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Series:   Elements in Politics and Communication

Angry and Wrong

The Emotional Dynamics of Partisan Media and Political Misperceptions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 September 2024

Brian Weeks
Brian Weeks
Affiliation:
University of Michigan

Summary

Use of partisan media is often associated with political misperceptions but little research has investigated whether partisan media can change beliefs and, if so, the mechanism through which that process occurs. This Element argues that political anger provides one key theoretical link between partisan media use and political misperceptions. Using three-wave panel survey data collected in the United States during the 2020 election, I show that people who use more partisan media are more angry and misinformed than less frequent or non-users. More importantly, consuming partisan media-particularly conservative media-can make people angrier about politics over time and this anger subsequently reduces the accuracy of political beliefs. While audiences for partisan media remain small, the findings indicate that partisan media play an important role in shaping political emotions and beliefs and offer one promising explanation for why their audiences are more likely to hold more inaccurate beliefs about politics.
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Keywords

Partisan MediaPolitical MisperceptionsPolitical MisinformationAngerEmotion
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Politics and Communication
Online ISBN: 9781009091121
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 28 November 2024

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Angry and Wrong
  • Brian Weeks, University of Michigan
  • Online ISBN: 9781009091121
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Angry and Wrong
  • Brian Weeks, University of Michigan
  • Online ISBN: 9781009091121
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Angry and Wrong
  • Brian Weeks, University of Michigan
  • Online ISBN: 9781009091121
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