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5 - REVENUE TRAPS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 August 2009

Scott Gehlbach
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Summary

The previous chapters present a story about the importance of initial conditions in determining political-economic outcomes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Facing diverse constraints in the early 1990s, postcommunist governments went about the task of creating tax systems in different ways. In the eastern half of the postcommunist world, a decision to focus on corporate taxation meant not only that tax revenue from enterprises would be politically important in general, but also that collections from firms that were familiar revenue sources — large enterprises, monopolies, and so on — would be especially critical to cash-starved governments. As I have shown, one apparent consequence of this decision is that post-Soviet governments disproportionately provided collective goods to sectors that were relatively easy to tax; in practice this amounted to a particular bias against new private enterprise. In contrast, the focus in Eastern Europe and the Baltics on new revenue sources created fewer incentives to discriminate in the provision of sector-specific collective goods based on the taxability of economic activity.

This is, so far, a story about the sensitivity of outcomes to initial conditions and the decisions made in the early years following the collapse of communism.

Type
Chapter
Information
Representation through Taxation
Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States
, pp. 127 - 154
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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  • REVENUE TRAPS
  • Scott Gehlbach, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Book: Representation through Taxation
  • Online publication: 31 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510106.006
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  • REVENUE TRAPS
  • Scott Gehlbach, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Book: Representation through Taxation
  • Online publication: 31 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510106.006
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • REVENUE TRAPS
  • Scott Gehlbach, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Book: Representation through Taxation
  • Online publication: 31 August 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510106.006
Available formats
×