Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Other-deception
- 2 Two models of self-deception
- 3 The need for an alternative model of self-deception
- 4 Functioning to reduce an anxiety; satisfying a desire
- 5 Self-deceptive belief formation: non-intentional biasing
- 6 False consciousness
- 7 Intentional and non-intentional deception of oneself
- 8 Irrationality
- 9 What, if anything, is objectionable about self- and other-deception?
- References
- Index
7 - Intentional and non-intentional deception of oneself
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 November 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Other-deception
- 2 Two models of self-deception
- 3 The need for an alternative model of self-deception
- 4 Functioning to reduce an anxiety; satisfying a desire
- 5 Self-deceptive belief formation: non-intentional biasing
- 6 False consciousness
- 7 Intentional and non-intentional deception of oneself
- 8 Irrationality
- 9 What, if anything, is objectionable about self- and other-deception?
- References
- Index
Summary
People can be deceived by appearances, by others, by themselves. If people are deceived in any of these ways, they are deceived in believing something, and consequently they believe something false.
One can be deceived in believing something without there having been any process whose intended outcome was one's state of being deceived. One could, for example, have been deceived by appearances without the appearances having been intentionally used for this effect. Recall the pediatrician who believed that the homeless man was not an affectionate father.
However, when one is deceived in believing something because one was deceived by another person, then, I argued, the deceiver engaged in a deliberate process whose intended outcome was one's state of being deceived. Deceiving another involves an intentional act of deception.
In this chapter I explore the relationship between the process of deceiving oneself into believing something and the state of being self-deceived in believing that something. Several issues will be discussed. One concerns the possibility of intentionally deceiving oneself; of engaging in a deliberate process whose intended outcome is one's own state of being deceived. A second concerns the sufficiency of such a process for the state of being self-deceived. In Chapter 2 we saw that while it is possible to intentionally deceive oneself into believing something, doing so is not sufficient for being self-deceived in believing that something. I discuss Davidson's explanation for this, and offer an alternative.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Seeing through Self-Deception , pp. 110 - 134Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998