Element contents
Political Selection in China
Rethinking Foundations and Findings
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 September 2023
Summary
Political selection is about how individuals are selected to political office – and this substantially determines the quality of governance. The evidence favors democratic elections as the selection institution that produces high governance quality. Yet authoritarian China, where a communist party monopolizes the selection of all officials of importance, presents a sophisticated and, by some measures, successful contrast to liberal democratic versions of political selection. Understanding how and how much the preferences of the few at the political center in Beijing systematically shape the composition and actions of the tens of thousands of leaders who manage politics, society, and the economy across China is foundational to understanding China. This Element critically reviews the literature on political selection in China to better structure our knowledge on this important question. It clarifies sources of greatly disparate findings in statistical studies and identifies major descriptive challenges to these studies in rich qualitative and quantitative evidence.
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Online ISBN: 9781009327145Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 23 November 2023
References
Ang, Yuen Yuen. 2016. How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Balla, Steven J., and Gormley, William T. Jr. 2017. Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability and Performance. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press.Google Scholar
Barnett, A. Doak. 1967. Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Bell, Daniel A. 2015. The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Belloni, Dennis C., and Beller, Frank P.. 1978. “Party and Faction: Modes of Political Competition.” In Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective, edited by Belloni, Dennis C. and Beller, Frank P., 417–450. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio.Google Scholar
Besley, Timothy. 2005. “Political Selection.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 19, no. 3: 43–60.Google Scholar
Besley, Timothy, and Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2011. “Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?” American Political Science Review, vol. 105, no. 3: 552–566.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zhiyue, Bo. 1996. “Economic Performance and Political Mobility: Chinese Provincial Leaders.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 5, no. 12: 135–154.Google Scholar
Zhiyue, Bo. 2002. Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.Google Scholar
Boittin, Margaret, Distelhorst, Greg, and Fukuyama, Francis. 2016. “Reassessing the Quality of Government in China.” MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5181-16, MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2016-38. SSRN. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2875244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Box, George E. P. 1976. “Science and Statistics.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 71, no. 356: 791–799.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brehm, John, and Gates, Scott. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik. 2004. “Management of Party Cadres in China.” In Bringing the Party Back In: How China Is Governed, edited by Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik and Yongnian, Zheng, 57–91. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1989. Essays on the Political Economy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolph M., and Morrow, James D.. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bulman, David. 2016. Incentivized Development in China: Leaders, Governance, and Growth in China’s Counties. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burns, John P. 1989. The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.Google Scholar
Burns, John P. 1994. “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura.” China Quarterly, no. 138: 458–491.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burns, John P. 2006. “The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System As a Leadership Selection Mechanism: An Evaluation.” In The Chinese Communist Party in Reform, edited by Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik and Yongnian, Zheng, 33–59. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Burns, John P., and Wang, Xiaoqi. 2010. “Civil Service Reform in China: Impacts on Civil Servants’ Behaviour.” China Quarterly, no. 201: 58–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carey, John M. 2000. “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions.” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 33, nos. 6 and 7: 735–761.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chaffee, John W. 1995. The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China. Albany: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
Chan, Hon S. 2004. “Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998.” China Quarterly, no. 179: 703–734.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chan, Hon S., and Gao, Jie. 2008. “Performance Measurement in Chinese Local Governments.” Chinese Law and Government, vol. 41, nos. 2–3: 4–9.Google Scholar
Chandler, Alfred D. 1962. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Chen, Ting, and Kung, James K.-S.. 2016. “Do Land Revenue Windfalls Create a Political Resource Curse? Evidence from China.” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 123: 86–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ting, Chen, and Kung, James K.-S.. 2019. “Busting the Princelings: The Campaign against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 134, no. 1: 185–226.Google Scholar
Chen, Ye, Hongbin, Li, and Zhou, Li-An. 2005. “Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China.” Economics Letters, vol. 88, no. 3: 421–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Choi, Eun Kyong. 2012. “Patronage and Performance: Factors in the Political Mobility of Provincial Leaders in Post-Deng China.” China Quarterly, no. 212: 965–981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Choi, Eun Kyong, Wagner Givens, John, and MacDonald, Andrew. 2021. “From Power Balance to Dominant Faction in Xi Jinping’s China.” China Quarterly, no. 248: 935–956.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Weerdt, Hilde. 2007. Competition over Content: Negotiating Standards for the Civil Service Examinations in Imperial China (1127–1279). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.Google Scholar
Donnithorne, Audrey. 1972. “China’s Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends since the Cultural Revolution.” China Quarterly, no. 52: 605–619.Google Scholar
Doyon, Jerome, and Barbara Keller, Franziska. 2020. “Knowing the Wrong Cadre? Networks and Promotions in the Chinese Party-State.” Political Studies, vol. 68, no. 4: 1036–1053.Google Scholar
Edin, Maria. 1998. “Why Do Chinese Local Cadres Promote Growth? Institutional Incentives and Constraints of Local Cadres.” Forum for Development Studies, no. 1: 97–127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edin, Maria. 2003. “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective.” China Quarterly, no. 173: 35–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Egorov, Georgy, and Sonin, Konstantin. 2011. “Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty–Competence Tradeoff.” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 9, no. 5: 903–930.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elman, Benjamin A. 2000. A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Fisman, Raymond, Shi, Jing, Wang, Yongxiang, and Wu, Weixing. 2020. “Social Ties and the Selection of China’s Political Elite.” American Economic Review, vol. 110, no. 6: 1752–1781.Google Scholar
Francois, Patrick, Trebbi, Francesco, and Xiao, Kairong. 2016. “Factions in Nondemocracies: Theory and Evidence from the Chinese Communist Party.” NBER Working Paper No. 22775. www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22775/w22775.pdf.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, Milton. 1966. “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” In Essays in Positive Economics, edited by Friedman, Milton, 3–16, 30–43. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Gailmard, Sean. 2002. “Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 18, no. 2: 536–555.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gandhi, Jennifer, and Przeworski, Adam. 2006. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 40, no. 11: 1279–1301.Google Scholar
Gao, Jie. 2009. “Governing by Goals and Numbers: A Case Study in the Use of Performance Measurement to Build State Capacity in China.” Public Administration and Development, vol. 29, no. 1: 21–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gao, Jie. 2010. “Hitting the Target but Missing the Point: The Rise of Non-Mission-Based Targets in Performance Measurement of Chinese Local Governments.” Administration and Society, vol. 42, no. 1: 56–76.Google Scholar
Gao, Jie. 2015. “Pernicious Manipulation of Performance Measures in China’s Cadre Evaluation System.” China Quarterly, no. 223: 618–637.Google Scholar
Government of the People’s Republic of China. 2006. Regulations on Retirement for Officials [老干部离休退休的年龄规定]. National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration, April 29. www.lswz.gov.cn/html/sjzz/gbbgs/2018-06/14/content_235867.shtml#:~:text=%E6%8C%89%E7%85%A7%E5%85%9A%E5%92%8C%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6%E7%8E%B0%E8%A1%8C,%E5%A5%B3%E5%B9%B4%E6%BB%A155%E5%91%A8%E5%B2%81%E3%80%82.Google Scholar
Guo, Gang. 2007. “Retrospective Economic Accountability under Authoritarianism: Evidence from China.” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 3: 378–390.Google Scholar
Haber, Stephen. 2006. “Authoritarian Government.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by Weingast, Barry R. and Wittman, Donald A., 693–707. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hazan, Reuven Y., and Rahat, Gideon. 2010. Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heberer, Thomas, and Trappel, Rene. 2013. “Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres’ Behavior and Local Development Processes.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 22, no. 84: 1048–1066.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Herbert, Penelope A. 1988. Examine the Honest, Appraise the Able: Contemporary Assessments of Civil Service Selection in Early T’ang China. Canberra: Australian National University Press.Google Scholar
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1999. “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective.” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, no. 1: 169–182.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hsu, S. Philip, and Jhih-Wei, Shao. 2014. “The Rule-Bound Personnel Turnover of China’s Provincial Leaders, 1993–2010.” In Choosing China’s Leaders, edited by Kou, Chien-wen and Zang, Xiaowei, 97–123. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Huang, Jing. 2000. Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics. Cambridge Modern China Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Huang, Yasheng. 1995. “Administrative Monitoring in China.” China Quarterly, no. 143: 828–843.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jia, Ruixue, Kudamatsu, Masayuki, and Seim, David. 2015. “Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance.” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 13, no. 4: 631–668.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jiang, Junyan. 2018. “Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 62, no. 4: 982–999.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keefer, Philip, and Knack, Stephen. 1997. “Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation.” Economic Inquiry, vol. 25, no. 3: 590–602.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keller, Franziska Barbara. 2016. “Moving beyond Factions: Using Social Network Analysis to Uncover Patronage Networks among Chinese Elites.” Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 16, no. 1: 17–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keng, Shu, Zhong, Lingna, and Pang, Baoqing. 2023. “Pinpointing the Chinese Nomenklatura: An Index to Rank China’s Leadership Positions.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 32, no. 141: 510–523.Google Scholar
Key, V. O. 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kou, Chien-Wen, and Tsai, Wen-Hsuan. 2014. “‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System.” China Journal, no. 71: 153–171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kung, James, and Chen, Shuo. 2011. “The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China’s Great Leap Famine.” American Political Science Review, vol. 105, no. 1: 27–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lam, Tao-chiu, and Chan, Hon S.. 1996. “Reforming China’s Cadre Management System: Two Views of a Civil Service.” Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 8: 772–786.Google Scholar
Landry, Pierre F. 2003. “The Political Management of Mayors in Post-Deng China.” Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, no. 17: 31–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landry, Pierre F. 2008. Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landry, Pierre F., Lü, Xiaobo, and Duan, Haiyan. 2018. “Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative Ladder.” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 51, no. 8: 1074–1105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, Charlotte. 2013. “Party Selection of Officials in Contemporary China.” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 48, no. 3: 356–379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, Charlotte. 2015. Training the Party: Party Adaptation and Elite Training in Reform-Era China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, Hong Yung. 1991. From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Lee, Jonghyuk. 2018. “Band of Rivals: Career Incentives, Elite Competition, and Economic Growth in China.” SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3416118.Google Scholar
Leng, Ning. 2018. “Visible Development First: The Political Economy of Restructuring China’s Public Service Sectors.” PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison.Google Scholar
Leng, Ning, and Zuo, Cai (Vera). 2022. “Tournament-Style Bargaining within Boundaries: Setting Targets in China’s Cadre Evaluation System.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 31, no. 133: 116–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hongbin, Li, and Zhou, Li-An. 2005. “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China.” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89, no. 9: 1743–1762.Google Scholar
Jiayuan, Li. 2015. “The Paradox of Performance Regimes: Strategic Responses to Target Regimes in Chinese Local Government.” Public Administration, vol. 93, no. 4: 1152–1167.Google Scholar
Ling, Li. 2022. “China’s 20th Party Congress: The Implications for CCP Norms: Revisiting the Resilience of the Age Limit Norm and Exploring Two Counterfactuals.” The Diplomat, November 30. https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/chinas-20th-party-congress-the-implications-for-ccp-norms/.Google Scholar
Xing, Li, Liu, Chong, Weng, Xi, and Zhou, Li-An. 2019. “Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China.” Economic Journal, vol. 129, no. 623: 2888–2915.Google Scholar
Zeren, Li, and Manion, Melanie. 2023. “The Decline of Factions: The Impact of a Broad Purge on Political Decision-Making in China.” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 53, no. 3: 815–834.Google Scholar
Liu, Hanzhang. 2018. “The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China.” Political Science Research and Methods, vol. 7, no. 4: 853–870.Google Scholar
Lorentzen, Peter L., and Lu, Xi. 2018. “Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign.” SSRN. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835841.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fengming, Lu, and Xiao, Ma. 2019. “Is Any Publicity Good Publicity? Media Coverage, Party Institutions, and Authoritarian Power-Sharing.” Political Communication, vol. 36, no. 1: 64–82.Google Scholar
Lü, Xiaobo, and Landry, Pierre F.. 2014. “Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China.” American Political Science Review, vol. 108, no. 3: 706–722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Damien, Ma, and Henderson, Joshua. 2021. “Age Rules: The Arrival of the Post-60s Generation in Chinese Politics.” MacroPolo, December 31. https://macropolo.org/analysis/post-60s-generation-chinese-politics/.Google Scholar
Liang, Ma. 2012. Public Service Performance and Political Elite Career Advancement: Evidence from China. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing.Google Scholar
Liang, Ma, Tang, Huangfeng, and Yan, Bo. 2015. “Public Employees’ Perceived Promotion Channels in Local China: Merit-Based or Guanxi-Orientated?” Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 74, no. 3: 283–297.Google Scholar
Manin, Bernard. 1997. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Manion, Melanie. 1985. “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders.” China Quarterly, no. 102: 203–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Manion, Melanie. 1993. Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Manion, Melanie. 2008. “When Communist Party Candidates Can Lose, Who Wins? Assessing the Role of Local People’s Congresses in the Selection of Leaders in China.” China Quarterly, no. 195: 607–630.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Manion, Melanie. 2015. “The Challenge of Corruption.” In China’s Challenges, edited by deLisle, Jacques and Goldstein, Avery, 125–138. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.Google Scholar
Manion, Melanie. 2018. “The Role of the Organization Department in Political Selection.” In Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County, edited by Oi, Jean C. and Goldstein, Steven M., 167–181. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maskin, Eric, Qian, Yingyi, and Chenggang, Xu. 2000. “Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form.” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 67, no. 2: 359–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
David, Meyer, Shih, Victor C., and Lee, Jonghyuk. 2016. “Factions of Different Stripes: Gauging the Recruitment Logics of Factions in the Reform Period.” Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 16, no. 1: 43–60.Google Scholar
Miller, Alice. 2012. “The Road to the 18th Party Congress.” China Leadership Monitor, no. 36. www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM36AM.pdf.Google Scholar
Miyazaki, Ichisada. 1976. China’s Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China, translated by Schirokauer, Conrad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Montinola, Gabriella, Qian, Yingyi, and Weingast, Barry R.. 1995. “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China.” World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1: 50–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nathan, Andrew J. 1973. “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics.” China Quarterly, no. 53: 33–66.Google Scholar
Nathan, Andrew J., and Link, Perry, eds. 2001. The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People – In Their Own Words. Compiled by Liang, Zhang. New York: Public Affairs.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nathan, Andrew J., and Tsai, Kellee S.. 1995. “Factionalism: A New Institutionalist Restatement.” China Journal, no. 34: 157–192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Naughton, Barry. 2007. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Oi, Jean C. 1992. “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China.” World Politics, vol. 45, no. 1: 99–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ong, Lynette H. 2012. “Fiscal Federalism and Soft Budget Constraints: The Case of China.” International Political Science Review, vol. 33, no. 4: 455–474.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Opper, Sonja, Nee, Victor, and Brehm, Stefan. 2015. “Homophily in the Career Mobility of China’s Political Elite.” Social Science Research, no. 54: 332–352.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pang, Baoqing, Keng, Shu, and Zhong, Lingna. 2018. “Sprinting with Small Steps: China’s Cadre Management and Authoritarian Resilience.” China Journal, no. 80: 68–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pieke, Frank N. 2009. The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pines, Yuri. 2012. The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Pye, Lucian. 1980. The Dynamic of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics: A Model and Some Propositions. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.Google Scholar
Pye, Lucian. 1981. The Dynamics of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, & Hain.Google Scholar
Qian, Yingyi, and Chenggang, Xu. 1993. “Why China’s Economic Reforms Differ: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector.” Economics of Transition, vol. 1, no. 2: 135–170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quinlivan, James T. 1999. “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East.” International Security, vol. 24, no. 2: 131–165.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rui, Guo. 2022. “China’s Communist Party Nears 97 Million, With More Younger and Educated Members.” South China Morning Post, June 20. www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3183669/chinas-communist-party-grows-near-97-million-its-made-younger.Google Scholar
Sheng, Yumin. 2010. Economic Openness and Territorial Politics in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sheng, Yumin. 2022. “Performance-Based Authoritarianism Revisited: GDP Growth and the Political Fortunes of China’s Political Leaders.” Modern China, vol. 48, no. 5: 982–1018.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shi, Xiangyu, and Tianyang, Xi. 2018. “Race to Safety: Political Competition, Neighborhood Effects, and Coal Mine Deaths in China.” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 131: 79–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shih, Victor, Adolph, Christopher, and Liu, Mingxing. 2012. “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China.” American Political Science Review, vol. 106, no. 1: 166–187.Google Scholar
Shih, Victor, Wei, Shan, and Mingxing, Liu. 2010. “The Central Committee, Past and Present: A Method of Quantifying Elite Biographies.” In Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies, edited by Gallagher, Mary E., Carlson, Allen, Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Manion, Melanie, 51–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shirk, Susan L. 1993. The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shirk, Susan L. 2023. Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, Graeme. 2009. “Political Machinations in a Rural County.” China Journal, no. 62: 29–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Graeme. 2013. “Measurement, Promotions and Patterns of Behavior in Chinese Local Government.” Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 40, no. 6: 1027–1050.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fubing, Su, Tao, Ran, Xi, Lu, and Ming, Li. 2012. “Local Officials’ Incentives and China’s Economic Growth: Tournament Thesis Reexamined and Alternative Explanatory Framework.” China and World Economy, vol. 20, no. 4: 1–18.Google Scholar
Sudduth, Jun Koga. 2017. “Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships.” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 50, no. 13: 1768–1801.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsou, Tang. 1995. “Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?” China Journal, no. 34: 95–156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wallace, Jeremy. 2016. “Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China.” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 46, no. 1: 11–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yuhua, Wang, and Minzner, Carl F.. 2015. “The Rise of the Security State.” China Quarterly, no. 222: 339–359.Google Scholar
Whitford, Andrew B. 2002. “Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and Democratic Responsiveness: The Case of the United States Attorneys.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, vol. 12, no. 1: 3–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whiting, Susan. 1995. “The Micro-Foundations of Institutional Change in Reform China: Property Rights and Revenue Extraction in the Rural Industrial Sector.” PhD dissertation, University of Michigan.Google Scholar
Whiting, Susan. 2000. Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whiting, Susan. 2004. “The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule.” In Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era, edited by Naughton, Barry and Yang, Dali, 101–119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiebe, Michael. 2020a. “Does Meritocratic Promotion Explain China’s Growth?” Doctoral dissertation, chapter 1. University of British Columbia. https://michaelwiebe.com/assets/ch1.pdf.Google Scholar
Wiebe, Michael. 2020b. “Replicating the Literature on Meritocratic Promotion in China.” Doctoral dissertation, chapter 2. University of British Columbia. https://michaelwiebe.com/assets/ch2.pdf.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Wong, Stan Hok-Wui, and Zeng, Yu. 2018. “Getting Ahead by Getting on the Right Track: Horizontal Mobility in China’s Political Selection Process.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 27, no. 109: 61–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guoguang, Wu. 2015. China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Chenggang, Xu. 2011. “The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development.” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 49, no. 4: 1076–1151.Google Scholar
Yan, Huai. 1995. “Organizational Hierarchy and the Cadre Management System.” In Decision-Making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders, edited by Hamrin, Carol Lee and Zhao, Suisheng, 39–50. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.Google Scholar
Yan, Yang, and Yuan, Chunhui. 2020. “City Administrative Level and Municipal Party Secretaries’ Promotion: Understanding the Logic of Shaping Political Elites in China.” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 29, no. 122: 266–285.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yao, Yang, and Zhang, Muyang. 2015. “Subnational Leaders and Economic Growth: Evidence from Chinese Cities.” Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 20, no. 4: 405–436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zeng, Qingjie. 2016. “Democratic Procedures in the CCP’s Cadre Selection Process: Implementation and Consequences.” China Quarterly, no. 225: 73–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zeng, Yu, and Hok-wui Wong, Stan. 2021. “Time Is Power: Rethinking Meritocratic Political Selection in China.” China Quarterly, no. 245: 23–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zhao, Ziyang. 2009. Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang, translated and edited by Pu, Bao, Chiang, Renee, and Ignatius, Adi. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
Zhong, Yang. 2003. Local Government and Politics in China: Challenges from Below. Studies on Contemporary China. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.Google Scholar
Zhou, Li-An. 2007. “Governing China’s Local Officials: An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model.” Economic Research Journal, vol. 7: 36–50.Google Scholar
Zhu, Hongshen. 2022. “Constructive Conflict in China: Managing Policy Tradeoffs Under Authoritarianism.” SSRN. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4274576.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zhu, Jiangnan. 2008. “Why Are Offices for Sale in China? A Case Study of the Office-Selling Chain in Heilongjiang Province.” Asian Survey, vol. 48, no. 4: 558–579.Google Scholar
Zuo, Cai (Vera). 2015. “Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China.” China Quarterly, no. 224: 955–984.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- 3
- Cited by