1 It is incorrect to assume that all “public interest” clients have one position in common or that their interest is necessarily the same as that of the broader public. See, e.g., Leon H. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 401 (1975). Many lawyers also object to the use of the term “public interest law,” or “work in the public interest,” because they believe that any lawyer who conscientiously represents the interests of his or her client is operating in the public interest. One illustration of the definitional problem is the failure to include work for the public prosecutor-to some people, the very prototype of public interest work-within the meaning of the term. Nor is work for most public agencies considered public interest work within the meaning of this literature, although some especially “activist” government agencies have been included. Yet the definition used here has achieved wide usage and essentially has been adopted by the American Bar Association, which uses the term “public service law.” For an example of a more traditional use of the term, see Auerbach, Carl, Some Comments on Mr. Nader's Views, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 503 (1970)-, for examples of the reformist view, see F. Raymond Marks, with Kirk Leswing & Barbara A. Fortinsky, The Lawyer, the Public, and Professional Responsibility (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1972); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 207 (1976); and Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public Interest Law in America ((Washington) Council for Public Interest Law, 1976). For a detailed discussion of the variety of meanings attached to the term “public interest” and for an attempt to generate an economic definition consonant with the usage here, see Burton A. Weisbrod, Introduction in Burton A. Weisbrod, Joel F. Handler, & Neil K. Komesar, eds., The Public Interest and Public Interest Law: An Economic and Social Analysis (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1978).Google Scholar

2 See the discussion and papers in Ronald Gross & Paul Osterman, eds., The New Professionals (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972).Google Scholar

3 These protests are discussed briefly in Eric E. Van Loon, The Law School Response: How to Sharpen Students' Minds by Making Them Narrow, in Bruce Wasserstein & Mark J. Green, eds., With Justice for Some: An Indictment of the Law by Young Advocates (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970); Ralph Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1970); and Robert Stevens, Law School and Law Students, 59 Va. L. Rev. 551 (1973). See also The Rutgers Report, The White Law School and the Black Liberation Struggle, in Robert Lefcourt, ed., Law Against the People: Essays to Demystify Law, Order, and the Courts (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1971).Google Scholar

4 Jerry J. Berman & Edgar S. Cahn, Bargaining for Justice: The Law Students' Challenge to Law Firms, 5 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 16 (1970).Google Scholar

5 Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 Yale L.J. 1069 (1970); Marks, supra note 1; Nader, supra note 3; Van Loon, supra note 3.Google Scholar

6 See, e.g., Nader, supra note 3, or Van Loon, supra note 3. Van Loon reports that none of the 39 Harvard Law Review editors of 1970 planned to enter Wall Street practice upon graduation. For further discussion of the various alternative forms of practice, see references cited in preceding notes, as well as Robert Lefcourt, The First Law Commune, in Lefcourt, supra note 3; and Joel F. Handler, Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, & Howard S. Erlanger, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights (New York: Academic Press, 1978).Google Scholar

7 The most comprehensive of these studies in the literature is a comparison of the careers of graduates in the 1950s and 1960s at the law schools of the University of Chicago and the University of Illinois. See Simon, Rita J., Frank Koziol, & Nancy Joslyn, Have There Been Significant Changes in the Career Aspirations and Occupational Choices of Law School Graduates in the 1960's? 8 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1973). Other reports with similar conclusions include David N. Rockwell, The Education of the Capitalist Lawyer: The Law School, in Lefcourt, supra note 3, at 102; Mark J. Green, The Young Lawyers, 1972: Goodbye to Pro Bono, N.Y. Magazine 29 (March 1972); and the data and citations in Comment, A Survey of Chicago Law Student Opinions and Career Expectations, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628 (1972). By 1971 Nader's view of the “idealism” of law students seemed to have mellowed as well. See interview with Ralph Nader, reported in Blum, The Man Who Makes Waves, Redbook 70 (Nov. 1971), cited in Comment, id. at 642. For an analysis of consistency and change in the reasons offered for attendance at law schools in the 1960s and early 1970s, see Stevens, supra note 3, at 576-79.Google Scholar

8 These data are from a stratified random sample of practicing lawyers, interviewed by telephone in fall 1973 or spring 1974 by the staff of the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory. The average interview lasted more than one hour. The sample was primarily drawn from the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (1972), but since there is some evidence that this directory underrepresents solo practitioners, lawyers not in private practice, and especially young lawyers, a supplementary sample was drawn from other sources. This supplementary sample was constructed by first drawing 15 states at random (each state's probability of being chosen was proportional to the number of lawyers in the state); then respondents were drawn from the most complete list of lawyers available for that state. Responses were pooled and weighted to correct for the varying sampling ratios and response rates.Google Scholar

In tables 1 and 2, lawyers graduating before 1961 are treated as one group, and firm size is collapsed into three categories. Except as indicated in the text and notes, infra, further analysis of these variables reveals no patterns that affect the findings reported; hence, data were collapsed for ease of presentation. Blacks and women are included in the analysis, but since these groups constitute such a small percentage of the bar, differences by race and sex do not affect the findings shown. Some rough data on jobs held by blacks and women are presented in Howard S. Erlanger, Social Reform Organizations and Subsequent Careers of Participants: A Follow-up Study of Early Participants in the OEO Legal Services Program, 42 Am. Soc. Rev. 233, 238 n.16 (1977).Google Scholar

9 The obviously rough classification of “activist government agencies” is open to dispute. In general, the tendency here was to under include, expecially in the pre-1960s. Hence, “New Deal” lawyers or lawyers going to agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Communications Commission, or Federal Trade Commission during the aggressive phases of the history of those agencies are not classified as taking “public interest” jobs. The relatively small number of lawyers involved, compared with the large effort involved in classifying the agencies, made this coding strategy seem prudent.Google Scholar

10 Because of this trend over the years, and because of the relatively high turnover in public interest jobs, a substantial majority of lawyers in these jobs are recent graduates. Graduates of 1965 or later made up three-quarters of the lawyers in public interest jobs in 1972 (but only one-third of the bar); post-1960 graduates accounted for 90 percent of the lawyers in public interest jobs (but less than one-half of the bar).Google Scholar

11 Further analysis indicates that this trend actually started about 1950. The change is rather small in absolute terms, but since the cohorts of the fifties and sixties are consistently higher than previous cohorts, it is reasonable to infer that a small change took place. One should be cautious, however, about attributing substantive importance to the higher percentage of jobs in large firms taken by the 1966-70 cohort, relative to the 1961-65 or 1971-72 cohorts.Google Scholar

12 Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and Students' Orientation to Social Reform, 12 Law & Soc'y Rev. (1978). See also forthcoming studies by James Hedegard and Felice Levine of the American Bar Foundation.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Neil K. Komesar & Burton A. Weisbrod, The Public Interest Law Firm: A Behavioral Analysis, in Weisbrod, Handler, & Komesar, supra note 1.Google Scholar

14 These lawyers were interviewed in 1973, using procedures similar to those of the national sample described supra. The respondents constitute a statistically appropriate sample of all lawyers known to have worked in these settings in 1972. Sample design and other methodological issues regarding these data are discussed in Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6.Google Scholar

15 Data for the bar based on the national sample, described supra. Google Scholar

16 Of course, such a system of ranking is very subjective; however, no available alternative measure is any better.Google Scholar

17 The background characteristics of Legal Services lawyers are discussed in more detail in Howard S. Erlanger, Lawyers in Neighborhood Legal Services: Social Background and the Impetus for Reform, 12 Law & Soc'y Rev. (1978), and in Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 High class standing is apparently overreported. Note that one-half of all respondents reported themselves as being in the top quarter of their classes.Google Scholar

19 The empirical finding here is similar to that of Simon, Koziol, & Joslyn, supra note 7, but the interpretation is different because of the consideration of differential opportunity costs.Google Scholar

20 Approximately one-third of the lawyers in Legal Services in 1967 left before the end of their third year, another quarter left by their fifth year, and only 29 percent were still there in the fall of 1973. See Erlanger, supra note 17, or Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6.Google Scholar

21 Erlanger, supra note 8, and reported in more detail in Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6.Google Scholar

The data on Legal Services lawyers are from a stratified random sample of all known participants in the program in 1967; the same general procedures were used in this study as in the surveys discussed supra. The sample is biased (to an unknown degree) in that it under-represents persons with short tenure in the program, persons who have dropped out of the legal profession since leaving Legal Services, and persons who are too mobile to be located in spite of our extensive inquiries through a variety of sources. Further information on sampling may be found in Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6. The analysis here is restricted to white males; blacks and women are excluded from the analysis because of their small sample size in the control group, despite the fact that in 1967 each group constituted about one-eighth of the Legal Services participants.Google Scholar

22 The national sample of the bar is the same as that reported supra. However, lawyers who retired before 1967, who received their law degrees after 1967, or whose 1967 jobs were in Legal Services were dropped from this control group, as were all respondents who were not white males.Google Scholar

23 Preliminary analysis of the careers of lawyers who left jobs with public interest law firms shows similar patterns.Google Scholar

24 The effect identified here would operate analogously in any other job; the process outlined here is a general socioeconomic one, not one that is unique to public interest law.Google Scholar

25 It is also not to say that the supply curve is insensitive to the public interest wage but only that it appears to be nearly flat in the area of current demand. It is reported, for example, that when during a lecture at Harvard Ralph Nader asked law students who were interested in public interest law to stand up, 90 percent of the audience arose. As he named successively lower salaries, however, increasingly the students sat down until at $4,000 only two students remained standing. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1140. Several studies have also found that law students, even those labeling themselves politically radical, expect to have substantial incomes. See Comment, supra note 7, and Stevens, supra note 3.Google Scholar

26 In the national survey of lawyers, for example, 80 percent of the respondents report spending less than 10 percent of their billable hours doing pro bono work; the average is between 6 and 7 percent of billable hours, with essentially no difference shown by year of graduation. Outside billable hours, the pattern is similar; lawyers in private practice report doing about one-half hour per week of pro bono work, with little variation by year of graduation. (See Handler, Joel F., Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, Howard S. Erlanger, & Jack Ladinsky, The Public Interest Activities of Private Practice Lawyers, 61 A.B.A.J. 1388 (1975), or Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6.) The following table shows the distribution of pro bono work during billable (1973) and nonbillable hours (1972-73) for lawyers in private practice, by type of client served.Google Scholar

Lawyers who graduated in the late 1960s seem more likely than other lawyers, both older and younger, to work for nontraditional clients (such as individuals and groups with civil rights, consumer, or environmental problems, or indigents with landlord-tenant, welfare, or credit problems), rather than for more traditional clients (such as charitable organizations or hospitals, or individuals with family or criminal problems). Additional analysis shows that these late-1960s graduates are also most concerned about not doing enough pro bono work. However, the most recent graduates interviewed, those who graduated in the early 1970s, report the lowest involvement in nontraditional pro bono cases; lawyers in this cohort are also somewhat less likely than those who graduated in the 1960s to report that they feel they should be doing more pro bono work.Google Scholar

27 See discussion in Edward Berlin, Anthony Z. Roisman, & Gladys Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 675 (1970); Marks, supra note 1; Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6; Comment, supra note 5; Weisbrod, Handler, & Komesar, supra note 1; Council for Public Interest Law, supra note 1.Google Scholar

28 Council for Public Interest Law, supra note 1.Google Scholar

29 Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6. A majority of lawyers in the bar (interviewed in the national survey, supra) apparently do not share those sentiments. The table below shows the percentages of the cohorts who felt that there should be “no restrictions on OEO Legal Services taking suits against the government”:Google Scholar

Year of Graduation Google Scholar

Prior toGoogle Scholar

1961 1961-65 1966-70 1971-72 TotalGoogle Scholar

Attorneys feeling that there should be “no restrictions on OEO Legal Services taking suits against the government” 60% 66% 71% 74% 64%Google Scholar

30 Interviews with participants in the program in 1972 indicate that at that time Legal Services was still “alive and well” and engaged in as much law reform effort as before. See Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6.Google Scholar

31 It has been suggested that one way to lower wages in the private sector is through increased competition. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95A S. Ct. 2004 (1975), and in the recent Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court has banned the minimum fee schedule and permitted lawyers to advertise. There has also been a movement toward increased use of legal clinics and of legal expense insurance. However, the ultimate cost effects of increased use of legal clinics and legal expense insurance in any of its forms is unknown. Finally, given the nature of the current market for legal services, the change most likely to decrease the wage in the private sector is a substantial increase in the total number of practicing lawyers.Google Scholar

32 These efforts to broaden commitment would be useful, however, in increasing public interest efforts and financial support in the private bar.Google Scholar

33 To the extent that the 1960s and 1970s also marked an increase in the percentage of lawyers joining large firms (as suggested in table 1 and in previous studies), this development is also most likely explained by characteristics of the demand for lawyers rather than of the supply. Given the large number of graduates and the relatively few positions that large firms have vacant at any one time, it is unlikely that these positions will go begging. Conversely, it is unlikely that large firms will hire more lawyers just because many graduates want jobs with them.Google Scholar

34 In analyses of the types of jobs that people hold, job-market factors are frequently omitted. For a discussion of the implications of this omission for the study of social mobility, see Aage Danger Sørensen, Models of Social Mobility, 4 Soc. Sci. Research 65 (1975), or Sørensen, Attainment and Opportunity, Discussion Paper 176-73 (Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, 1973).Google Scholar

35 A recent comprehensive review of the financial status of public interest law firms (the usual recipients of foundation funds) suggests, however, that the firms are not in as precarious a position as many writers believe. See Council for Public Interest Law, supra note 1, at 239.Google Scholar

36 Commitment to public service is seen by many writers in the field of sociology as part of the uniqueness of professional occupations. See, e.g., Bernard Barber, Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions, 92 Daedalus 669 (1963); Richard H. Hall, Occupations and the Social Structure (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975); Wilbert E. Moore, The Professions: Roles and Rules (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970); for a critique, see Douglas A. Klegon, Lawyers and the Social Structure: An Historical Analysis of the Role of Professionalization Among Lawyers in the United States (unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975).Google Scholar

37 In addition to the positions of Marks, supra note 1, and Tucker, infra note 39, see the statements of Justice Brennan and Dean Griswold, who more generally discuss the undesirability of a bar bifurcated into private practice and public service sectors. Associate Justice William J.Google Scholar

Brennan, Jr., The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, in Arthur E. Sutherland, ed., The Path of the Law from 1967 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); Erwin N. Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, in Sutherland, id. A discussion of the history of the bifurcated bar may be found in Klegon, supra note 36.Google Scholar

38 Marks, supra note 1, at 288-93; see also id. at 273-87 for a general analysis of the burdens of public interest work and a consideration of alternative sources of funding. For an economic analysis of the latter issue, see Richard Settle & Burton A. Weisbrod, Financing of Public Interest Law; An Evaluation of Alternative Financing Arrangements, in Weisbrod, Handler, & Komesar, supra note 1.Google Scholar

39 Tucker, Mama S., Pro Bono Publico or Pro Bono Organized Bar? 60 A.B.A.J. 916 (1974).Google Scholar

40 E.g., AB 4050, introduced by Assemblyman John Knox in March 1976.Google Scholar

41 See, e.g., the arguments of Robert J. Rauch, Public Interest Law: Should Lawyers Pick Up the Tab? 61 A.B.A.J. 453 (1975); and Marks, supra note 1. Not the least of these problems centers on the definition of the public interest. For example, a dissenting judge in the lower court decision in the Alaska pipeline case, Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (1974), noted that, in his view, getting oil down from Alaska was more important to the public interest than were the environmental considerations; hence he opposed the granting of fees to the Wilderness Society and its coplaintiffs.Google Scholar

42 S.F. Recorder, Apr. 7, 1977, at 1.Google Scholar

43 For a more detailed discussion of these and other groups, see Marks, supra note 1; and Handler, Hollingsworth, & Erlanger, supra note 6. On the recent asserted successes of the Chicago Council of Lawyers, see Peter Dowd & Marcia Dowd, Chicago Experiments in Delivering Neighborhood Legal Services, 1 New Directions in Legal Services 85 (1976).Google Scholar

44 Council for Public Interest Law, supra note 1, at 90.Google Scholar

45 Data from the national survey of the legal profession (supra) indicate that there is a widespread feeling that current efforts are inadequate. The table below shows the percentages of the cohorts who felt that “efforts of the organized bar to deliver legal services to those groups with relatively little access to the legal system” were insufficient:Google Scholar

Year of Graduation Google Scholar

Prior to 1961 1961-65 1966-70 1971-72 TotalGoogle Scholar

Attorneys feeling that “efforts of the organized bar to deliver legal services to those groups with relatively little access to the legal system” were insufficient 50% 61% 66% 65% 57%Google Scholar

46 See the detailed .discussion and analysis in Adolf Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of America, 23 Buffalo L. Rev. 343 (1974); and Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 636 (1974).Google Scholar

47 The Burger Court has moved to curtail access to the federal courts on the theory that they are already overloaded and are being burdened with matters that are more properly dealt with by legislatures. Recent cases have denied standing except where a direct injury can be shown, where the injury is unique to the plaintiff, and where the plaintiff is asserting his or her own rights rather than those primarily of a third party. The Court has also moved to curtail the feasibility of class-action suits for monetary damages and has restricted the ability to sue in federal court to redress alleged violation of constitutional rights. In the area of constitutional claims, the Court has also placed increasing reliance on state courts for adjudication. However, while standing in the federal courts has been curtailed, other changes in federal law have greatly expanded public representation in federal agency proceedings (see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1975)). In addition, there have been moves in this direction at the state level (see Center for Public Representation, Inc., Toward a Fairer and More Responsive Administration (Madison, Wis.: Center for Public Representation, 1975) and Handbook on Public Advocacy in the Administrative State (Madison, Wis.: Center for Public Representation, 1976)).Google Scholar

48 Comment, supra note 46. In certain cases the award is mandatory; in others it is at the discretion of the court.Google Scholar

49 Newman v. Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). In the instant case there was clear statutory provision for fees, but the reasoning of the Court in support of the fees awarded appeared to sanction such awards even when statutory authority was absent. See Comment, supra note 46.Google Scholar

50 As the table below (from the national survey of the bar, supra) indicates, also close to one-half the members of the bar support the private attorney general idea.Google Scholar

51 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (1974). See Note, Private Attorney General Fees Emerge from the Wilderness, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 258 (1974), and Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the Private Attorney General: Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 Hastings L.J. 733 (1973).Google Scholar

52 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 46; and Richard V. Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 Md. L. Rev. 379 (1973). see also Dawson, John P., Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1975); Peter Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 301 (1973); Harold Leventhal, Attorneys' Fees for Public Interest Representation, 62 A.B.A.J. 1134 (1976). But cf. Richard K. Walker, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees under the Private Attorney General Concept: A Defense Perspective, 23 U. Kan. L. Rev. 653 (1975); and various objections by the public such as Editorial, Legal Fees, S.F. Examiner, Apr. 22, 1975.Google Scholar

53 See discussion in Case Note, Eleventh Amendment Does Not Bar an Award of Attorney's Fees Based on the Private Attorney General Theory, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 133 (1975).Google Scholar

54 In the early seventies, there was concern that public interest law firms, which bring most of the private attorney general suits, would be denied tax exemption as nonprofit organizations. (See Goldsmith, Richard N., The IRS Man Cometh: Public Interest Law Firms Meet the Tax Collector, 13 Ariz. L. Rev. 857 (1971).) In 1974 the Internal Revenue Service ruled that a nonprofit public interest law firm could accept fees awarded by a court or public agency only up to 50 percent of the firm's litigation budget if it was to maintain tax-exempt status. (See IRS Limits Fees in Law Firm Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1974.)Google Scholar

55 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95A S. Ct. 1612 (1975). This decision has been the subject of a good number of notes and commentaries; see, e.g., Case Note, Attorneys' Fees-Public Interest Litigation-Absent Statutory Authorization, Federal Courts May Not Award Fees under the “Private Attorney General” Exception, 1975 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 777. For Justice Thurgood Marshall's optimistic interpretation of the implications of this decision, see Marshall, Financing Public Interest Law Practice: The Role of the Organized Bar, 61 A.B.A.J. 1487 (1975).Google Scholar

56 Thus the battle was lost on both fronts, because the substantive victory was overturned by congressional legislation.Google Scholar

57 Under the “American Rule,” each party bears its own court costs in almost all cases; this is in marked contrast with the procedure in Great Britain. See, e.g., the discussion in Homburger, supra note 46.Google Scholar

58 Over 73 bills were introduced in the last session of Congress, sponsored by such diverse senators as Kennedy and Buckley. See Update, 1 New Directions Legal Services 8 (June 1976); and Leventhal, supra note 52.Google Scholar

59 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, sec. 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (amending 42 U.S.C. 1988 (1970)).Google Scholar

60 Magnuson-Moss Warranty and Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 2301 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).Google Scholar

61 See discussions in Council for Public Interest Law, supra note 1. Prospective participants are to be informed whether they will be compensated before proceedings begin. Participants in a number of proceedings have already been compensated with awards as high as $20,000.Google Scholar

62 In 1974-75 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (successor to the Atomic Energy Commission) appeared to be taking major steps in this direction, and the comptroller general advised that such agencies do have discretionary power to make such awards (see Council for Public Interest Law, supra note 1, at 291-96).Google Scholar

63 Similar legislation has recently been passed in California. Henry Weinstein, California's New Gold Rush, Juris Doctor, Jan. 1978, at 8.Google Scholar

64 The uncertainty of funding alone is justification for pursuing such nonprofessional alternatives as lay advocacy. But there are other reasons as well: lawyers are not uniquely qualified to advocate underrepresented interests, and their favored methods of advocacy may not always be the most appropriate. On these points, and for a discussion of alternatives to the professional model, see especially Marc Galanter, The Duty Not to Deliver Legal Services, 30 U. Miami L. Rev. 929 (1976). see also Trubek, David M., Book Review, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 303; Richard Danzig & Michael J. Lowy, Everyday Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 675 (1975); Laura Nader & Linda R. Singer, Dispute Resolution, 51 Cal. St. B.J. 281 (1976); Center for Public Representation, supra note 47.Google Scholar