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Ideology and Praxis in Thomas Sankara’s Populist Revolution of 4 August 1983 in Burkina Faso

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2021

Guy Martin
Guy Martin*
Affiliation:
University of Nairobi
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Extract

This article is an inquiry into the origins, the ideological basis, political and economic organization and prospects of the Populist Revolution ushered in Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) by the military coup d’état of 4 August 1983 led by Captain Thomas Sankara. Set against an inauspicious background of scarce resources, dismal poverty, recurrent drought and regional and international hostility, and occurring at a time when Socialism is on the wane in Africa, the coup initially seemed doomed to failure. The very fact that it has been able to survive for almost three years in such an unfavourable context is in itself intriguing. We venture the hypothesis that the relative longevity and temporary success of the Sankara regime is to be explained by the fact that-contrary to many similar socialists experiments-it has actually managed to actively and durably mobilize genuine and significant popular support for its policies.

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Insight
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African Issues , Volume 15 , 1987 , pp. 77 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1987 

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References

Notes

This is a revised and updated version of a paper by the same title presented by the author at the 28th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 23-26 November 1985.

1. The main sources on this section are: Victoria Brittain, ‘Introduction to Sankara and Burkina.” Review of African Political Economy no. 32 (Aprill985): 39-47; Jouffrey, Roger, “Thomas Sankara et la révolution voltaique.” Afrique contemporaine vol. XXIII, no. 130 (avril 1984): 44–53;Google Scholar René Utayek, “Le Changment politique et constitutionnel en Haute-Volta.” L’Année Africaine 1983: 86-106; and Yarga, Larba, “Lés prémices a l’avènement du Conseil National de la Revolution en Haute-Volta.” Le Mois en Afrique vol. 18, nos. 213/14 (octobre 1983): 24–41.Google Scholar

2. R. Otayek, “Le Changement politique et constitutionnel en Haute-Volta”, op. cit., p. 89.

3. V. Brittain, “Introduction to Sankara and Burkina”, op. cit., p. 44.

4. These events are chronicled in V. Brittain, op. cit.: 44-45; R. Otayek, op. cit.: 93-96; L. Yarga, “Les prémices à l’avènement du CNR en Haute-Volta” op. cit.: 34-40; “Upper Volta: At last a really radical coup. Africa Contemporary Record vol. XVI (1983/84), p. В 590; and, particularly, “Upper Volta”: Postponing Marxism?” Africa Confidential vol.24, no. 12 (8 June 1983): 7-8. On French interventions in African affairs in general, see Martin, Guy, “The Historical, Economic and Political bases of France’s African Policy.” The Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1985): 189–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5. For a socio-political analysis of the Bukinabe military in terms of generations, see in particular “Haute-Volta: les Raisons Sociales d’ un Coup d’Etat.” Politique africaine no. 9 (mars 1983): 86-89; Otayek, R., op. cit.: 90-91, and Catherine Somé, Sociologie du pouvoir militaire: le cas de la Haute-Volta (Bordeaux, 1979).Google Scholar

6. “Sankara: cet Homme qui Dérange.” Interview of Thomas Sankara by Siradiou Diallo in Jeune Afrique, 12 octobre 1983, p. 43 (author’s translation from the French, as elsewhere in this article).

7. Ibid, p. 43.

8. Declaration du Capitaine Thomas Sankara à la 39e session ordinaire de l’Assemblee Générale des Nations Unies, 4 octobre 1984. Ouagadougou: Ministere des Relations extérieures, 1984, p. 3. This is quite reminiscent of some of Fanon’s most forceful statements: “We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe (...) Let us decide not to imitate Europe (...) If we wish to live up to our peoples’ expectations, we must seek the solution elsewhere than in Europe (...) we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.” ( Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1967: 251–255, translation modified by the author).Google Scholar

9. “We Have to Depend on Ourselves.” Interview of Thomas Sankara by Patricia J. Sethi in Newsweek, 19 November 1984, p. 68

10. “Sankara: cet Homme qui Derange”, op. cit., p. 43.

11. Letter of Mr. Basile L. Guissou, Burkina’s Minister of External Relations, to the author dated 9 August 1985.

12. Ibid.

13. Conseil National de la Révolution/CNR, Discours d’Orientation Politique pronounce à la Radio-télévision nationale par le Captaine Thomas Sankara le 2 octobre 1983. Ouagadougou: Ministère de l’Information, 1983, p.23.

14. “Thomas Sankara: le multipartisme? Une mascarade qui nous a coute tres cher.” Interview of Thomas Sankara by Mohamed Maiga in Afrique-Asie, 24 octobre 1983, p. 32.

15. “Sankara: cet Homme qui Dérange”, op. cit., p. 46.

16. Interview of T. Sankara by M. Maiga in Afrique-Asie, 15 août 1983, p. 19.

17. Quoted in Susan McDonald, “Burkina: Sankara in Paris.” West Africa, 17 February 1986, p. 339.

18. CNR, Discours d’Orientation Politique: 17-19.

19. Ibid, p. 25.

20. Ibid, p. 38-43.

21. CNR, An 11: Programme Populaire de Développement. Ouagadougou: Imprimerie Nationale, n.d.

22. Interview of T. Sankara by P.J. Sethi in Newsweek, 19 November 1984, p. 68.

23. CNR, Discours d’Orientation Politique, p. 44.

24. Ibid, p. 44-45.

25. Ibid, p. 45. Thus, since the 4 August 1983 Revolution, Burkina has established close political, economic and military relations with a number of progressist African régimes such as Chadli Bendjedid’s Algeria, Jerry Rawlings’ Ghana and Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya. Since early 1984, there has been a noticeable uneasiness in relations with Libya coincidental with a clear “rapprochement” with Algeria.

26. Afanasyev, V.G., Marxist Philosophy: A Popular Outline. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 4th edition, 1980, p. 155.Google Scholar

27. Ziegler, Jean, “Dans la Haute-Volta du capitaine Sankara: l’espoir,malgre tout.” Le Monde diplomatique no. 360 (Mars 1984), p. 10.Google Scholar Alongside this official structure there is another one of unoffocial advisers to the President, including, inter alia, the Zairian political activist Buana Kabue and the late Malian journalist Mohammed Maiga (who died in Ouagadougou on I January 1984 in mysterious circumstances).

28. Interview of Cpt. Pierre Ouédraogo, Secretary general of the CDRs, in Liberation Afrique-Caraïbe-Pacifique no. 22 (juillet 1984): 14-17; Sennen Andriamirado, ‘Burkina: Assurer la marche de la revolution”, interview of Cpt. P. Ouédraogo in Jeune Afrique, 17 juillet 1985, p. 28.

29. CNR, Statut Général des Comités de Défense de la Révolution. Ouagadougou. Imprimerie des Forces Armées Nationales, 1984, Title I, article 4, p. 7; Tide 11: 10-23.

30. Ibid, Title Ill, Chapter 1: 23-24.

31. Ordonnance no. 83-015 CNR/PRES du 19 octobre 1983 portant creation de tribunaux populaire de la revolution, article 2 & 3, reproduced in Afrique-Asie, 30 janvier 1984, p. 34.

32. Ibid, article 11.

33. The recent decision by the CNR to modify prefectoral functions from appointed to elective aims at a similar objective. This decision was taken in order to demystify the functions of a prefect, and to make power truly a people’s power (see West Africa, 11 November 1985, p. 2393.

34. See in particular R. Otayek, “Le Changement politique et constitutionnel en Haute-Volta”, op. cit.: 97-98.

35. Statement by Professor Michel Maille, delegate of the International federation for the rights of man to the trial; quoted in Lyse Doucet, “The Diawara Affair.” West Africa, 14 April 1986, p. 762. A former Ivorian government minister turned successful international businessman, Mohamed Diawara was, along with Moussa N’Gom, former Senegalese Secretary general of CEAO and Moussa Diakité, former Malian director of the CEAO’s Solidarity and Development Fund (FOSIDEC), accused of embezzling CFA francs 6.5 billion (about US $ 18 million) belonging to the CEAO. The legal proceedings initiated in October 1984 led to the detention without trial of the three accused. After a brief trial conducted during Ouagadougou’s TPR fifteenth session (25 March-April 1986), the revolutionary tribunal sentenced the three men to 15 years in prison. Diawara and Diakité were ordered to pay almost CFA F 6.5 bn between them as well as CFA F 650 mo in damages and interest (about $ 20 mo) as well as individual fines of CFA F mo (about $3, 000) each. N’Gom was ordered to repay CFA F 142.5 mo plus CFA F 14.2 mo in damages and interest (about $550, 000). Their property is to be seized and there is no right of appeal outside of requests for grace from the Burkinabé leader, Cpt. Thomas Sankara (on the Diawara affair and its outcome, see S. Andriarmirado, “CEAO: Prêt pour un nouveau redémarrage.” Jeune Afrique, 9 avril 1986, p. 38; S. Andriamirado, “Procès Diawara: Ce qui n’a pas été dit.” Jeune Afrique, 16 avril 1986: 30-35; Lyse Doucet, “The Diawara Affair.” West Africa, 14 April 1986, 761-762; Sadio L. Sow, “Le Sommet du Procès.” Afrique-Asie, 14 avril 1986: 18-19; and Sadio L. Sow, “Diawara: chronique d’ un proces.” Afrique-Asie, 21 avril 1986: 6-14).

36. World Bank, World Development Report 1985 (New York, 1985), p. 174.Google Scholar

37. Ibid p. 184.

38. Ibid p. 204; OECD, External Debt of Developing Countries: 1983 Survey (Paris, 1984), p. 209; OECD, External Debt of Developing Countries in 1984. Doc. DCD/85.43 (Paris, 1985), p. 61.

39. OECD, 1983 Survey, p. 209; 1984 Survey, p. 61.

40. On the PPD, see CNR, An 11: Programme Populaire de Dévelopment, C. Benabdessadok, “Burkina: audace et prudence. “Afrique-Asie, 6 mai 1985: 14-15; Burkina: la Volonté de Vaincre.” Actuel Développement no. 67 (juillet 1965): 32-53; and Jean Viero, “Burkina: Towards Self-reliance.” West Africa, 14 January 1985: 58-59.

41. Pascal Labazee, “Réorganisation économique et resistances sociales: la question des alliances au Burkina.” Politique africaine no. 20 (décembre 1985), p. 14.

42. J. Viero, “Burkina: Towards Self-reliance”, op. cit., p. 59.

43. Yves Lacoste, “Développement: la course d’obstacles.” Actuel développement no. 67 (juillet 1985), p. 41.

44. On this point, see Martin, Guy, “The Franc Zone, Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa.” Third World Quarterly vol. 8, no. 1 (January 1986): 225–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45. P. Labazée, “Réorganisation économique”, op. cit.: 19-20.

46. P. Labazée, “La voie étroite de la révolution au Burkina.” Le Monde diplomatique no. 371 (fevrier 1985), p. 13.

47. On this point, see Howard French, “Strategists Wage Battle of the Budget.” African Business, February 1986: 24-25.

48. Ibid, p. 25; see also François Misser, “Working Together for a New Revival.” African Business, July 1985, p. 20.

49. This point is made by Lyse Doucet in “Burkina: Economics and Revolution.” West Africa, 10 February 1986, p. 295.

50. P. Labazée, “Réorganisation économique”, op. cit.: 14-17.

51. Ibid. 23-24.

52. Lyse Doucet, “Burkina: Economies & Revolution”, op. cit., p. 296.

53. These are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina, Congo, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

54. The case of Ghana is unique. That country changed from Socialism to Capitalism with the 25 February 1966 military coup d’etat which overthrew Kwame Nkrumah, and later moved back to Socialism with the 1st January 1981 military coup which brought Flight-lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings to power.

55. R. Otayek, “Le Changement politique et constitutionnel en Haute-Volta”, op. cit., p. 96.

56. Most notable among these are Claude Dubuch, “Langage du pouvoir, pouvoir du langage.” Politique africaine no. 20 (décembre 1985): 44-53; Yves André Fauré “Ouaga et Abidjan: divorce à l’africaine?” in ibidem: 78-79; and Paul Michaud, ‘Turning off the Burkinabé.” New African, April 1986, p. 34.

57. Interview of T. Sankara by P.J. Sethi in Newsweek, 19 November 1984, p. 68.

58. Zie Douaba, “Burkina Faso: parlons chiffres.” Afrique-Asie, 31 décembre 1984, p. 56.

59. See Lyse Doucet, “Burkina: Economies & Revolution”, op. cit., p. 296; “Burkina: Salary Cuts.” West Africa, 13 January 1986, p. 100.

60. “Burkina: salary cuts.” West Africa, 13 January 1986, p. 100.

61. See Maggie Jonas, “Burkinabé officials sent back to the land.” African Business, October 1985, p. 68.

62. Alfred Thierry, “Burkina: les surprises de Sankara.” Afrique-Asie, 11 fevrier 1985, p. 29.

63. “Message du President Thomas Sankara lors du deuxième anniversaire de la RDP.” Sidwaya, 6 août 1985, p. 5.

64. On these measures, see in particular Lyse Doucet, “Bèrkina: Economics and Revolution”, 22. cit., p. 296.

65. This new spelling of “Moose” (instead of the former “Mossi”) conforms to the directives contained in the 16 December 1975 presidential decree (ref. 75/PRES/EN).

66. On this point, see the excellent study by C. Savonnet-Guyot, “Le Prince et le Naaba.” Politique africaine no. 20 (décembre 1985): 29-30, 41-43. See also Savonnet-Guyot, C., Etat et societes au Burkina: Essai sur le politique africain. Paris: Karthala, 1986.Google Scholar

67. C. Savonnet-Guyot, “Le Prince et le Naaba”, op. cit., p. 43.

68. The total number of civil servants dismissed is generally estimated at about 3, 000.

69. On this point, we disagree with the official categorization of the peasantry as part of the petty bourgoisie (cf. CNR, Discours d’Orientation Politique, p. 18). In agreement with Fanon’s analysis, we are of the opinion that the impoverished, over-exploited and proletarized African peasantry constitutes an authentically revolutionary class (Frante Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 47).

70. “Mali/Burkina: Post-mortem.” Africa Confidential vol. 27, no. 3 (29 January 1986), p. 6.

71. West Africa, 11 November 1985, p. 2393; West Africa, 10 Marchl986, p. 543.

72. Message du Président Thomas Sankara à l’occasion au deuxèime anniversaire de la RDP.” Sidwaya, 6 aout 1985: 3-4.

73. P. Labazée, “La voie étroite de la révolution au Burkina”, op. cit., p. 13. See also P. Labazée, “Réorganisation économique, op. cit., p. 28.

74. D. Coutellier, “A Propos du Dossier Burkina: Réflexions d’un coopérant sur une révolution.” Actuel dévetoppment no. 69 (novembre 1985), p. 63.

75. Frante Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 159 (translation modified by the author).

76. Bouzid Kouza, “Conseil de l’Entente: la Cabale d’Houphouet.” Afrique-Asie, 7 octobre 1985: 15-16.

77. On the Burkina/Mali armed conflict, see in particular “Burkina-Mali: au-delà des frontières.” Afrique-Asie, 13 janvier 1986: 10-19; “Sankara-Traoré: peuvent-ils se reconcilier?” Jeune Afrique, 15 janvier 1986: 30-35; “Le Prix de la Guerre.” Jeune Afrique, 15 février 1986, 10-15; and Lyse Doucet, “Mali/Burkina: Two sides, one peace.” West Africa, 21 January 1986: 170-172 (especially pp. 171-172 for the Burkina version).

78. On this point see Guy Martin, “The (...) Bases of France’s African Policy”, op. cit.: 206-207.

79. The following statement made by Cpt. Thomas Sankara at a public rally in Ouagadougou on 11 September 1985 has certainly not contributed to ease mounting tensions between Burkina and Mali:

“The sister Republic of Mali should know that her happiness will be our happiness, and her unhappiness will be our unhappiness; the Malian people’s worries are the Burkinabé people’s worries. The Burkinabé Revolution is at the disposal of the Malian people, who badly needs it. This is so because only revolution will enable it to combat hunger, thirst, disease, ignorance, and above all to combat neo-colonial and imperialist exploitation.” (Quoted in S. Andriamirado, “CEAO: Sommet a Abidjan ou a Dakar.” Jeune Afrique, 13 November 1985, p. 34).

80. On this point, see “Mali/Burkina: Post-mortem.” Africa Confidential vol. 27, no. 3 (29 January 1986), p. 5.

81. Interview of T. Sankara by P.J. Sethi in Newsweek, 19 November 1984, p. 68.