This book is a study of Aristotle's metaphysics in which the central argument is that Aristotle's views on substance are a direct response to Plato's Theory of Forms. The claim is that Aristotle believes that many of Plato's views are tenable once one has rejected Plato's notion of separation. There have been many recent books on Aristotle's theory of substance. This one is distinct from previous books in several ways: firstly, it offers a completely new, coherent interpretation of Aristotle's claim that substances are separate in which substances turn out to be specimens of natural kinds. Secondly, it covers a broad range of issues, including Aristotle's criticism of Plato, his views on numerical sameness and identity, his epistemology and his account of teleology. There is also a discussion of much of the recent literature on Aristotle.

"Spellman offers a highly readable discussion of an extremely rarified, but absolutely crucial, area of Aristotle's philosophy. She excels in her coverage of the current scholarship and advances several original interpretations of her own, the most significant of which is her proposal that the substances are 'specimens of natural kinds,' making them particulars which 'mimic the universal.' Spellman's book is both a solid contribution to the field and a superb introduction to Aristotelian metaphysics." John F. Heil, Jr., Canadian Philosophical Review

"Spellman joins the match with a well researched, carefully argued, complex and subtle analysis of key Aristotelian ideas....Specialists in the field and graduate students will benefit from Spellman's analysis." Religious Studies Review

"...Spellman's book can be read with much profit." Richard Bemelmans, Mnemosyne