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2 Hawkins (at 196) points out that when the police deal with states of affairs and with a familiar population, their enforcement approximates a compliance rather than a sanctioning model. It might be overstating things, however, to suggest that the police turn away from sanctioning in these circumstances to the extent that business regulators almost invariably do.Google Scholar

3 S. Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy (1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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5 See J. Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (1985).Google Scholar

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9 A review of data from the United States, Australia, Israel, Britain, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Kuwait, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Costa Rica is available in Grabosky, P., Braithwaite, J., & Wilson, P. R., The Myth of Community Tolerance Toward White Collar Crime, 20 Austl. & N.Z. J. Criminology 33–44 (1987); for evidence to 1982, see Braithwaite, J., Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White Collar Criminals, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 723–63 (1982).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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11 Senior water board man, quoted by Hawkins at 194.Google Scholar

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13 J. Frank, F. T. Cullen, & L. F. Travis, Sanctioning Corporate Crime: Public Support for Civil and Criminal Intervention (paper to Annual Meeting of Midwest Criminal Justice Association, 1984).Google Scholar

14 Grabosky & Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle (cited in note 4).Google Scholar

15 M. Dukes & I. Lunde, Review of the Restrictive Actions Under the Australian Drug Regulatory System, Med. J. Austl., May 15, 1986, at 412–15.Google Scholar