1. I am grateful to Batya Stein for her excellent translation and her comments and suggestions, which significantly contributed to this paper. For a discussion of the concept of ideal types, see M. Weber, Gesammlte Aufsatze zur Wissenschafts Lehre, ed. Johannes Winckelman, 5th ed. (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1982), pp. 146–214.

2. R. T. De George, The Nature and Limits of Authority(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1985), chaps. 3–4.

3. See Jenkins, I., Social Order and the Limits of Law(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 154.Google Scholar

4. Ibid., pp. 159–160.

5. H. Tchernowitz, Toledot Ha-Halakha, pi. 1, p. 164.

6. Ibid., p. 165.

7. Albeck, S., Law Courts in Talmudic Times[Heb.] (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1987).Google Scholar

8. Ibid., p. 33. See also his detailed discussion in chap. 4.

9. Shimh Mekubetset, Baba Metsiah 59b

10. Maiki Ba-Kodesh, pt. 2. p. 74 (emphasis added).

11. Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 242:31

12. Commentary on Avodah Zarah 7a, s.v. hanish'al la-hakham. The phrase “pillars of the world” refers to R. Abraham b. David of Posquières (Ha-Ra'avad). whom R. Nissim quotes at the opening of this passage. The views of Ha-Ra'avad are discussed more extensively in the context of the deontic model.

13. See Siftei Cohen, Shulhan Arukh, loc. cit.

14. For R. Hirsch's responsum, see his Shemesli Marpeh, 52.

15. See Katz, Y., “Samson Rafael Hirsch Ha-Meyimjn Ve-Ha Masmil,” in Torah im Derekh Eretz, ed.M., Breuer (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1987), p. 16.Google Scholar On amberger, R. and his approach, see A., Stern, hhim Ve Kivunnim (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1987), chap. 3.Google Scholar

16. See JT Gittin 1:2, BT Eruvin 62b-63a, Kiddushin 31b, M. Sanhedrin 5:2, and Sanhedrin 110a.

17. Hilkhot Talmud Torah 5:1–2; see also Shulhan Anikh, Yoreh Deah 242

18. Hagahot Maimoniot, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 5:1–2, c.

19. Hilkhot Talmud Torah 28.

20. R. Samuel de Medina (Ha-Rashdam), Responsa Hoshen Mishpat 1 (emphasis added). See also R. Moshe Provençal, Responsa 6.

21. Albeck, Law Courts in Talmudic Times, p. 19.

22. Lehem Shamayim, pt. 1, introduction. For further analysis, see Sagi, A., It Is Not in Heaven: Issues in the Philosophy of Halakha [Heb.] (Ein Tsurim: Herzog Institute for Jewish Studies, 1993). chap. 7.Google ScholarPubMed

23. Compare Jenkins. Social Order and the Limits of Law, p. 159. Note that Jenkins does not adopt the positivist theory and views the legal system as part of a broader social context which, in turn, serves to justify and validate the legal system.

24. Sifrei, Mishpatim 154.

25. Malbim, Deut. 17:11. See also R. Baruch Halevy Epstein, Torah Temimah, ad loc

26. Gur Aryieh, Deut. 17:11.

27. Sefer Hamitzvot La-Rambam, Chavel ed. (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1981), p. 17.Google Scholar

28. See R. Hanania Cassis's commentary on Sefer Hamitzvot, Kin'at Soferim, ad loc.

29. It could possibly be claimed that Nahmanides is not endorsing a deontic model and simply believes there is no objective corpus of knowledge-the Torah is only what the rabbis say. Kirschenbaum explicitly suggests this view when he claims that, according to Nahmanides, ” there is no 'objective' right, and 'right' is what the sages of Israel say is 'right.'” See Kirschenbaum, A., “Equity and Jewish Law,” Da'at 13 (1984): 50. In my view, however, Nahmanides does acknowledge the existence of an objective corpus.Google Scholar His statement “He gave me the Torah as taught by them, even if they were to err” indicates that he foresees the possibility of a conflict between the Torah and a rabbinical decision. For an analysis of Nahmanides' position, see Sagi, A., “Decision Making and Objective Truth in Halakha: Some Considerations Regarding the Philosophy of Halakha”[Heb.], Diné Israel 15 (1989–90): 28–37; idem, “Halakhic Praxis and the Word of God: A Study of Two Models,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 1 (1992): 320–321; idem, “The Relationship between Peshat and Derash” [Heb.], Tarbiz 61 (1992): 583–592.Google Scholar

30. Hasagot, loc. cit.

31. R. Hayyim Azulai (Hida) suggests a different interpretation of Nahmanides. He stresses the phrase “confused his reasoning” and argues that if the Sanhedrin “could not bring themselves to tell him he is wrong…then it is possible that Nahmanides himself admits he need not heed their ruling” (Sha'ar Yosef, Horayot [Livorno, 1757], p. II). This interpretation seems implausible, however, and the one I suggested is also the one endorsed by R. Z. H. Heyyot: “Nahmanides did not claim that [he should heed them] only when they have all agreed to reject his claim. Whether they have answered his objections reasonably and logically, or told him they have all agreed to reject his claims for no reason, the majority is heeded even when they say about the right that it is left” (see The Complete Works [Jerusalem: Divrei Hakhamim, 1958], pt. I, p. 377).

32. See, for instance,Derashot Ha-Ran, Feldman, ed. (Jerusalem, 1977), p.112; H. Crescas, Or Elohim III, rule 5, chap. 2, and others.Google Scholar

33. In principle, the justification of hermeneutical authority may differ from that of legislative authority, and Maimonides and Nahmanides indeed disagreed on this count. See Sefer Hamitzvot II and Nahmanides' objection ad loc. I do not deal with this distinction in the following discussion.

34. Maimonides applies this argument to the hermeneutical as well as the legislative dimension of rabbinical activity, whereas Nahmanides limits it to the legislative realm.

35. See A. Sagi, “Between a Religious Commandment and a Legal Obligation: On the Halakhic Thought of R. Simeon Skop” [Heb.], Da'at, in press, and idem. It Is Not in Heaven, chap. 2, source 20.

36. As R. Simeon does, when he argues that the basis of halakhic authority is a rational sevara.

37. Wasserman, R.E., “Kuntres Divrei Soferim,” in Kovets Shi'urim, pt. 2 (Tel Aviv, 1963), p. 3.Google Scholar R. Wasserman was obviously not aware of R. Simeon's view when writing this, as R. Simeon does address this question. See also R. M. S. Cohen of Dvinsk, Mashakh Hokhmah on Deut. 17:11; Amiel, R.M., Darkei Moshe(Tel Aviv, 1983), I, chaps. 4–6.Google Scholar

38. It could be argued that these sources are irrelevant to a general discussion of models of authority, as they only apply to one specific and well-defined authority—the Sanhedrin. Halakhic literature, however, reveals a more complex picture. Maimonides indeed narrows the scope of application of this verse to the Great Court in Jerusalem (Hilkhot Mamrim 1:1–2). In talmudic sources, it is made to pertain to the “court in Yavneh” (seeSifrei, Mishpatim 153; JT Sanhedrin 11:3). Other sources, however, broaden its scope. See for instance R. Nissim, who supports the deontic model: ” The sages in all generationshave been empowered to decide regarding rabbinic disputes as they see fit…and we have been commanded to abide by their decisions, whether or not they are in line with the truth” (Derashot Ha-Ran, p. 112 [emphasis added); see also pp. 85–86 and She'iltot, Mishpatim 58). Note that Sefer Ha-Hinukhstates that the main obligation is to “abide by the Great Court and do all they have commanded…and this commandment is valid when the Great Court is in Jerusalem.” It then proceeds to claim, however, that “included in this commandment is also the obligation to abide by the instructions of the judge at all times” (Sefer Ha-Hinukh, Chavel ed. [Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1962], commandment 492, p. 650 [emphasis added]). See also Horowitz, Y., Shnei Luhot Ha-Berith(Jerusalem, 1963), chap. 4, p. 2. I also discuss below the views of R. Elyiahu Hamizrahi, who understands the verse “thou shalt not deviate” in broad terms. As the view endorsing a broad application of the verse requiring complicance with rabbinic instructions at all times is supported by several sages, it is clear that sources relying on this verse are relevant to a discussion about models of authority.Google Scholar

39. Assaf, S., “The Letters of R. Samuel b. Ali” [Heb.], Tarbiz 1 (1930): 64.Google Scholar

40. See Sagi, “Halakhic Praxis and the Word of God.”

41. Commentary on the Torah, Deut. 17:11. On the uses of this statement, see Hamizrahi's commentary ad loc.; David Nito, Mateh Dan, dispute 2, 68. See also Moses Sofer (Hatam Sofer), Commentary on the Torah, “Torat Moshe” ad loc. On Nahmanides' position, see my ” Decision Making and Objective Truth in Halakha.”

42. See his book of responsa Min Hashamayim and, in particular, the illuminating introduction by R. Reuven Margaliot.

43. See Mikhtav Me-Eliyahu, vol. 1, pp. 73–77

44. See Kovets Iggrot Haion Ish, pp. 38, 48, and others. For further analysis of the charismatic approach, see Urbach, E.E., The World of the Sages [Heb.] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1988), pp. 21–47Google Scholar; Heschel, A.Y., “Divine Inspiration in the Middle Ages,” in Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume, Hebrew sec. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1950).Google Scholar

45. See Bacon, GershonC., “Da'at Torah and Birthpangs of the Messiah” [Heb.], Tarbiz 52 (1983): 497–508. Note, in particular, R. Dessler's response to attacks blaming Orthodox rabbis for their failure of leadership during the Holocaust.Google Scholar

46. R. Eliyahu Mizrahi, Responsa, no. 57

47. Adar Hayakar, p. 39.

48. See Shweid, E., Democracy and Halakha [Heb.], (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1978).Google Scholar

49. Malki Bakodesh, pt. 3, pp. 80–81.

50. Maimonides claims that even the authority of the Talmud rests on public consent. See introduction to the Mishneh Torah.

51. The responsum (271) by R. Zevi Joshua Horowiu (Ha-Ribash), is particularly illuminating in this context. He dismisses the first argument as a basis for rabbinical authority in his own times and justifies it in terms of the people's willingness or agreement to acknowledge authority.

52. Maimonides, introduction to Mishneh Torah.

53. Sefer Ha-Hinukh, commandment 67, p. 120.

54. R. Nissim, Commentary on Avodah Zarah 7a. Many other sages support this stance. See, for instance, R. Shlomo b. Adret (Ha-Rashba) and R. Yom-Tov b. Abraham (Ha-Ritva) ad loc. The tosafists and R. Asher (Rosh) suggested a more complex approach in their talmudic commentaries.

55. Responsa Shemesh Marpeh, no. 52.

56. Ibid.

57. Israeli, R.S., Amud Ha-Yemani (Jerusalem: Eretz Hemdah, 1992), p.53.Google Scholar

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. See Be 'er Sheva (Warsaw, 1890), p. 7. See also R. Hayyim Yosef Azulai [Hida], Patah Eynayim, Rosh Hashanah 25b; Hayyim Palache, R., He-Hafetz Hayyim (Izmir, 1863),76:9.Google Scholar

61. Hefetz Adonmon Horayot (Dewa, 1928), pp. 163–164.

62. See Sefer Yere'im (Zalkov, n.d.), AmudHa-lyr'ah. no. 32.

63. Alluding to R. Hayyim Azulai (Ha-Hida), who wrote a book by this name.

64. Ha-Hefetz Hayyim 76, 11,