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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2021
The perspective we are taking today on U.S. policy towards Southern Africa is, I believe, badly needed. It is both wrong and unrealistic to see southern Africa as detached from the rest of Africa. Africans in majority-ruled Africa know that. The British certainly know it. The Russians and the Chinese seem to know it. South Africa’s John Vorster has made clear how well he knows it.
1 The figures come from the Federal Energy Administration. (Editors’ note: Two special appendices originally attached to this paper were deleted due to space limitations. They concerned U.S. oil imports by country of origin and destinations of U.S. exports to Africa. These are available in the fuller Senate printing of the testimony and committee questioning.)
2 National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa. “Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa,” AF/NSC-1G 69, August 15, 1969, p. 27. Here after cited as NSSM 39 Study.
3 NSSM 39 Study, pp. 28-9.
4 NSSM 39 Study, p. 30.
5 NSSM 39 Study, pp. 30-1.
6 “World Trade Outlook for Africa,” Overseas Business Reports, U.S. Department of Commerce, OBR 75-16, March 1975, pp. 2-3.
“South Africa, Nigeria, and Zaire will be the major markets for U.S. sales, with high world commodity prices playing an important role in expanding their foreign exchange earnings and import potential,” says the same source, p. 2. It singles out for consideration in addition Angola, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zambia. OBR 75-20 of April 1975 is on “Marketing in Cameroon,” reflecting some interest there too.
7 OBR 75-16, March 1975, p. 3.
8 OBR 75-16, March 1975, pp. 2-3.
9 Herskovits, , Jean, , “Nigeria: Africa’s New Power.” Foreign Affairs, January 1975, p. 314, n. 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
10 “Market Factors in South Africa,” OBR 74-57, p. 18.
11 “Marketing in Nigeria,” OBR 74-66, p. 22.
12 See Appendix I. I am indebted to Professor Ann Seidman for the chance to benefit from reading her unpublished ms. dealing with U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa.
13 NSSM 39 Study, p. 8.
14 Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Represen tatives, March 20, 22 April 6, 1973.
15 “NATO Arms South Africa,” Africa, No. 47, July 1975, p. 34.
16 NSSM 39 Study, p. i. This statement comes under the heading of “I. SUMMARY B. The Problem.” It continues, “Our investments, primarily in South Africa, total about $1 billion and our trade yields a highly favorable balance of payments advantage. This geographically important area has major ship repair and logistic facilities which can be useful to our defense forces. An important space tracking station is located in South Africa. Outside of the region our investments in Africa total about $1.5 billion and profitable trade relations are expanding. Relationships involving these economic interests and a variety of other matters including U.S. defense installations elsewhere in Africa could become more difficult if our policies in southern Africa generate intense adverse reaction.” (p. ii.)
17 Ambassador John Scali said in 1973, “It is the single most trouble some issue that I have at the United Nations.” Importation of Rhodesian Chrome, Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, September 6, 1973. Washington 1973.
18 See “Washington Notes on Africa,” Washington Office on Africa, July 1975, pp. 1-2.
19 I shall not take up here the complex question of disinvestment and other variations on the theme of investment, except to stress the possibility that some firms may one day find their South African activities affecting opportunities they would like to pursue in black African countries.
20 I am indebted to Philip A. Wellons, lawyer at the International Legal Center (New York, N.Y.) and consultant to the O.E.C.D., for clarifying my ideas about the first of these three suggestions and contributing his own on the last two.
