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Guerrilla War in Portuguese Africa: An Assessment of the Balance of Force in Mozambique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 May 2017

Walter C. Opello Jr
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Extract

The status of the guerrilla wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau has long been a topic of debate. While the coup d'etat in Portugal has affected the struggle for liberation in all three territories, the complexion of the debate appears to have changed most significantly with respect to the hostilities in Mozambique. This article presents an assessment of the balance of military force in Mozambique from the inception of the guerrilla war in 1964 through April 1974. Such an assessment provides an interesting perspective to recent military and political developments in that territory.

Five phases can be discerned in the fighting in Mozambique since the beginning of the war in 1964. The first phase began in September of that year and ran roughly to the end of 1965. This phase was marked by the initial military successes of the nationalists, the Frente de Libertaca'o de Mozambique (FRELIMO), and the loss of some territory and population by the Portuguese in the districts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. The second phase, which began in 1966 and ended at the close of 1969, was characterized by an increase in the ability of FRELIMO to concentrate military force on more heavily defended Portuguese positions but with a decrease in the limits of the zones of fighting in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Phase three ran roughly through the twelve months of 1970 and was marked by a change in Portuguese counterinsurgency strategy which began with the launching of a number of highly successful counteroffensives against FRELIMO bases and sanctuaries. The fourth phase, which began in 1971 and ended in the first months of 1973, was characterized by a diminishing of the level of fighting in Cabo Delgado and Niassa and a concomitant shifting of the focus of military activities to the district of Tete. The fifth phase, which began in the summer of 1973, has been characterized by the spread of military activities from Tete to the northern sectors of Vila Pery and Beira districts. Each phase is discussed in detail below.

Type
Research Article
Information
African Issues , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , Summer 1974 , pp. 29 - 37
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1974 

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References

1 H. Humphries, Colonel Donald, The East African Liberation Move- 1 ment, Adelphi Papers No. 16 (London: London Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 5.Google Scholar In the early 1960s, FRELIMO had four bases in Tanzania: Bagamoyo, Kongwa, Lindi, and Songea. Kongwa was the main military training base and Songea, in the south, the primary operations base. 1

2 W. Grundy, Kenneth, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview (New York, USA: Grossman Publishers, 1971), p. 103;Google Scholar Gibson, Richard, African Liberation Movements (London: Oxford University 1 Press, 1972), p. 286;Google Scholar and The New York Times, 15 March 1971.

3 Dodson, James M., “Dynamics of Insurgency in Mozambique,” Africa Report, 12 (November 1967), p. 53:Google Scholar Hughs, Glyn, “FRELIMO and the Mozambique War of Liberation,” Monthly Review, 20 1! (December 1968), pp. 17–18.Google Scholar

4 This attack had been preceded by a foray into Mozambique by a small band of FRELIMO dissidents led by Paulo Gumane about a month earlier in which a priest and a bus driver had been killed. :

5 Excerpts from the four articles Kilbracken published in Southern Rhodesian newspapers at the end of September and the beginning of October 1965 can be found in “Confirmations of the War,” Africa ∼ Today, 21 (November 1965), pp. 7-8.

6 Ibid., p. 7.

7 Frelimo also started military operations in Tete district at this time but was forced to withdraw because of supply problems. See 2 Colin Legum, “Guerrillas Harass Portuguese in Africa's Forgotten War,” 77ie Observer, London, 29 January 1967.

8 Mondlane, Eduardo, The Struggle for Mozambique (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 154.Google Scholar

9 Kilbracken, “Confirmations of the War,” p. 7. 2

10 M. Whitacker, Paul, “Arms and the Nationalists,” Africa Report, 15 , (May 1970), pp. 12–14.Google Scholar

11 The Standard, Dar es Salaam, 1 February 1972.

12 Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, pp. 152-153.

13 Ibid., p. 153. 2

14 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on the Situa- 2 tion with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Territories Under Portuguese Administration (hereafter referred to as “Special Committee on …Granting of Independence to…Countries, …Peoples, Territories…“), Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, Document A/AC.109/L.538/Add. 2, 15 April 1969, pp. 2-3.

15 Ibid.

16 Patrick Orr, “Decline of FRELIMO,” New Africa (November- December 1967) p. 6; and Lawrence Fellows, “Portuguese Curb Guerrillas in Mozambique,” The New York Times, 21 November 1966.

17 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence to…Countries,…Peoples, Territories… (A/AC.109/L.767), 24 March 1972, p. 13.

18 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence to…Countries,…Peoples, Territories… (A/AC.1D9/L.538/Add. 2), 15 April 1969, pp. 2-3.

19 Ibid.; and Brenden F. Jundanian, “Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique,” (Paper read at the International Studies Association/West, Seventh Annual Conference, San Francisco, March 1973), p. 11.

20 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence to…Couritries,.. .Peoples, Territories… (A/AC.109/L.694),9 April 1971, p. 10.

21 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

22 Arriaga's tenure as commander of the armed forces ended in August 1973. He was replaced by Brigadier-General TomSs Jose’ Basto Machado.

23 “Mozambique Echoes With Talk of Military Victory,” The New York Times, 25 July 1970.

24 Ibid., and United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence to…Countries,…Peoples, Territories… (A/AC.109/L.694),9 April 1971, p. 10.

25 Ibid.

26 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence to…Countries,…Peoples, Territories… (A/AC.109/L.625/Add. 2, Part I), 12 May 1970, p. 17; and Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-First Session, Annexes, Volume I, 20 September-20 December 1966, p. 316.

27 Frederic Hunter, “Is He Portugal's Secret Weapon in Mozambique?“ The Christian Science Monitor, 30 July 1973.

28 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Military Activities and Arrangements by Colonial Powers in Territories Under their Administration which Might be Impeding the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/8423, Part II), 24 November 1971, p. 26; and United Nations General AssemblySpecial Committee on…Granting of Independence to…Countries, …Peoples, Territories… (A/AC.109/L.538/Add. 2), 15 April 1969, p. 5.

29 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence t o … Countries, … Peoples , Territories… (A/AC.109/L.538/Add.2), 15 April 1969, p. 4;(A/AC.109/L.451/Add.2,12 April 1968, p.9; and (A/AC.109/L.767), 24 March 1972, p. 13.

30 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence t o … Countries, … Peoples , Territories… (A/AC.109/L.694),9 April 1971, p. 17.

31 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence t o … Countries, … Peoples , Territories (A/AC.109/L.767), 24 March 1972, p.10.

32 Ibid., p. 11.

33 The New York Times, 15 March 1971.

34 FRELIMO is reported to have attacked the town of Tete and the airfield across the Zambezi with 122 mm. rockets, badly damaging a number of buildings. The Portuguese claim, however, that the attack was frustrated and the guerrillas only succeeded in launching a few rockets against the airfield which did little damage.

35 This writer made such a trip in February 1972. Convoys of civilian buses, trucks, and cars accompanied by five Portuguese military vehicles (sandbagged for protection against mines, mounting heavy machine guns, and carrying reaction troops) form up near Moatize a few kilometers from the town of Tete and at Zobue on the Malawi border each morning. The trip from Zobue to Tete, a distance of about one-hundred kilometers, takes ten to twelve hours. The pace is slow with frequent stops made to allow the buses to embark and disembark African travellers. Evidence of the success of FRELIMO military operations could be seen in the occasional heaps of ash and twisted metal on the road that were all that remained of vehicles which had run over land mines or had been ambushed by FRELIMO guerrillas. Contrary to a report made by Peter Webb (“Africa's Mini- Vietnam,” Newsweek. 27 November 1972, pp. 46-48), Portuguese soldiers did not precede the convoy probing for mines. The troops this writer observed seemed unconcerned (which bordered on the careless at times) about the possible danger on the road. This probably reflected the boredom of convoy duty where attacks were relatively infrequent. By rough estimate, at least thirty-five percent of the troops were African on the t r ip made by this writer.

36 Hunter, “Is He Portugal's Secret Weapon in Mozambique?“

37 Steele, Jonathan, “Dambusters of Mozambique Prepare to Go into Action,” The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 26 September 1970.Google Scholar

38 United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on…Granting of Independence t o … Countries, … Peoples , Territories… (A/AC.109/L.690), 26 March 1971, pp. 30-31; and Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Military Activities and Arrangements by Colonial Powers in Territories Under their Administration which Might be Impeding the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/8423, Part II), 24 November 1971, p. 3 1 . In February 1973, a secret conference is reported to have taken place in Nampula between General Deslandes, the chief of the Portuguese general staff, and Admiral Hugo Biermann, who was designated as South Africa's commander-in-chief of armed forces. Discussion reportedly centered on FRELIMO's activities in Tete.

39 Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 November 1973, p. 3055.

40 Ibid., 1-31 December 1972, pp. 2703-04.

41 Marcum, John, Portugal and Africa: The Politics of Indifference (A Case Study in American Foreign Policy) East African Studies V (Syracuse, N.Y.: The Program of Eastern African Studies of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, March 1972), pp. 17–19.Google Scholar

42 Marcum, “The United States and Portuguese Africa: A Perspective on American Foreign Policy,” (Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, 1971), pp. 2-3.

43 A. Diamond, Robert and Fouquet, David, “Portugal and the United States,” Africa Report, 15 (May 1970), pp. 15–16.Google Scholar

44 William Minter, “Allies in Empire: Part II—U.S. Military Involvement,“ Africa Today, 17 (July-August 1970), pp. 30-31.

45 James MacManus, “Who Are FRELIMO?” and “Caetano Acts to Africanize Mozambique,” The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 21 July 1973 and 23 February 1974.

46 MacManus, “Caetano Acts to Africanize Mozambique.“

47 Newsweek, 1 April 1974.

48 Contrary interpretations are supplied by H. Henriksen, Thomas in “Portugal's Changing Fortunes in Africa,” Current History, 64 (March 1973);CrossRefGoogle Scholar Radford, Jeff in “Mozambique: Who's Winning the War?” Engage/Social Action, 1 (May 1973);Google Scholar and M. Williams, Roger in “Mozambique: A Tenacious Colonialism on its Deathbed,” World, 17 July 1973.Google Scholar Henriksen, for example, cites as evidence for the change in Portugal's fortunes in Mozambique increased guerrilla activity in Tete.