The Air Ministry, in granting me permission to deliver this lecture, have asked me to make it clear that “ the statements made are based entirely on my own knowledge and the opinions expressed in no way reflect the official views.” I should like to acknowledge the courtesy of the Air Ministry in giving me permission, and to say that I should be surprised if some of my opinions were in accord with the official view.

Towards the end of the war, although submarines were still doing a considerable amount of damage to shipping, the Navy was rapidly getting their measure.

Submarines were being sunk faster than the enemy could build ; their submarine service had been made so hazardous that it was increasingly difficult for the enemy to man their submarines and maintain the morals of the crews during attempted operations.

This result was not achieved by any one arm of the Navy, nor by any particular invention, but was effected by the intensive use and close co-ordination of praqtically all the resources which the Navy could command.