Element contents
Series: Elements in Epistemology
Higher-Order Evidence and Calibrationism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2022
Summary
The higher-order evidence debate concerns how higher-order evidence affects the rationality of our first-order beliefs. This Element has two parts. The first part (Sections 1 and 2) provides a critical overview of the literature, aiming to explain why the higher-order evidence debate is interesting and important. The second part (Sections 3 to 6) defends calibrationism, the view that we should respond to higher-order evidence by aligning our credences to our reliability degree. The author first discusses the traditional version of calibrationism and explains its main difficulties, before proposing a new version of calibrationism called 'Evidence-Discounting Calibrationism.' The Element argues that this new version is independently plausible and that it can avoid the difficulties faced by the traditional version.
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in EpistemologyOnline ISBN: 9781009127332Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 26 January 2023
References
Beddor, B. (2015). Process reliabilism’s troubles with defeat. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(259), 145–59.Google Scholar
Bradley, D. (2020a). Self-locating belief and updating on learning. Mind, 129(514), 579–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, D. (2007). Does Murphy’s law apply in epistemology? Self-doubt and rational ideals. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 2, 3–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, D. (2009). Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy. Philosophy Compass, 4(5), 756–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, D. (2010). Higher-order evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1), 185–215.Google Scholar
Christensen, D. (2011). Disagreement, question-begging, and epistemic self-criticism. Philosophers’ Imprint, 11, 1–22.Google Scholar
Christensen, D. (2016a). Conciliation, uniqueness and rational toxicity. Noûs, 50, 584–603.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, D. (2016b). Disagreement, drugs, etc.: From accuracy to akrasia. Episteme, 13(4), 397–422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, D. (2019). Formulating independence. In Skipper, M. & Steglich-Petersen, A. (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DiPaolo, J. (2019). Second best epistemology: Fallibility and normativity. Philosophical Studies, 176(8), 2043–66.Google Scholar
Dorst, K. (2019). Higher-order uncertainty. In Skipper, M. & Steglich-Petersen, A. (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35–61.Google Scholar
Dorst, K. (2020). Evidence: A guide for the uncertain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100(3), 586–632.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorst, K. (in press). Higher-order evidence. In Lasonen-Aarnio, M. & Littlejohn, C. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.Google Scholar
Elga, A. (2013). The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle. Philosophical Studies, 164(1), 127–39.Google Scholar
Elga, A. (n.d.). Lucky to be rational. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Feldman, R. (2005). Respecting the evidence. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 95–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fitelson, B. & Jehle, D. (2009). What is the ‘Equal Weight View’? Episteme, 6(3), 280–93.Google Scholar
Foley, R. (1990). Fumerton’s puzzle. Journal of Philosophical Research, 15, 109–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frances, B. (2010). The reflective epistemic renegade. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(2), 419–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gallow, J. D. (2019). Diachronic Dutch books and evidential import, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99(1), 49–80.Google Scholar
González de Prado, J. (2020). Dispossessing Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 101(2), 323–40.Google Scholar
Good, I. J. (1967). On the principle of total evidence. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17(4), 319–21.Google Scholar
Greaves, H. & Wallace, D. (2006). Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility. Mind, 115(459), 607–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greco, D. (2019). Fragmentation and higher-order evidence. In Skipper, M. & Steglich-Petersen, A. (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 84–104.Google Scholar
Hazlett, A. (2012). Higher-order epistemic attitudes and intellectual humility. Episteme, 9, 205–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henderson, L. (in press). Higher‐order evidence and losing one’s conviction. Noûs.Google Scholar
Horowitz, S. & Sliwa, P. (2015). Respecting all the evidence. Philosophical Studies, 172, 2835–58.Google Scholar
Huemer, M. (2011). The puzzle of metacoherence. Philosophy and Phenomeno-logical Research, 82(1), 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ichikawa, J. & Jarvis, B. (2013). The Rules of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaacs, Y. (2021). The fallacy of calibrationism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 102(2), 247–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joyce, J. M. (1998). A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65(4), 575–603.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher order evidence. In Goldman, A. I. & Whitcomb, D. (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 183–217.Google Scholar
Kelly, T. (2014). Evidence can be permissive. In Steup, M., Turri, J., & Sosa, E. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed.). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 298–312.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. (2008). A justificationist view of disagreement’s epistemic significance. In Millar, A., Haddock, A., & Pritchard, D. (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 145–54.Google Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2010). Unreasonable knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1), 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2014). Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2), 314–45.Google Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2015). New rational reflection and internalism about rationality. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5, 145–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2020). Enkrasia or evidentialism? Philosophical Studies, 177, 597–632.Google Scholar
Levi, I. (1980). The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance. Cambridge: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Levinstein, B. A. (n.d.). Higher-order evidence as information loss. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Littlejohn, C. (2018). Stop making sense? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(2), 257–72.Google Scholar
Lord, E. (2014). From independence to conciliationism: An obituary. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(2), 365–77.Google Scholar
Matheson, J. (2015). Are conciliatory views of disagreement self-defeating? Social Epistemology, 29(2), 145–59.Google Scholar
Neta, R. (2018). Evidence, coherence and epistemic akrasia. Episteme, 15(3), 313–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pittard, J. (2015). Resolute conciliationism. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260), 442–63.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. (2014). Truth as the fundamental epistemic good. In Matheson, J. & Vitz, R. (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 112–29.Google Scholar
Rasmussen, M. S., Steglich-Petersen, A., & Bjerring, J. C. (2018). A higher-order approach to disagreement. Episteme, 15(1), 80–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schoenfield, M. (2015). A dilemma for calibrationism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(2), 425–55.Google Scholar
Schoenfield, M. (2018). An accuracy based approach to higher-order evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(3), 690–715.Google Scholar
Sepielli, A. (2014). What to do when you don’t know what to do when you don’t know what to do …. Noûs, 48(3), 521–44.Google Scholar
Shogenji, T. (2007). A conundrum in Bayesian epistemology of disagreement. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Skipper, M. (2019). Higher-order evidence and the impossibility of self-misleading evidence. In Skipper, M. & Steglich-Petersen, A. (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 189–208.Google Scholar
Skipper, M. (2021). Does rationality demand higher-order certainty? Synthese, 198(12), 11561–85.Google Scholar
Skipper, M. (2022). Higher-order evidence and the normativity of logic. In Stapleford, S., McCain, K., & Steup, M. (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge, pp. 21–37.Google Scholar
Skipper, M. & Bjerring, J. C. (2020). Bayesianism for non-ideal agents. Erkenntnis, 87(1), 93–115.Google Scholar
Smithies, D. (2012). Moore’s paradox and the accessibility of justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(2), 273–300.Google Scholar
Smithies, D. (2015). Ideal rationality and logical omniscience. Synthese, 192(9), 2769–93.Google Scholar
Staffel, J. (in press). Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher-order evidence. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12400.Google Scholar
Steel, R. (2018). Anticipating failure and avoiding it. Philosophers’ Imprint, 18, 1–28.Google Scholar
Steel, R. (2019). Against right reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(2), 431–60.Google Scholar
Street, S. (2006). A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philosophical Studies, 127, 109–66.Google Scholar
Titelbaum, M. (2015). Rationality’s fixed point (or: In defense of right reason). In Hawthorne, J. & Gendler, T. (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 253–94.Google Scholar
van Wietmarschen, H. (2013). Peer disagreement, evidence, and well-groundedness. Philosophical Review, 122(3), 395–425.Google Scholar
Vavova, K. (2018). Irrelevant influences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(1), 134–52.Google Scholar
Weatherson, B. (n.d.). Do judgments screen evidence? Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
White, R. (2005). Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1), 445–59.Google Scholar
White, R. (2009). On treating oneself and others as thermometers. Episteme, 6, 233–50.Google Scholar
White, R. (2010). You just believe that because... Philosophical Perspectives, 24, 573–615.Google Scholar
Whiting, D. (in press). Recent work on higher-order evidence. Analysis.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (2011). Improbable knowing. In Dougherty, T. (ed.), Evidentialism and Its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 147–64.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. (2019). Evidence of evidence in epistemic logic. In Skipper, M. & Steglich-Petersen, A. (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 265–97Google Scholar
Worsnip, A. (2018). The conflict of evidence and coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(1), 3–44.Google Scholar
Ye, R. (2015). Fumerton’s puzzle for theories of rationality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(1), 93–108.Google Scholar
Ye, R. (2020). Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility. Synthese, 197(12), 5435–55.Google Scholar
- 8
- Cited by