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Experimental Markets and Environmental Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2016

Jason F. Shogren
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Abstract

Experimental markets can be a useful tool to guide and evaluate environmental policy. This paper reviews four experiments to illustrate. Two institutional experiments are considered—Coasian bargaining with positive transaction costs, and a gaming experiment of dynamic choice in a conflict. Two valuation experiments are also discussed—the impact of sequential reduction mechanisms on the value of risk, and experimental auction markets to elicit the value of safer food.

Type
Invited Presentation
Information
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , October 1993 , pp. 117 - 129
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

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