vietnam.
Summary of the Bạch Đăng River Battle
Sunzi's Art of War does not include a single word about sea battles. What he does mention is the importance of currents and, in particular, river currents. Maritime warfare in ancient China was conducted mainly on canals, rivers, and inland lakes, not on the open ocean. River battles could make or break Chinese dynasties. For example, the 663 victory at the mouth of the Paek River was widely considered to be the height of the Tang dynasty's naval activities. Similarly, the 938 defeat at Bạch Đăng River would be the low point of the successor Nan-Han state.
By the eighth and ninth centuries, there was a gradual slowdown of the Tang expansion and a withdrawal from China's far-flung military outposts. Constant wars against the Turks, the Uighurs, the Tibetans, and Arabs in the West drained China's finances. Rebellions meant that large sections of the Tang empire became semi-independent from the capital's control. Finally, in 906, the Tang dynasty fell. China was subdivided into a number of small states, each seeking to dominate the others. While the northern states relied mainly on their large armies, the southern coastal states were maritime powers. This created a military stalemate that lasted for several decades. Nan-Han was one such maritime state, located in modern-day Guangdong province. It became rich through maritime commerce, which allowed it to support a strong navy.
7 - Sino-French War (1884–85)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Regionalism in China can easily result in military defeat. On August 23, 1884, a French fleet under Admiral Courbet entered Fuzhou Harbor and attacked the Nanyang fleet. In a matter of hours it sank nine of the eleven modern Chinese-built ships while they were still in port. When the south requested assistance from China's northern navy, called the Beiyang fleet, Li Hongzhang, the Viceroy of Zhili province, refused to place his own ships in danger, which guaranteed that France could dominate China's southern coastal waters. In the end, China was forced to sue for peace and accept France's terms, which included granting Vietnam its independence from China. The stripping away of a major tributary state like Vietnam was a crucial step in the incremental dismemberment of the Chinese empire.
Summary of Chinese Tensions with France
The Sino-French war was fought over French control of Annam (Vietnam), an on-again off-again Chinese tributary state from the Han dynasty onward. The French hoped to split Annam away from China and make it a French protectorate. China possessed a modern navy— on paper at least— by the early 1880s, but it was not a united and well-coordinated force. While its four fleets possessed a variety of modern ships, each fleet was designed to defend only its specific region, and so refused to come to another fleet's aid. Although the impact of regionalism may appear slight in peacetime, it can make all of the difference during periods of warfare.
One of the most important Chinese naval bases during the early 1870s was at the Fuzhou shipyards. On August 23, 1884, a French fleet of eight ships under Admiral Courbet conducted a surprise attack against the southern fleet's base at Fuzhou. The French fleet destroyed all but two of the eleven modern Chinese-built ships while they were still anchored at port. Within the space of less than one hour, naval bombardments destroyed not only the cream of China's southern fleet but also the Fuzhou shipyard, which had been built with French aid beginning in 1866. Approximately three thousand Chinese were killed, and damage to ships and docks were estimated at USD 15 million.
Introduction: The Special Characteristics of China's Maritime History
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Like all countries with a long maritime tradition, there are many unique ways each country's navy fight. The US Navy, for example, is known for never giving up. It still honors John Paul Jones's famous saying “I have not yet begun to fight.” In 1905, Jones's body was even exhumed from a Parisian cemetery and reburied in the Annapolis chapel to symbolize the importance of this American characteristic. Other global navies have their own ingrained beliefs, some of which defy reason, including the Royal Navy half-gill ration of grog per day or how Japanese pilots preferred death, many opting not to bring a parachute with them on missions, to the dishonor of military defeat. The focus of this book will be on those special characteristics that distinguish the Chinese navy.
The fourteen historical case studies presented below will help to illustrate a number of special characteristics that modern-day Chinese naval officers perhaps take for granted, including a belief in the Mandate of Heaven, tributary system, and the fear of “losing face,” either in a diplomatic setting, in a military defeat, or by risking valuable equipment in battle. Ethnic and language differences, regional loyalties, and political mistrust potentially exacerbate these problems. Peculiarities include the Mongol dual-officer diarchy that led to political commissar system utilized by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Meanwhile, outside naval influences, such as blockade, sanctions, or embargoes, can exert a profound impact on China, just as foreign intervention or, equally important, a decision not to intervene, can often determine the outcome of major maritime events.
Since 1949, two Han Chinese-dominated governments have opposed each other across the Taiwan Strait. Historically, effective rule in China required a strong Mandate of Heaven. Signs of this included the defeat of the ruler's political rivals, the absence of internal rebellions, strong central control over the provinces, and domestic prosperity. As long as the ruler's Mandate of Heaven appeared to be strong, the vast majority of Chinese accepted their fate and would go along with the status quo. If, however, the ruler's Mandate of Heaven seemed questionable, then a new leader might be tempted to claim the mandate for himself while the military could suddenly switch sides in an internal rebellion to abandon the ruling government in favor of its challenger.
5 - Ming Loyalists Flee to Taiwan (1661–83)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Offshore islands have played an important political and military role throughout Chinese history. During the mid-to-late seventeenth century, Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong opposed the Manchu invasion of China, which resulted in the creation of the Qing dynasty in 1644. Retreating to Taiwan, Zheng defeated the Dutch, who had taken the island in 1624, at Zeelandia in 1661. When Zheng died in 1662, his followers continued their opposition to the Qing from Taiwan. While Zheng is condemned in Qing dynasty sources for opposing the central government of China, in Communist sources he is lauded for expelling the Dutch. This shows how contradictory certain events are viewed in Chinese history.
Summary of the Ming Opposition on Taiwan
Near the end of the Ming dynasty, Taiwan became the venue for naval conflict. During the 1620s, a new trading power, the Dutch, based themselves in Taiwan, which they called Formosa (meaning “Beautiful island” in Portuguese). Following the collapse of the Ming dynasty in 1644, the Manchu Qing dynasty dominated northern China and slowly moved southward. The Manchus were opposed by Zheng Chenggong (1624–62), better known in Western studies as Koxinga, which came from his Ming title “Lord of the Imperial Surname,” which in Chinese transliteration reads as “Guo Xing Ye.”
Zheng Chenggong had a Japanese mother, but a Chinese father, who was one of the leaders of the so-called Japanese pirates, or wokou. Joining the Han Chinese against the invading Manchus, Zheng became a Ming loyalist. In 1659, he became famous for leading a maritime expedition of more than 100,000 troops up the Yangzi River to attack the Qing's southern headquarters at Nanjing. This attack failed. However, Zheng is best known for reestablishing Chinese control over Taiwan: in April 1661, Zheng's 25,000 forces landed near the Dutch stronghold at Anping, the modern-day city of Tainan. After a nine-month siege, the fortress of Zeelandia capitulated. Zheng allowed the Dutch to leave unharmed in return for acquiring their claim over Taiwan.
Zheng Chenggong holds a rather unique place in the history of Chinese coastal defense, since he was simultaneously considered to be a Japanese pirate, an anti-Manchu Ming loyalist, and a Han nationalist credited with ousting the Dutch and reasserting Chinese control over Taiwan.
9 - Chinese Decision to Sink The Nationalist Navy as Blockships (1937)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Destruction of valuable naval equipment appeared during the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). While during its first war with Japan, Chinese naval officers sought to conserve their equipment, in the second war it was perhaps wasted needlessly. Specifically, during the second Sino-Japanese War the bulk of the Nationalist navy was sunk as blockships in what soon became clear was a useless effort to slow the Japanese advance up the Yangzi River. Competing Chinese fleets even matched each other to sink more ships. In the end, scuttling the Nationalist navy did not stop the Japanese. Since many of the sunken ships were in shallow waters, they could be salvaged and used by the Japanese invaders. For example, Ninghai and Pinghai were successfully refloated, adopted into the Japanese Imperial Navy, and renamed Mikura and Mishima.
Summary of the Nationalist Blockship Strategy
A blockship is a vessel deliberately sunk to prevent the use of a river, canal, or harbor. It may either be sunk by a navy defending the waterway to prevent the ingress of attacking enemy forces, or it may be brought by enemy raiders and used to prevent the waterway from being transited by the defending forces. This practice goes back many centuries. In China, it was a long-time tactic of the Chinese navy to block any maritime threat to China's internal rivers and canals by clogging harbors with log booms and chains strung from a row of floating junks. A famous battle scene in the 1966 Hollywood blockbuster Sand Pebbles takes place over destroying just such a river obstacle.
In 1930, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Admiral Ch'en Shao-kuan (1889–1969) the acting Minister of the Navy, and in 1932 he became the full Minister. Ch'en adopted an ambitious naval program, which envisioned 71 first-line ships, including battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and carriers, plus a total of 34 support ships, including submarines, depot ships, mine sweepers, torpedo boats, and hospital ships. The formation of this new force was to be divided into a Central, Northeast, and Guangdong Navy, with the Central navy being the largest and composed of two regular squadrons and a training squadron, the Northeast Navy accounting for the second fleet, and the Guangdong navy accounting for the third.
Index
- Bruce A. Elleman
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2 - Battle of Yaishan (1279)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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The Mandate of Heaven switches from dynasty to dynasty. This transition is often accomplished by civil war. For example, the last remnants of the Song loyalists lost to the Mongols at the Battle of Yaishan on March 19, 1279. Interestingly, both fleets were composed mainly of Han Chinese, and the two Han commanders were born in the same region of North China, shared the same surname, and even belonged to the same clan. The Song supporters hoped to recreate their dynasty while those Han Chinese who fought for the Mongols supported the new Yuan dynasty. After the Yuan victory at Yaishan the Mongols acquired an additional 800 Song ships. As one specialist of the Yuan navy has concluded, it was “essentially the Song navy” fighting itself on both sides of the battle, and that “except for a few thousand Mongols, the Yuan forces that fought at the historic battle of Yaishan were all Han Chinese.”
Summary of the Battle of Yaishan
In the first fifty years of the Mongol continental expansion, their armies raided throughout North China, and invaded Russia, Poland, Silesia, Moravia, Hungary, and eastern Austria, eventually pushing south into Asia Minor. But they made little progress against the maritime states of East Asia. For example, for 30 years they were unable to cross the Imjin River to take the island of Kangwha where the Korean king had fled. For 40 years the Mongols maneuvered their forces around the northern and western borders of the Southern Song empire, but they were unable to break through the Chinese defensive system between the Huai River and the Yangzi River. All of this changed once Han Chinese defectors knowledgeable about maritime warfare joined the Mongols.
Previously, the Mongols had had little use for boats in their land campaigns. But in 1259, Qubilai Khan promoted Zhang Rongshi to be “Commander of Ten Thousand of the Navy” with the specific goal of training naval officers. In 1265, Qubilai moved his capital to Yanjing, in northern China, and began creating his great capital, Daidu, on the site of modern-day Beijing. Mongol military preparations against the Song included building a navy to penetrate into the waterways of the Chinese defensive system. But despite years of effort, the newly created Yuan navy failed to break through the Song defenses.
13 - Missile Blockade: The Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–96)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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A naval show of force can have a dramatic impact. Almost 50 years to the day after the Potsdam Conference of July 16–August 2, 1945, resulting in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which reconfirmed the Cairo Declaration signed two years before stating that Taiwan should be returned to China, the PRC conducted six missile tests during July 21–26, 1995, in an area only 40 nautical miles north of Taiwan's Pengchiayu Island. These tests interfered with both sea and air traffic to-and-from Taiwan, and ignited international outrage. In March 1996, a second series of missile tests sought to influence Taiwan's presidential election. The second attempt also failed, however, and Lee Teng-hui became the first democratically elected president in all of Chinese history. China's actions have since been described as a “missile blockade.” They led to the intervention of two US Navy carrier battle groups in support of Taiwan.
Summary of the Taiwan “Missile Blockade” Crisis
The July 1995 missile tests by the PRC are often portrayed as a response to the granting of an American visa to Taiwan's president Lee Teng-hui for an unofficial visit to Cornell University in early June 1995. However, the real underlying concern for the PRC was over Taiwan's rapid democratization and the growing separatist claims by large numbers of Taiwanese. On July 18, 1995, China announced that ballistic missile tests would take place between 21 and 28 of July. These dates exactly corresponded with the fiftieth anniversary of the 1945 Potsdam treaty stating that China would regain all territories lost to Japan, including Taiwan, after World War II ended.
The PRC missile tests were intended to create an exclusion zone, in this case a ten-nautical-mile circle, in which ships and planes could not enter safely. This zone was located about 85 miles north of Taiwan, which was just outside Taiwan's sovereign waters but actively interfered with flight paths and shipping lanes. Six DF-15 (CSS-6/ M-9) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) were fired, two each on July 21, 22, and 23, 1995. Beijing's announcement warned other states “against entering the said sea area and air space” during the firing period. These PRC missile tests diverted hundreds of commercial flights heading for Taipei.
14 - The EP-3 Standoff and Diplomatic Resolution (2001)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Diplomacy with China can avoid war. When a US EP-3 surveillance plane was forced to land on Hainan Island after a collision with a Chinese fighter plane, US Ambassador Joseph W. Prueher conducted ten days of intensive negotiations with Beijing to bring about the release of the plane's crewmembers. To end the crisis, Prueher submitted a letter to Beijing, stating, “Please convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei that we are very sorry for their loss. […] We are very sorry the entering of China's airspace.” In English, the word sorry does not necessarily imply responsibility. In the Chinese translation of Prueher's letter, however, it did: “The Prueher letter is translated by Chinese officials as both feichang bao qian, or ‘very sorry,’ and wan xi.” Meanwhile, “a copy of the US Embassy Chinese translation of the same letter only uses wan xi.” This letter placated China, which led to the release of the American crew. Prueher later explained that much of negotiating with China is building ladders to let them climb down from untenable positions.
Summary of the April 1, 2001 EP-3 Incident
On April 1, 2001, following a collision between a Chinese and American plane, the damaged US EP-3 surveillance plane landed on Hainan Island without permission from the Chinese authorities. The plane and its crew were immediately detained. To resolve the EP-3 standoff, former US admiral and at that point the US ambassador to China, Joseph Prueher, worked closely with Annapolis classmates, including Richard Armitage, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's deputy at the State Department, and Admiral Denny Blair, who was CinCPac. At one crucial stage of the negotiations, Admiral Blair offered to send an aircraft carrier to China. This would normally have been Prueher's favored solution, as shown by his actions in 1995–96. But the ambassador declined this suggestion, fearing that too strong a signal might backfire and lead to the prolongation of the incident.
Almost exactly ten days after the April 1, 2001, collision between a US EP-3 surveillance plane and the Chinese jet fighter, Ambassador Prueher delivered the final draft of what became known in Washington as the “Two Very Sorries Letter” to Beijing officials with the message that it would be the Bush administration's best and final offer.
6 - Battle of Chuanbi (1839)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Manchu versus Han tensions often resulted in military defeat at foreign hands. One of the strangest encounters between the British and Chinese during the first Opium War was the Battle of Chuanbi. On November 3, 1839, Volage and Hyacinth faced off and defeated 16 Han Chinese–manned war junks attempting to defend a foreign merchant ship that had signed the Manchu anti-opium pledge. Unlike the rather ambiguous results of an earlier encounter, in this naval battle the two British sailing ships used their maneuverability before the wind to “slip and cut” among the slower Chinese junks, all the while “delivering broadsides as they ran.” In the end the Royal Navy defeated the Qing by blockading the Yangzi River, thus threatening to starve out the Manchu court in Beijing. Han Chinese merchants in the South mainly profited from this victory. PRC historians agree that the Manchus were bad rulers, but still condemn the British for winning the Opium Wars rather than portraying the conflicts as a joint Han–British victory over the Manchus.
Summary of the Battle of Chuanbi
In September 1836, the Qing Emperor, Daoguang, ordered the governor-general in Guangzhou to eliminate all opium imports. China had initially prohibited the smoking of opium in 1729, and had then outlawed its growth and importation in 1796, but these laws were never enforced. As a result, there was a large domestic opium trade in China. By the 1830s, millions of dollars in silver were also being shipped out of China every year, primarily by British traders in return for the importation of high-quality Indian opium. So long as China retained a foreign trade surplus, the Qing emperors had ignored opium imports. But once the silver drain became too severe, their decision to ban foreign opium suddenly became a top priority.
For a time, the Qing government toyed with legalizing opium imports and imposing a tariff similar to other foreign medicines. But, this solution would strengthen not weaken the already wealthy Han Chinese merchant class in South China, who sought greater autonomy from Beijing. Domestic Han–Manchu tensions perhaps convinced the Daoguang Emperor to “kill two birds with one stone,” by trying to eliminate at one stroke both the foreign threat— the opium traders— and the domestic threat— Han Chinese merchants.
11 - The Taiwan Strait Crises (1954–55 and 1958)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Mao Zedong responded to a 1952–53 increase in Nationalist forces along the Taiwan Strait by signing an armistice in Korea, and then moving additional troops south. The first crisis in 1954–55 led to the evacuation of the Dachen Islands, off Zhejiang province, which was Chiang Kai-shek's home province, so this was considered a personal “loss of face” for him. In 1958, the Nationalists— with help from the US Navy— resisted PLA attempts to retake Jinmen Island, blocking Xiamen harbor. In both crises, politics trumped military strategy. Mao hoped to halt the Nationalist blockade, backed up by a US strategic embargo, which was undermining China's economy. Desperate to catch up, Mao's Great Leap Forward, 1958–1961, led to one of the worst famines in history, with an estimated 45 million Chinese perishing. Meanwhile, increasing tensions with the USSR eventually resulted in a split.
Summary of the Taiwan Strait Crises
During the Nationalist retreat from the mainland in 1949, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan instituted a naval blockade of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although the Nationalist navy was comparatively large, its forces were retained mainly for defense of Taiwan's coastal perimeter. To conduct the blockade, the Nationalists worked with a number of guerrilla movements located on offshore islands not far from China's coast. Later, the US Navy helped defend Taiwan even while providing military assistance— especially aircraft— that made air patrols of the blockade possible. The Nationalist blockade of the PRC lasted from 1949 through 1958.
A Communist attack on the Nationalist-held base on Jinmen Island (Quemoy) failed during October 1949. But Communist forces, in spite of naval and air inferiority, succeeded in overwhelming the Nationalist base on Hainan Island during February–April in 1950, the Zhoushan Archipelago during May 1950, and Tatan Island as late as July 1950. By the summer of 1950, therefore, the Nationalists had lost their crucial island bases in the Bo Hai, off the mouth of the Yangzi River, and on Hainan Island. Although the Communist victories diminished the blockade area by half, the Nationalists used their remaining offshore bases to continue their blockade of the ports of Shantou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Wenzhou, which were critical to deter the Communists from launching an invasion of Taiwan.
Frontmatter
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Selected Bibliography
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8 - Qing Beiyang Fleet's Defeat in the Battle of the Yellow Sea (1894)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Summary
The proper adaption and efficient use of Western naval equipment has been a constant challenge to China. In the opening days of the first Sino-Japanese War, foreigners were convinced that China would win. Two of its German-made ships had such thick armor that the Japanese guns could not pierce them. During September 1894, however, the Japanese defeated China in the Battle of the Yellow Sea (also called the Battle of the Yalu). Not only did the Chinese ships have inadequate ammunition, and so quickly ran out, but putting the heavier ships in the center to protect them allowed the Japanese to pick off the older and weaker ships on the wings, thus easily winning the battle.
Summary of the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War
The Chinese navy has arguably only engaged in one full-scale “modern” naval battle against a foreign opponent. By the early 1890s, China's navy was ranked eighth in the world, with a total of 65 ships, compared to Japan's eleventh ranking with only 32 ships. Immediately prior to the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, one British admiral even claimed that China's Navy “would prove more than a match for the Japanese at sea; in fact, the Japanese would not be in it.” Within each separate fleet, however, there was a notable lack of central authority. As described by William Tyler, the Beiyang fleet was like a “machine” whose “complexity lay in a vast muddle of diverse motives and ideals.” Instead of order, from the Viceroy down to the director of the arsenal, the interlocking “wheels revolved to no general purpose but only to their own.” In the midst of this confusion, there could be no “homogeneity of purpose,” but only a “monstrously disordered epicyclic heterogeneity.” The lack of a unified naval structure, both to connect the various fleets and to direct them efficiently as individual units, proved to be an enormous disadvantage for the Chinese navy.
The September 17, 1894 Battle of the Yellow Sea set the course of the Sino-Japanese War. Admiral Ding Ruchang and the other high-ranking Chinese officers came from the Army and so were woefully untrained in modern naval strategy and tactics. On the day of the battle, Admiral Ding's ten ships were sailing in what has widely been described as a wedge-shaped formation.
4 - Ming–Kotte War in Southeast Asia (1410–11)
- Bruce A. Elleman
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Summary
The Chinese navy has often been tasked to carry out expansionist policies. Admiral Zheng He is usually credited for commanding seven peaceful naval missions during the Ming dynasty to explore and set up trade with China's southern neighbors. However, in 1410, a Chinese fleet arrived in local waters near Sri Lanka seeking to establish Chinese power along the local maritime routes. When pirates, supported by the Kotte King Alakeshvara, attacked the Chinese ships a conflict broke out in southern Sri Lanka. During the Ming–Kotte war (1410–11), Admiral Zheng He and his troops invaded Kotte, conquered its capital, took its king and his family hostage, and brought them back to China. Eventually, the Yongle Emperor freed Alakeshvara, but when he got home a new pro-Chinese king had already taken the throne. Future Sri Lankan tribute missions to Beijing pledged their loyalty as part of China's extended tributary system. With Chinese power secured, Kotte pirates never again bothered a Ming treasure fleet.
Summary of the Ming–Kotte War
During the early years of the Ming dynasty, a deep-sea armada under Admiral Zheng He set sail in 1405 for a two-year voyage to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. In a total of seven expeditions that continued through 1433, these Chinese fleets visited Cochin, Siam, Java, Malacca, Sri Lanka, India, the Persian Gulf, and perhaps traveled as far south and west as southern Africa. Zheng He set up several strategic bases and trading centers during these voyages, most notably at Malacca, just up the Malaysian coastline from modern-day Singapore. As a result of his travels, many rare delicacies and strange animals were brought back to China.
These voyages are generally portrayed by the Chinese as peaceful. However, the Ming also used these voyages to claim land for China and to dominate local governments, which undermines descriptions of the voyages as nonmilitary expeditions. These early visits during the Ming, and claims that Chinese fishermen and fishing vessels were present in South China Sea waters for hundreds of years, have been used to date Chinese sovereignty over these disputed islands all the way back to the fifteenth century. Later, Communist historians argued that Zheng He stopped at the Paracel and Spratly Islands on his voyages, thus proving Chinese sovereignty there.
Contents
- Bruce A. Elleman
-
- Book:
- The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy
- Published by:
- Anthem Press
- Published online:
- 04 October 2019
- Print publication:
- 31 August 2019, pp v-vi
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Conclusions: The Influence of History on the Formation of a Modern Chinese Navy
- Bruce A. Elleman
-
- Book:
- The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy
- Published by:
- Anthem Press
- Published online:
- 04 October 2019
- Print publication:
- 31 August 2019, pp 73-82
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- Chapter
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Summary
Based on the 14 historical case studies discussed earlier, this study has sought to show some of the special characteristics that might impact the behavior of the contemporary Chinese navy. History influences all nations, but some more so than others. Arguably, China is one of the most retrospective nations on the planet, which means Chinese often utilize examples from their past to form contemporary strategies. These historical cases may be applied to new circumstances. A number of the most important historical characteristics will be highlighted in the following sections.
One of the most obvious Chinese characteristics is “face” as in “losing face” and “gaining face.” Because of the extreme “loss of face” involved with military defeat, later generations might chose not to dwell on valuable military lessons that might have otherwise been learned. For example, in 938 the Vietnamese used a clever ambush on the Bạch Đăng River to destroy an invading Chinese fleet. Three hundred and fifty years later, in 1288, the Vietnamese used the same ruse a second time with equal success, this time against a Mongol-led Chinese fleet. This second victory was only possible because the Han Chinese admiral never told his Mongol co-commander the history of the 938 defeat, so the Mongol admiral fell into the exact same trap. The highly selective use of historical lessons to favor one's successes over one's defeats occurs in other countries, of course, but seems to be more prevalent in “face” cultures like China.
Another critical Chinese characteristic is the belief in Mandate of Heaven, or the widespread perception that political legitimacy can switch from one dynasty to another succeeding dynasty. Most, but not all, Han Chinese accept the new dynasty without question and will fight for it, regardless of whether the new dynasty is Han or foreign. During the early Yuan dynasty, for example, it was not Mongols fighting in the massive sea battles to dominate China but primarily Han fighting Han. This occurred because of the widespread perception that the Mandate of Heaven had shifted from the Song to the Yuan dynasty. Thus, in one of China's largest sea battles at Yaishan in 1279, it was Han Chinese who carried out most of the fighting on both sides, with the Mongols the ultimate victors.
12 - China's Decision to Take the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam (1974)
- Bruce A. Elleman
-
- Book:
- The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy
- Published by:
- Anthem Press
- Published online:
- 04 October 2019
- Print publication:
- 31 August 2019, pp 57-62
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