Nobody doubts the significance of science in modern society. Science is often held responsible for spurring the technological transformations, the rises in population, and the shifts in economic production and sources of inequality that characterize the modern landscape. At the same time, nobody seems to have figured out just what science is, and how it is distinguished from other modes of knowledge. Debates persist in the philosophy, history, and sociology of science about how science differs from more commonplace modes of reasoning and practical action. Many participants in these debates have grown doubtful about whether it even makes sense to speak of science as a coherent method, separate from the economic interests, material culture, and specialized skills that distinguish the different subfields of biology, chemistry, astronomy, physics, and the like. The once unquestionable conviction that science must be different from “mere” political opinion, untested speculation, and commonsense belief has recently taken a beating, and the defenders of science are nowadays asked to account for how science is not patriarchal or to explain how it is not an extension of Western colonialism.

In this volume I do not intend to add fuel to such debates so much as to suggest how we might develop more differentiated conceptions of the sciences, scientific methods, and the relationship between scientific and commonsense knowledge. I do not try to solve the problem of defining “science” or the problem of demarcating science from other modes of reasoning and practical action.