When a capitalist exploiter dies, he is usually survived, apart from his heirs, by his cars, banking accounts, businesses, stocks and bonds. The victims of his exploitation do not survive him; they outlive him. Aware that the masses of the world—once beyond his predatory habits, greed and blood-sucking—are anxious to forget him, he leaves behind a will calling for the construction of a huge foundation, library or museum to perpetuate his name, a name which is usually engraved deep into the walls.

In the past fifteen years African heads of state and the Organization of African Unity have striven with little success to unite liberation movements fighting the settlers and colonialists in their countries in Southern Africa. The first attempt was made by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and other leaders, and was directed at uniting the Pan-Africanist Congress and its rival African National Congress of South Africa soon after both were banned and forced into exile following the Sharpeville demonstrations. When leaders of both parties fanned out into the world to solicit support, some of the would-be supporters forced them into a makeshift marriage of convenience.

Early this year I spent some time in Somalia with the purpose of looking for material that could contribute to a history of political ideas in twentieth century Africa; and, as it fortunately happened, I found much more than I had expected. If I was surprised at this it may have been partly because Somalia, at least in recent years, appears to have become somewhat neglected by Western scholarship. Some preliminary notes and impressions may therefore be of interest.

Alien settlerism in Africa may be defined as a system of colonization under which an expatriate white community has set itself up as sole possessor of power and sovereignty regardless of the usual status of a numerically inferior group as a minority. Within this definition, the settlers in Africa represent the remnants of foreign invasions from overseas (England, France, Portugal, Spain) which, having receded to their European shores, left behind distinct patterns of legal, political, economic and social oppression of the indigenous populations.

Nineteen fifty-five marked a turning point in Africa’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Prior to that year, the views of the few independent African nations had been completely overshadowed by cold war politics. The Bandung Conference, however, symbolized the emergence of a Third World approach to international problems, and African views on the Arab-Israeli conflict became increasingly important. With the winds of change blowing across the African continent, the two major contenders in the Middle Eastern crisis—Egypt and Israel—began to concentrate on wooing African support for their own positions.

I am pleased at this opportunity to give an account of recent developments in Ethiopia. As Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, I have been deeply engrossed in the subject ever since heavy fighting broke out in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea on January 31. I also have a very personal interest in this subject since I served at one time as Consul in Asmara. Indeed, twenty-five years ago last month I opened our consular post there.

The events that followed proved this expectation to have been based on weak axioms. The political division of the country-first into three, and later into four regions—resulted in political, economic and social imbalances. Not only did such a structure favor the growth of tribalism with its attendant evils; it aided the emergence of a class sytem of “haves,” “have-mores,” “have-littles,” and “have-nots.”

Over the nine years since the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in February 1966, Ghana has come under three different governments: that of the National Liberation Council (February 1966 to October 1969), the Progress government (late 1969 to January 1972), and the government of the National Redemption Council (1972– ). Various views have been expressed in journals and magazines where writers have tried to depict the country’s foreign policy under the different regimes. For instance, Ruth First said that the government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) pursued a pro-West policy, and the Times (London) said a day after the coup d’etat of 24 February 1966 that Ghana had “swung back to reliance on the West.” William Gutteridge, however, maintained that the NLC government had restored a degree of neutralism to the country’s foreign policy rather than abandon the policy of nonalignment and neutralism in entirety. He added that the NLC had opted for more modest pan-African policies following Nkrumah’s pan-African excesses. Other people accused the NLC government of supporting the colonialists in Africa by refusing to allow freedom fighters the opportunity to meet and organize from within Ghana.

The major legislative attention of Congress in 1974 with respect to Africa focused on aspects of U.S. aid policy and an effort to repeal the Byrd amendment, which permits the importation of strategic materials in contravention of U.N. sanctions.

In the area of U.S. aid policy, the Congress adopted several pieces of legislation with implications for Africa. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-559) requested the President to increase Africa’s share of the Agency for International Development (AID) loans and grants and to provide the developing nations of Africa with an equitable share of United States economic assistance (sec. 49).