THE GRAMMAR OF FAITH

Ludwig Wittgenstein's place in the philosophical canon is rather less certain at the beginning of the present century than it was in the middle quarters of the last. Though Wittgenstein is a very strong background influence on some major figures in contemporary philosophy, his stock has generally fallen. However, it has risen, albeit modestly, in the philosophy of religion, and arguably these shifts are related. Wittgenstein's work contains many references to theological matters, but his interest in and sympathetic stance towards Christian faith has always been something of an embarrassment to many of the philosophical establishment. Nor did his attitude to philosophical problems flatter them: recall his dictum that ‘The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness’ (19783: §255). He thought that the clarity for which philosophers should strive ‘means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear’ (§133). The proper concern of philosophy is the destruction of idols and its aim is, one could almost say, salvific: ‘To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’ (§309). Though Wittgenstein was not thinking of idols as a theologian would, his approach, especially when cast in language strongly redolent of religion, has understandably alienated some philosophers. Conversely, but for the same reason, theologians seeking conceptual clarity without investing in particular metaphysical theories have often welcomed his work: for him, as for theologians, philosophy is best regarded as an in principle dispensable tool of description and conceptual clarification.