1 See Washington Post, 11 October 1974, p. D19; 13 October 1974, p. A11; Esquire, October 1974, p. 43.

2 See Washington Post, 12 October 1974, p. A3.

3 The Star, Johannesburg, Weekly Airmail Edition, 4 October 1974.

4 See David Newsom's testimony in Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, Hearings of the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 20 and 22 March and 6 April 1973 at pp. 145 and 159. No actual sales of such aircraft have ever been made and no applications were pending. Newsom evidently intended the speech as a message to South Africa.

5 Ibid., pp. 71 and 68.

6 Apparently, since none of the five options in NSSM 39 dealt with the possibility of successful armed struggle, a sixth option was added, premised on this possibility. The text of this option is not available, but on the basis of conversations with State Department sources, the author does not believe that the option did more than add intellectual breadth to the range of possibilities.

7 It should be remembered that U.S. trade and investment in independent Africa is concentrated in relatively few countries and industries. At year end 1967, Libya and Liberia alone represented 27.7 percent of U.S. direct investment in the continent as a whole, while 27.6 percent of exports were concentrated in northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Ethiopia). The bulk of U.S. investment in black states since 1968 has been in petroleum production in Libya and Nigeria. (See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, FT 455 U.S. Exports, 1968, et seq. Survey of Current Business, October 1968.)

8 Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, pp. 132, 144, 44.

9 Ibid., p. 47.

10 Ibid., pp. 103 and 147. Mr. Newsom: What we are discussing is that area of items of essentially a civilian character which conceivably could be adapted for use in the support of military operations… . I do not argue, Mr. Chairman, that these are unimportant to a country's ability to wage war or to maintain internal security. I do argue that in the face of problems in our own aerospace industry, in the light of balance-of-payments problems, and in the face of severe competition from others the question of whether restraint shall be put on sale of civilian items because of their possible use in support of a military effort is not an easy one.

11 Ibid., p. 330.

12 Ibid., pp. 45-46.

13 See U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, Hearings of the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part 2, 12 November 1971, p. 101.

14 Total Ex-lm exposure in South Africa as of 31 December 1971 was $81 million. See ibid., Part 1, May, June, July 1971, pp. 463 and 468.

15 See ibid.. Part 2, 27 September, 12 November, and 6 and 7 December 1971 at p. 213.

16 See Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo at pp. 29, 50, 52, 147, 153, 155, and 159.

17 Ibid., pp. 155-57. See also the testimony of journalist Bruce Oudes, pp. 4-14, 68.

18 See Africa News, Vol. I l l , No. 50, 19 December 1974. * Section 503 of the Military Procurement Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-156; the so-called Byrd Amendment) reads as follows: Sec. 503. The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (60 Stat. 596; 50 U.S.C. 98-98h) is amended (1) by redesignating section 10 as section 11, and (2) by inserting after section 9 a new section 10 as follows: “Sec. 10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on and after January 1, 1972, the President may not prohibit or regulate the importation into the United States of any material determined to be strategic and critical pursuant to the provisions of this Act, if such material is the product of any foreign country or area not listed as a Communist-dominated country or area in general headnote 3(d) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202), for so long as the importation into the United States of material of that kind which is the product of such Communist-dominated countries or areas is not prohibited by any provision of law.“