Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cc8bf7c57-pd9xq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-12T01:28:00.154Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
Series:   Elements in Metaphysics

Abstract Objects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2024

David Liggins
David Liggins
Affiliation:
University of Manchester

Summary

Philosophers often debate the existence of such things as numbers and propositions, and say that if these objects exist, they are abstract. But what does it mean to call something 'abstract'? And do we have good reason to believe in the existence of abstract objects? This Element addresses those questions, putting newcomers to these debates in a position to understand what they concern and what are the most influential considerations at work in this area of metaphysics. It also provides advice on which lines of discussion promise to be the most fruitful.
Get access

Keywords

abstractconcretemetaphysicsnominalismPlatonism
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Online ISBN: 9781009241373
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 29 February 2024

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alston, W. (1958). Ontological commitments. Philosophical Studies, 9 (1/2), 8–17. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00797866.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, A. (2003). Does the existence of mathematical objects make a difference? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81 (2), 246–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/713659635.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, A. (2005). Are there genuine mathematical explanations of physical phenomena? Mind, 114 (454), 223–38. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzi223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, L. R. (1987). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Balaguer, M. (1998a). Attitudes without propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (4), 805–26. https://doi.org/10.2307/2653723.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Balaguer, M. (1998b). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Balaguer, M. (2009). Fictionalism, theft, and the story of mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica, 17 (2), 131–62. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkn019.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baras, D. (2022). Calling for Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197633649.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Båve, A. (2015). A deflationist error theory of properties. Dialectica, 69 (1), 23–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12086.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benacerraf, P. (1965). What numbers could not be. Philosophical Review, 74 (1), 47–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benacerraf, P. (1973). Mathematical truth. Journal of Philosophy, 70 (19), 661–79. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025075.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boyce, K. (2020). Mathematical surrealism as an alternative to easy-road fictionalism. Philosophical Studies, 177 (10), 2815–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01340-x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burgess, J. (1982). Epistemology and nominalism. In Irvine, A. D., ed., Physicalism in Mathematics. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1902-0_1.Google Scholar
Burgess, J. and Rosen, G. (1997). A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198250126.001.0001.Google Scholar
Chalmers, D. J. (2009). Ontological anti-realism. In Chalmers, D. J., Manley, D. and Wasserman, R., eds., Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chudnoff, E. (2013). Intuition. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683000.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clarke-Doane, J. (2017). What is the Benacerraf problem? In Pataut, F., ed., New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 17–43. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45980-6_2.Google Scholar
Cling, A. (1989). Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency. Philosophical Studies, 56 (1), 53–75. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00646209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Colyvan, M. (2001). The Indispensability of Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/019513754X.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Colyvan, M. (2010). There is no easy road to nominalism. Mind, 119 (474), 285–306. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzq014.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cowling, S. (2017). Abstract Entities. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Daly, C. (2013). Psychology and indispensability. Monist, 96 (4), 561–81. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist201396426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Daly, C. and Liggins, D. (2010). In defence of error theory. Philosophical Studies, 149 (2), 209–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9346-1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Daly, C. and Liggins, D. (2011). Deferentialism. Philosophical Studies, 156, 321–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9596-y.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dever, J. (2008). Compositionality. In Lepore, E. and Smith, B., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 633–66. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0026.Google Scholar
Dorr, C. (2010). Of numbers and electrons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 110, 133–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00282.x.Google Scholar
Edwards, D. (2014). Properties. Cambridge: Polity.Google ScholarPubMed
Enoch, D. (2010). The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: How best to understand it, and how to cope with it. Philosophical Studies, 148 (3), 413–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Felappi, G. (2014). ‘In defence of sententialism’. Dialectica, 68 (4), 581–603. https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12085.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Field, H. (1984). Review of Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects by Crispin Wright. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 14 (4), 637–62. https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/00455091.1984.10716402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Field, H. (1989). Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Field, H. (1998). Mathematical objectivity and mathematical objects. In Laurence, S. and MacDonald, C., eds., Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 387–403.Google Scholar
Field, H. (2016). Science without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777915.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5684.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. (1967). A causal theory of knowing. Journal of Philosophy, 64 (12), 357–72. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodman, N. and Quine, W. V. (1947). Steps toward a constructive nominalism. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12 (4), 105–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/2266485.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hale, B. (1987). Abstract Objects. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Hale, B. (2001a). Singular terms (1). In Hale, B. and Wright, C., eds., The Reason’s Proper Study: Essays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 31–47. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198236395.003.0002.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hale, B. (2001b). Singular terms (2). In Hale, B. and Wright, C., eds., The Reason’s Proper Study: Essays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 48–71. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198236395.003.0003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hart, W. D. (1991). Benacerraf’s dilemma. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 28 (68), 87–103.Google Scholar
Hellman, G. (1989). Mathematics without Numbers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198240341.001.0001.Google Scholar
Hellman, G. (1998). Maoist Mathematics? Philosophia Mathematica, 6 (3), 334–45. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/6.3.334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hellman, G. and Shapiro, S. (2019). Mathematical Structuralism (Cambridge Elements: Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Huber, F. (2008). Assessing theories, Bayes style. Synthese, 161, 89–118. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9141-x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huemer, M. (2009). When is parsimony a virtue? Philosophical Quarterly, 59 (235), 216–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.569.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. (1977). Statements about universals. Mind, 86 (343), 427–9.Google Scholar
Keller, J. A. (2017). Paraphrase and the symmetry objection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95 (2), 365–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1168457.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, J. (2001). Lonely souls: Causality and substance dualism. In Corcoran, K. J., ed., Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 30–43. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501723520-004.Google Scholar
Knowles, R. and Liggins, D. (2015). Good weasel hunting. Synthese, 192 (10), 3397–412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0711-7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kovacs, D. (2021). How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist. Synthese, 198, 2129–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02196-8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lange, M. (2017). Because without Cause: Non-Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Leng, M. (2010). Mathematics and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280797.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1991). Parts of Classes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Liggins, D. (2008). Quine, Putnam, and the ‘Quine–Putnam’ indispensability argument. Erkenntnis, 68 (1), 113–27. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9081-y.Google Scholar
Liggins, D. (2010a). Epistemological objections to platonism. Philosophy Compass, 5 (1), 67–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00259.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liggins, D. (2010b). The autism objection to pretence theories. Philosophical Quarterly, 60 (241), 764–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.656.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liggins, D. (2014). Abstract expressionism and the communication problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 65 (3), 599–620. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axt012.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liggins, D. (2020). Against hermeneutic fictionalism. In Armour-Garb, B. and Kroon, F., eds., Fictionalism in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 81–102. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190689605.003.0005.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liggins, D. (2021). Should a higher-order metaphysician believe in properties? Synthese, 199, 10017–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03234-0.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyon, A. (2012). Mathematical explanations of empirical facts, and mathematical realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90 (3), 559–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.596216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyon, A. and Colyvan, M. (2008). The explanatory power of phase spaces. Philosophia Mathematica, 16 (2), 227–43. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkm025.Google Scholar
MacBride, F. (1999). Listening to fictions: A study of Fieldian nominalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50 (3), 431–55. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.3.431.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maddy, P. (1997). Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198250754.001.0001.Google Scholar
Maddy, P. (2005). Three forms of naturalism. In Shapiro, S., ed., Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 437–59. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325928.003.0013.Google Scholar
Magidor, O. (2013). Category Mistakes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572977.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Malament, D. (1982). Review of Science without Numbers by Field, Hartry H.. Journal of Philosophy, 79 (9), 523–34. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil198279913.Google Scholar
Markosian, N. (2004). A defence of presentism. In Zimmerman, D., ed., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 47–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCain, K. and Poston, T. (eds.) (2017). Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Melia, J. (1995). On what there’s not. Analysis, 55 (4), 223–9. https://doi.org/10.2307/3328390.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melia, J. (1998). Field’s programme: Some interference. Analysis, 58 (2), 63–71. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/58.2.63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melia, J. (2000). Weaseling away the indispensability argument. Mind, 109 (435), 455–79. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/109.435.455.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, K. (2012). Mathematical contingentism. Erkenntnis, 77 (3), 335–59. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9404-5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrison, J. (2010). Just how controversial is evidential holism? Synthese, 173 (3), 335–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9440-5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrison, J. (2012). Evidential holism and indispensability arguments. Erkenntnis, 76 (2), 263–278. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9300-4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nolan, D. (1997). Quantitative parsimony. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48 (3), 329–43. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/48.3.329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nolan, D. (2016). Method in analytic metaphysics. In Cappelen, H., Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 159–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.16.Google Scholar
Oliver, A. (1996). The metaphysics of properties. Mind, 105 (417), 1–80. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/105.417.1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parsons, T. (1980). Nonexistent Objects. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Paseau, A. (2005). Naturalism in mathematics and the authority of philosophy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56 (2), 377–96. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pettigrew, R. (2008). Platonism and aristotelianism in mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica, 16 (3), 310–32. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkm035.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1969). Existence and quantification. In Quine, W. V., ed., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 91–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1970). Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1980). Logic and the reification of universals, In Quine, W. V., ed., From a Logical Point of View. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 102–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raven, M. J. (2022). Metaphysical grounding. Oxford Bibliographies Online. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, G. (1993). The refutation of nominalism (?). Philosophical Topics, 21 (2), 149–86. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199321221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, G. (1999). Review of Naturalism in Mathematics by Penelope Maddy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50 (3), 467–74. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/50.3.467.Google Scholar
Rosen, G. (2002). A study in modal deviance. In Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J., eds., Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 283–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, G. (2009). Abstract objects. In E. N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Fall 2009 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/abstract-objects/.Google Scholar
Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. In Hale, B. and Hoffman, A., eds., Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–36. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007.Google Scholar
Rosen, G. and Burgess, J. (2005). Nominalism reconsidered. In Shapiro, S., ed., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 515–35. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325928.003.0016.Google Scholar
Saatsi, J. (2016). On the ‘indispensable explanatory role’ of mathematics. Mind, 125 (500), 1045–70. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schiffer, S. (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199257760.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sennet, A. and Fisher, T. (2014). Quine on paraphrase and regimentation. In Harman, G. and Lepore, E., eds., A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 89–113. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118607992.ch5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapiro, L. (ed. and trans.) (2007) The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Sider, T. (1999). Presentism and ontological commitment. Journal of Philosophy, 96 (7), 325–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, T. (2013). Against parthood. In Bennett, K. and Zimmerman, D. W., eds., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Vol. 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 236–93. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682904.003.0006.Google Scholar
Sjölin Wirling, Y. (forthcoming). Neutrality and force in Field’s epistemological objection to platonism. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2048689.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skiba, L. (2021). Higher-order metaphysics. Philosophy Compass, 16, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12756.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sober, E. (1981). Evolutionary theory and the ontological status of properties. Philosophical Studies, 40 (2), 147–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353787.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sober, E. (2000). Quine’s two dogmas. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 74 (1), 237–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00071.Google Scholar
Stanley, J. (2001). Hermeneutic fictionalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 25 (1), 36–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4975.00039.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stoljar, D. (2017). Philosophical Progress: In Defence of a Reasonable Optimism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802099.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stump, E. and Kretzmann, N. (1981). Eternity. Journal of Philosophy, 78 (8), 429–58. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026047.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swain, M. (1998). Causal theory of knowledge. In Craig, E., ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 5. London: Routledge, pp. 263–6. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-P004-1.Google Scholar
Swoyer, C. (1996). Theories of properties: From plenitude to paucity. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 243–64. https://doi.org/10.2307/2216246.Google Scholar
Szabó, Z. G. (2003). Nominalism. In Loux, M. J. and Zimmerman, D. W., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11–45. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.001.0001.Google Scholar
Tarski, A. (1983). On the concept of logical consequence. In Corcoran, J., ed., Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938. Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 409–20.Google Scholar
Topey, B. (2021). Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: On modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge. Synthese, 199, 4415–36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02984-7.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
van Elswyk, P. (2022). The linguistic basis for propositions. In Tillman, C. and Murray, A., eds., The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. New York: Routledge, pp. 57–78. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315270500-3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
von Solodkoff, T. (2014). Paraphrase strategies in metaphysics. Philosophy Compass, 9 (8), 570–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12150.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walton, K. L. (1993). Metaphor and prop oriented make-believe. European Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1), 39–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.1993.tb00023.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wetzel, L. (2009). Types and Tokens. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. (2016). Abductive philosophy. Philosophical Forum, 47 (3–4), 263–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. (2017). Semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology. In Armour-Garb, B., ed., Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 325–46. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0013.Google Scholar
Wright, C. (2001). On the philosophical significance of Frege’s theorem. In Hale, B. and Wright, C., eds., The Reason’s Proper Study: Essays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 272–306. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198236395.003.0013.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. (1998). Does ontology rest on a mistake? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp vol. 72 (1), 229–61.Google Scholar
Yablo, S. (2000). Apriority and existence. In Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C., eds., New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 197–228. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199241279.003.0009.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. (2001). Go figure: A path through fictionalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 25 (1), 72–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4975.00040.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. (2002). Abstract objects: A case study. Philosophical Issues, 12 (1), 220–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-2237.2002.tb00068.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. (2005). The myth of the seven. In Kalderon, M., ed., Fictionalism in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 88–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yablo, S. (2014). Aboutness. Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt2tt8rv.Google Scholar

Save element to Kindle

To save this element to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Abstract Objects
  • David Liggins, University of Manchester
  • Online ISBN: 9781009241373
Available formats
×

Save element to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Abstract Objects
  • David Liggins, University of Manchester
  • Online ISBN: 9781009241373
Available formats
×

Save element to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Abstract Objects
  • David Liggins, University of Manchester
  • Online ISBN: 9781009241373
Available formats
×