Britain's declaration of war against Germany on 4 August 1914 did not appreciably alter the Royal Navy's strategic policy as it had evolved after 1911. Since there was no clear delineation between the distant blockade, as instituted in 1912, and offensive pre-war plans, the Admiralty's unfolding wartime strategy appeared erratic and unco-ordinated. Some have suggested that the Navy had no definitive plan at the war's outset and suffered a ‘continuing failure’ to produce co-ordinated operational schemes afterwards. This was attributable to the lack of a proper staff system prior to the war, the half measures implicit in the War Staff 's creation in 1911, and the espousal of individual causes by senior officers who comprised Churchill's War Staff Group. The immediate pre-war period established the Admiralty's wartime failings since there was ‘misplaced emphasis’ on the distant blockade to defeat the High Seas Fleet rather than a concerted effort to disrupt Germany's economy. This view is contentious given the evidence presented in previous chapters and other sources which confirm that an economic strategy underpinned all pre-war naval planning against Germany. The widely accepted view is that, despite operational failings and the ensuing North Sea stalemate, the Navy's strategic policy was consistent and logical.