Students of government quite often argue that citizen participation leads to a more equal sharing of economic resources in society. Most empirical support for this proposition comes from analyses of western European societies. In the third world literature, scholars advance this thesis mostly with regard to a village or community context. They assert that participation in key decisions of social change is a critical if not sufficient condition for insuring that the local populace's resources are mobilized and its needs served (Charlick, 1980; Huntington and Nelson, 1976; International Labour Office, 1977; and Nelson, 1979). At the nation-state level, particularly in Africa, there has been little opportunity because of the one-party states and military regimes to establish the character of the relationship between participation and the distribution of economic resources. One prominent study of elections in Kenya's one-party state (Bienen, 1978: 90) concludes that competition for elected office has created a government “responsive to popular pressure” and able to “deliver goods and services which are highly valued.” This study, however, did not attempt to establish that the poorer segments of the public actually benefited. For participation to result in any substantial equalization of wealth those who are most disadvantaged should receive some benefit. This paper seeks to explore this issue: Does a liberal democratic electoral system at the national level induce politicians of an African state to improve the economic existence of the poorer segments of the population? The empirical data for this analysis comes from Botswana. Since most of the poor in Botswana live in the rural areas, the paper will concentrate on rural development.