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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Robert J. Spitzer
Affiliation:
State University of New York Cortland
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Summary

A few years ago, I read a lengthy article in a prominent law journal about the constitutional power to declare war. The article ably presented opposing views regarding the enduring debate between those who argue for congressional pre-eminence over war-related decisions and those who believe that the president possesses great war-making discretion. But, the author offered a startling categorical finding that he said “all scholars have missed”: namely, that “the Founders denied the President a veto over congressional decisions to wage war….” This finding was, in turn, offered by the author as decisive support for greater congressional power over war-related decisions. “Wow,” I thought. Had the author uncovered a previously unknown letter by the likes of James Madison, for example, stating in unambiguous terms that declarations of war could not be vetoed by the president? Such a finding would be of major historical and constitutional significance. And, was it true that all scholars had missed this finding?

On its face, such a claim would seem to contradict a straight reading of the Constitution. According to Article I, sec. 7, “Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States” for signature or veto.

Type
Chapter
Information
Saving the Constitution from Lawyers
How Legal Training and Law Reviews Distort Constitutional Meaning
, pp. 1 - 8
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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  • Introduction
  • Robert J. Spitzer
  • Book: Saving the Constitution from Lawyers
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167512.001
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  • Introduction
  • Robert J. Spitzer
  • Book: Saving the Constitution from Lawyers
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167512.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Robert J. Spitzer
  • Book: Saving the Constitution from Lawyers
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167512.001
Available formats
×