1 See A. Bentley, The Process of Government 226–27, 370–71, 454–55 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); D. Truman, The Governmental Process 506–16 (New York: Knopf, 1951).Google Scholar

2 T. J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969).Google Scholar

3 See e.g., R. B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1975); id., The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 655; C. R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985); id., Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 Va. L. Rev. 271 (1986).Google Scholar

4 Washington is now the leading headquarters city in the United States, with some 29% of all national nonprofit associations headquartered there in 1981, up from 19% in 1971. Washington Post, July 13, 1983. More than 4,000 individual corporations retain representatives in Washington; 1,200 firms employ permanent government affairs sta5s there. Washington Representatives Directory 1984, at 5. Lawyers are a highly visible segment of this growing array of representatives. Washington has by far the highest ratio of lawyers to population of any major metropolitan area. B. A. Curran et al., The Lawyer Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile of the U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s at 583 (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1985). Membership in the D.C. bar, which is not mandatory for government lawyers, exceeded 35,000 by 1981. Letter from the Director of Administration and Finance of D.C. Bar, 1981. Given that there are some 25,000 lawyers with permanent offices in the District, this suggests that thousands of nonresident lawyers appear as counsel there. The number of out-of-town law firms maintaining a branch office in D.C. grew from 45 in 1965 to 247 in 1983. Martindale-Hubbell 1965; National Law Journal, The NLJ 250: A Special 5-Year Report on the Dramatic Growth of the Nation's Largest Law Firms, Special Anniversary section, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2.Google Scholar

5 See at 212–14 infra for a description of the sample.Google Scholar

6 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); J. Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York Basic Books, 1973) (“Wilson, Political Organizations”); T. M. Moe, The Organization of Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) (“Moe, Organization of Interests”); J. Chubb, Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of Energy (Palo Alto, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1983) (“Chubb, Interest Groups”); J. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 390 (1983).Google Scholar

7 A. L. Fritschler, Smoking and Politics (Englewocd Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983); R.A. Bauer, I. Pool, & L. A. Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (Chicago: Aldine, 1963) (“Bauer et al.”).Google Scholar

8 K. L. Schlozman & J. T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1986); E. O. Laumann, D. Knoke, & J. Kim, An Organizational Approach to Policy Formation: A Comparative Study of Energy and Health Domains, 50 Am. Soc. Rev. 1 (1985).Google Scholar

9 Much of the research on lobbyists has been done at the state level, using lists of registered lobbyists. See L. H. Zeigler & M. Baer, Lobbying (San Francisco: Wadsworth Press, 1969); W. D. Devries, The Michigan Lobbyist: A Study in the Bases and Perceptions of Effectiveness (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1960); S. C. Patterson, The Role of the Lobbyist: The Case of Oklahoma, 25 J. Politics 72 (1963); B. D. Kolesa, Lobby in the Nonpartisan Environment: The Case of Nebraska, 24 W. Pol. Q. 65 (1971); L. H. Zeigler & H. Van Dalen, Interest Groups in State Politics, in H. Jacobs & K. Vines, eds., Politics in the American States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). While such lists may be appropriate at the state level, the deficiencies of the lobbyist registration lists as rosters of those actively engaged in attempts to affect federal policy are well known (U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Affairs 1983). Milbrath's study of lobbyists, which remains the locus elussicus within the field, is based on interviews with a sample of 114 lobbyists on the registration lists. L. Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1963) (“Milbrath, Washington Lobbyists”). Cherrington and Gillen and Hall conducted unstructured interviews with business group representatives. See P. W. Cherrington & R. L. Gillen, The Business Representative in Washington (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1962) (“Chenington & Gillen”); D. R. Hall, Corporative Lobbying—The Power of Pressure (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969). More recently Berry studied both organizations and individuals, but only among public interest groups. J. Berry, Lobbying for the People (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977) (“Berry, Lobbying”).Google Scholar

10 M. Green, The Other Government (New York: Grossman, 1975); J. Goulden, The Superlawyers (New York: Weybright & Talley, 1972); George washington Law Review, Inside Washington Law: The Roles and Responsibilities of the Washington Lawyer, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 526 (1970).Google Scholar

11 C. Horsky, The Washington Lawyer (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952).Google Scholar

12 Wilson's analysis of political organizations devotes a chapter to organizational representation. Although it raises some salient issues about the representative-organization relationship, it does not attempt to develop a comprehensive analysis of the relationship. Wilson, Political Organizations at 305–25. Moe's analysis of the internal politics of interest organizations distinguishes among the major participants in the organization and recognizes the potential influence that the representative staff may have on organizational goals and tactics through their control of information and expertise, but it contains no empirical data that address the issue. Moe, Organization of Interests at 97–100. Cherrington & Gillen at 49–510; Bauer et al. at 330–31; L. A. Dexter, How Organizations Are Represented in Washington 143–45 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964); and Berry, Lobbying at 79–109, comment briefly on the relationships between representatives and organizations but do not attempt to generalize beyond their particular subject matter. Milbrath, Washington Lobbyists, again is the most comprehensive analysis. He asked lobbyists about their personal histories and present activities, as well as about the organization that employed them. Given the date of the research and the size and scope of his sample, however, additional data on the relationships between representatives and organizations would surely be welcome.Google Scholar

13 See, e.g., Moe, Organization of Interests at 97–100.Google Scholar

14 See D. Bell, The Coming of Post-industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1976); R. E. Lane, The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society, 31 Am. Soc. Rev. 649 (1966); R. H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York: Hall & Wang, 1967); S. Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

15 See E. Freidson, Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); J. P. Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 891 (1983).Google Scholar

16 R. H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 Midw. J. Pol. Sci. (1969); Moe, Organization of Interests at 9700 (cited in note 6); Wilson, Political Organizations at 305–25 (cited in note 6).Google Scholar

17 See, e.g., Berry, Lobbying (cited in note 9).Google Scholar

18 See, e.g., Lane, Wiebe, and Skowronek (works cited in note 14).Google Scholar

19 For a broad review and analysis, see Freidson, Professional Powers (cited in note 15).Google Scholar

20 Again, see Freidson, id., for a useful discussion of distinctions among different kinds of experts. In the end, Freidson follows the same convention and limits his analysis to established professional groups.Google Scholar

21 Green, The Other Government (New York: Grossman, 1975); J. S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

22 B. Danet, K. B. Hoffman, C N. C. Kermish, Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client Interaction: The Biography of a Failure, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 905 (1980).Google Scholar

23 H. Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in A. King, ed., The New America Political System (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978) (“Heclo, Issue Networks”).Google Scholar

24 Cited in note 11.Google Scholar

25 T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: Free Press, 1954).Google Scholar

26 T. Parsons, The Law and Social Control, in W. Evan, ed., Law and Sociology (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962).Google Scholar

27 J. P. Heinz, & E. O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1982) (“Heinz & Laumann, Chicago Lawyers”).Google Scholar

28 R. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm. 37 Stan. L. Rev., 503 (1984).Google Scholar

29 Green, The Other Government (New York: Grossman, 1975). Moreover, it is not clear whether the model of representatives as autonomous mediators applies to nonprofessionals, who are not schooled in professional ethics and may not possess the collectivity orientation that Parsons attributes to the professions. There may be other, nonprofessional sources of such a broader social perspective by representatives, including government service or even participation in “the Washington community.” It is necessary, therefore, to examine the potential bases for the autonomy and influence of both professional and nonprofessional representatives.Google Scholar

30 The distinction between client organization and representative in the private sphere is much more complicated than is the case for public representatives. No study of legislative representation, for example, encounters doubt as to the identification of the representatives. They are the legislators, officially endowed with the power to act authoritatively. The identity of interest group representatives is not as clear. Lobbyist registration laws produce lists of individuals who may be taken as representing organized groups, but we know many lobbyists do not register, and there is seldom any assurance that even those who do are the principal agents of their respective organizations. Consider a trade association. It may employ several people to monitor government actions, call on friendly congressmen, or intervene in a case pending before a regulatory agency. Testimony on behalf of the association may be given to a congressional committee hearing by the elected president of the organization. But that person may be a short-term unpaid official who is the CEO of a firm that belongs to the trade association. Is that spokesperson a representative of the principal, or the principal itself? Milbrath, Washington Lobbyists (cited in note 9), opted for the latter conception; Berry, Lobbying (cited in note lo), chose the former. Our sense is that it is often impossible to make the distinction with any confidence. Individuals often play many roles, some within the organization, some representing it to the external world, and some that are quite unrelated to the particular organization at all. The task of research is to sort out those roles and determine how they are organized and interrelated. Accordingly, we have included as a representative anyone who is deemed by organization officials to be representing its interests in Washington. Our conception of a representative is thus much broader than conventional discussions of lobbyists, and the distinction should be noted at the outset. The two roles are not identical. Lobbyist is a narrower concept, both in its legal meaning—the 1946 Lobby Registration law refers only to direct efforts to influence legislation-and in its popular connotations-it implies pressure, cajolery, with a high incidence of unsavory methods and a liberal use of money. Representation, on the other hand, may include lobbying but encompasses other forms of service to the client and a much broader array of possible institutional targets as well. Representation implies little or nothing regarding the techniques employed. The term readily accommodates the narrowest, most lawyerly forms of client service, such as formal representation in court, as well as conventional lobbying, public relations work, and consulting relationships. It was surprising when Milbrath (1963) reported how much time his lobbyists spent in their offices and how little importance they attached to having contracts on Capitol Hill. Many Washington representatives never go to the Hill, but instead spend much of their time simply monitoring the Washington scene on behalf of their clients. As such, representative is clearly the broader and more useful term, and it enables us to examine a much larger and more diverse set of people.Google Scholar

31 See note 12.Google Scholar

32 For discussion of a similar approach, see D. hoke & E. O. Laumann, The Social Organization of National Policy Domains: An Exploration of Some Structural Hypotheses, in N. Lin & P. V. Marsden, eds., Social Structure and Network Analysis 256 (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1983).Google Scholar

33 Operational definitions of each domain are provided in app. 1. The particular topics included in a given operational definition of a policy domain were determined from a broad-ranging reading of the documentary sources pertaining to a particular policy subject. The Congressional Quarterly, e.g., regularly publishes volumes devoted to reviewing legislative and other initiatives over the course of the year that bear on particular policy topics, such as health and energy. The Federal Register was also consulted for information about the activities of specific executive agencies having responsibility for particular substantive policies.Google Scholar

34 See, e.g., D. Hadwiger, & W. Browne, eds., The New Politics of Food (Lexington, Mass.: Lesington Books, 1978); H. Guither, The Food Lobbyists (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980); J. P. Heinz, The Political Impasse in Farm Support Legislation. 71 Yale L.J. 952 (1962); D. H. Davis, Energy Politics (3d ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Chubb, Interest Groups (cited in note 6).Google Scholar

35 See, e.g., T. Marmor, The Politics of Medicare (London: Routledge & Kegan, Paul, 1970); P. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982).Google Scholar

36 See, e.g., G. Wilson, Unions in American National Politics (London: Macmillan, 1979); J. D. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (New York: Knopf, 1969); D. Bok & J. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970).Google Scholar

37 Heclo, Issue Networks (cited in note 23).Google Scholar

38 The procedures for identifying organizations active in a domain required a substantial amount of documentary investigation and preliminary interviewing. No existing list adequately defined the population of interested parties. Each policy area involves numerous policy-making subsystems within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, each of which potentially attracts distinctive types of participants. Because any one method of locating interested parties has a systematic bias toward identifying certain kinds of organizations and neglecting others, we combined nominations from several sources and thereby attempted to compile a comprehensive listing of relevant organizations. Appendix 2 describes the details of our sampling methods and the nature of the resulting sample. This strategy achieved our analytic objectives. The several measures of activation allow us to examine patterns of participation and representation by the putatively most influential actors in each system. But we also identified a number of smaller organizations, as well as organizations that participate only intermittently in the selected domains. Thus, we produced a list that faithfully reflects variations in the kinds of organizations that participate in policy making, in the nature of the interests they pursue, and in the sorts of resources they can bring to bear.Google Scholar

39 We identified the representatives by conducting telephone interviews with client informants in a minimum of 75 organizations in each domain, 316 organizations in all. The response rate was 78%, with 10% of the organizations refusing interviews. Another 12% could not be located, were located overseas, or had ceased to exist. The refusals did not follow a pattern and therefore do not constitute a major source of bias. See Andrew Shapiro, “Sampling Memorandum,” June 28, 1984, at 12–14 (on file with authors). These informants were identified by using published listings of organization officers, supplemented with direct inquiries of the organizations to determine who had operating responsibility for the organization's involvement in federal policy in the appropriate domain. The informant was asked to name up to four individuals inside the organization (employees, officers, member-volunteers) and up to four individuals external to the organization (employed in outside firms, trade associations, and so forth, but not falling within the definition of an internal representative) who acted as key representatives for the organization in the policy area. It is this listing of nominated individuals from which we drew the sample. The client interviews generated between 400 and 450 names of representatives in each domain, for a total of 1,716 individuals. (Representatives could appear on the lists as many times as they were mentioned; about 5% appeared in more than one domain.) Random selection from these lists produced samples of 257 to 261 representatives per domain, with a realized sample ranging from 192 to 216 across the four domains. The overall response rate of representatives is 77%. About 10% of the representatives contacted declined interviews; the remainder of those not interviewed could not be scheduled for various reasons. See Shapiro at 16–17 for more information on the response rates by domain. Slightly more than two-thirds of the respondents were based in Washington and were personally interviewed there. Another 15%, based in other major cities, also were interviewed personally. The remainder of the sample was interviewed by telephone using an adapted format. The fact that almost one-third of the persons meeting our definition of a Washington representative are located outside the Washington metropolitan area deserves stressing. Contrary to much received opinion, which has taken notice of the rapid growth of the trade association and lawyer populations in Washington over the past decade, Washington does not currently exercise a monopoly over the performance of the representational function. Unfortunately, we lack any historical evidence that would permit us to estimate the extent to which this function has shifted to Washington. Certainly we might expect that different aspects of representation might be done by “Washington insiders,” and our data do permit this sort of analysis.Google Scholar

40 The target government officials (including those holding elected, appointed, and career positions) were identified by asking the representatives sampled to give the names and positions of “the five government officials or staff members you contact most often in the course of your work” in the appropriate policy domain. From these lists, we sampled 101 to 108 names in each domain and successfully interviewed about 72%. About 8% of the government officials declined to be interviewed. See Shapiro at 18 for more information on the response rate by domain.Google Scholar

41 For a general discussion see 0. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975).Google Scholar

42 Freidson, Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).Google Scholar

43 See Washington Post, July 13, 1983; Auerbach, Unequal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Green, The Other Government (New York: Grossman, 1975); Time, March 3, 1986, at 2634.Google Scholar

44 Milbrath, Washington Lobbyists at 40 (cited in note 9); 71 of 104 lobbyists received a salary but no fee from clients.Google Scholar

45 K. L. Schlozman, & J. T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy 101 (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).Google Scholar

46 Organizations were classified as follows. Businesses include all for-profit corporations and public utilities except those organization types included in the nonprofit category (such as for-profit hospitals). Nonprofit organizations include universities, hospitals, research organizations, and humanitarian organizations, such as the Red Cross and CARE. Trade associations include associations of business organizations (as defined above) and individuals engaged in business (such as fanners). Both single-industry and multi-industry organizations (such as the Chamber of Commerce) are included. Professional associations include associations of individual professionals (such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers), as well as associations of nonprofit organizations (as defined above). Citizen-government organizations include groups that advocate the interests of particular subpopulations (such as veterans, children, the elderly, minorities), particular social and political issues (such as the environment, consumer rights, world population and hunger, drug abuse, abortion), and government agencies (typically at the local or state level, such as the National Governors' Association). A small number of representatives working in political action committees (PACs) were sampled; these were classified according to the type of their parent organization. Positions within organizations were classified as follows. The category “executivies” includes organization-wide leadership position, including chief executive officers, presidents, chairmen, board members, and so forth. “Government affairs” includes such titles as government affairs officer, legislative director, D.C. office manager, public relations director, and D.C. representative. “Research stall” includes ail other nonlegal positions inside organizations. A small number of individuals held two titles in the organization. They were classified by the highest ranked title, using the following ranking: (1) government affairs, (2) internal legal positions, (3) executive positions, and (4) other positions. Due to the small number of government affairs representatives in nonprofit organizations, these respondents were combined with the executives of nonprofit organizations.Google Scholar

47 It might be argued that the high proportion of organizational employees is an artifact of our sampling design, in that by starting with an organization employee as an informant and asking for “key representatives” we biased the list of nominations in favor of organization employees. It is true that by using the term “key representative” we limited the set of representatives to those who played a major representative role for the client organization. Thus, the law firm associate who prepared a summary of a piece of legislation is not likely to be named as a key representative, though the partner who gave him the assignment is nominated. Our procedure does, however, establish a group of individuals with a comparable level of involvement in representation. The potential for bias is counteracted to some extent by the fact that we asked for the same number of internal and external representatives. The sense that came through clearly during the course of the client interviews was that respondents nominated virtually all of the external representatives who had done work for the organization in the policy domain in recent years. Some 40% of the organizational informants named the maximum number of internal representatives allowed (four), but only 23% could name as many as four external representatives. Thus, if the limit caused any underenumeration, it is more likely to have been an underenumeration of the inside representatives. The pattern seems to reflect a genuine difference in the relative use of internal and external representatives rather than a bias of the informants. Only 31% of all organizations surveyed reported that they regularly retained law firms for advice and representation in the policy domain, and one-half (51%) reported that they never used law firms for such purposes. See E. O. Lauman & J. P. Heinz, Washington Lawyers and Others: The Structure of Washington Representation, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 465, 480 (1985). This interpretation is further supported by comparison of the frequency with which client organizations report using nominated individuals. Of all representatives named, 75% were said to represent the organization regularly. For representatives based in law and consulting firms, that figure is virtually the same (73% and 71% respectively).Google Scholar

48 Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1983 (Washington, D.C., 1983).Google Scholar

49 See note 4.Google Scholar

50 Milbrath, Washington Lobbyists (cited in note 9). We should note that Milbrath's sample is not directly comparable to ours. We have defined representatives much more broadly. Executives, internal lawyers, and other internal staff are less likely to register as lobbyists than are government affairs personnel or external lawyers, and this may account for the somewhat lower proportion of lawyers in our sample. Other research on lobbysits has found surprisingly similar percentages. Of Berry's sample of public interest group lobbyists, 35% had law degrees. Berry, Lobbying at 88 (cited in note 9). Zeigler and Baer's four-state study of state lobbyists found a low of 10% lawyers in Utah and a high of 42% lawyers in North Carolina. Zeigler & Baer, Lobbying at 44 (San Francisco: Wadsworth Press, 1969).Google Scholar

51 Guither, The Food Lobbyists (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980).Google Scholar

52 E. O. Laumann & D. Knoke, The Organizational State ch. 4 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

53 Income varies by domain, from a low of 55,000 in labor to a high of 75,000 in energy, but the differences in earnings across domains are overshadowed by differences across organizaion positions. An analysis of covariance of income by domain and organizaiton position, entering age as a covariate, found that while all the main effects were significant, organization position uniquely explains some 28% of the variance in income; domain uniquely explains only 1.3% of the variance.Google Scholar

54 We were, of course, using an intentionally comprehensive definition of Washington representatives.Google Scholar

55 Almost one-quarter (22%) of the representatives working in law firms are based in other cities, mostly such major urban centers as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. This group reports spending an average of about 2–3 days a month in Washington.Google Scholar

56 Though he does not exclude inside counsel from consideration, he does not appear to have them especially in mind.Google Scholar

57 Heinz & Laumann, Chicago Lawyers at 70 (cited in note 27).Google Scholar

58 Id. Google Scholar

59 Id. at 64.Google Scholar

60 J. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962); J. Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 47 (1963).Google Scholar

61 Heinz & human, Chicago Lawyers, at 59—83.Google Scholar

62 Auerbach, Unequal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

63 Heinz & Laumann, Chicago Lawyers, at 12.Google Scholar

64 B. A. Curran et al., The Lawyer Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile of the U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1985).Google Scholar

65 Heinz & Laumann, Chicago Lawyers, at 12.Google Scholar

66 Id. Google Scholar

67 Id. Google Scholar

68 Id. at 70.Google Scholar

69 Though the available data on the ethnoreligious composition of the populations of the two cities are not entirely satisfactory, the best available evidence suggests that Jews constitute just over 5% of the population of the Washington metropolitan area and just under 4% of the population of the Chicago metropolitan area. (For the Washington area data, see United Jewish Appeal Federation of Washington, D.C., 1980 survey; for the Chicago area data, see A Population Study of the Jewish Community of Metropolitan Chicago (Chicago: Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, 1985)) Thus, the greater representation of Jews in the Chicago bar than among Washington representatives would not appear to be explained by differences in the general populations of the two sites. It does not seem plausible that the distribution of ethnoreligious groups by level of educational attainment would systematically vary in the two cities in such a way that Jews would be less represented among the more highly educated population in Washington than they are in Chicago, but we do not know of any available data on that point.Google Scholar

70 Heinz & Laumann, Chicago Lawyers, at 12.Google Scholar

71 Respondents were asked to indicate how they had allocated their time among these activities over the past 12 months by checking whether they had spent 0%, 1–5%, 6–25%, 26–50%, or more than 50% of their time in each activity. The responses were converted to continuous variable, maximum-likelihood estimates of percentages of time that sum to 100% using a computer program originated by Charles Cappell and written by Kent W. Smith. Respondents were instructed to differentiate between conventional law practice and policy activity as follows: “Please include [under conventional law practice] all time spent on regular legal work, including case by case matters that do not shape policy to a significant extent. Test cases, administrative rulemaking, legislative advice and advocacy—work that shapes policy—should be included under policy activity.” A small number of cases reported spending no time in policy activity, even though their responses to other questions indicated substantial involvement in various policy issues and with government agencies and officials. These cases were assigned a minimum value of 1—5% on federal policy time.Google Scholar

72 There might be a response bias against reporting time in conventional law practice if respondents perceived that the study was less interested in such representation. Given the sponsorship of the research by an organizatiaon identified with lawyers, the high status of respondents, and the degree of variance observed in reports of time spent on law practice, responses do not appear significantly biased.Google Scholar

73 Heclo, Issue Networks (cited in note 23).Google Scholar

74 The following fields were presented: agriculture, civil rights, communications, consumer rights, defense, domestic economics, education, energy, environment, foreign affairs, health, housing, international trade, labor, law enforcement, rural development, social welfare/social security, tax, transportation, and urban development. Representatives were asked to add other fields, as necessary.Google Scholar

75 Bok & Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 395–403 (New York Simon & Schuster, 1970).Google Scholar

76 In addition to time spent on the main policy areas, time spent in closely related policy fields also was included in the total for the domain. Included in agriculture was rural development, the environment, and international trade. To energy we added transportation and environment. Health included social welfare, consumer rights, environment, and housing. Social security, civil rights, and international trade were added to labor.Google Scholar

77 The lists were as follows. Agriculture: price supports, foreign trade, commodities trading, food safety, food welfare, land use, agricultural finance. Energy: nuclear energy, oil, natural gas, coal, alternative energy sources, general energy conservation issues and regulations, electric power, energy-related tax policies. Health: regulation of health care providers, regulation of health professionals, health care payment and insurance plans, food and drug regulation, funding and policies on biomedical research, public health care delivery systems, manpower and training. Labor: labor-management relations, employment standards, jobs programs, immigration and farm labor, occupational safety and health, private pensions, social security and public pension programs, equal employment opportunity and civil rights, international trade questions affecting employment. Representatives could add other subfields.Google Scholar

78 See, e.g., D. Cater, Power in Washington (New York: Random House, 1964).Google Scholar

79 The number of government agencies in each domain vanes somewhat—from a low of 38 in labor to a high of 56 in agriculture. As a result responses are not strictly comparable across domains. Nonetheless, given the very low percentage of agencies contacted in any of the domains, we simply report the mean number of contacts without adjusting for domain.Google Scholar

80 The modal category for each was 610% of their time. Milbrath, Washington Lobbyists at 117 (cited in note 9).Google Scholar

81 See, e.g., Auerbach, Unequal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).; P. H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

82 For an analysis of the various ways in which government experience was found helpful by representatives, see R. H. Salisbury with J. P. Heinz, E. O. Laumann, & R. L. Nelson, Who You Know Versus What You Know: The Uses of Government Experience for Washington Lobbyists (paper presented at Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, April 1986).Google Scholar

83 See Harvard Law Review Developments, Conflicts of Interest and Government Attorneys, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1981), for a review of rules and proposals concerning the phenomenon.Google Scholar

84 N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1982, p.10.Google Scholar

85 See, e.g., E. Drew, Politics and Money, New Yorker, Dec. 6, 1982.Google Scholar

86 Horsky, The Washington Lawyer (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952).Google Scholar

87 T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: Free Press, 1954).Google Scholar

88 See Andrew Shapiro, Sampling Memorandum, June 28, 1984 (on file with the authors), for a more complete description of this procedure and the other three methods used in generating the target population of interested parties.Google Scholar

89 See Shapiro at 4–5 for the committees included.Google Scholar

90 See Shapiro at 2–3 for further details, including the list of government units actually included in each domain.Google Scholar

91 Differences in the composition of the four sources of nomination are in themselves interesting findings. National membership organizations and ideological groups—highly newsworthy groups—appeared more often in press accounts and congressional hearings, while business and trade associations dominated mentions by governmental officials and the listings from Washington Representatives. See R. H. Salisbury, Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 64 (1984), for a fuller discussion.Google Scholar

92 We found a similar pattern in the approach we adopted. The correlation between the number of mentions received through our sampling procedures and the number of influence “votes” given organizations in Laumann and Knoke's study was.70 for energy and.71 for health. D. Knoke & E. O. Laumann, The Social Organization of National Policy Domains: An Exploration of Some Structural Hypotheses, in N. Lin & P. V. Marsden, eds., Social Structure and Network Analysis (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1983); also see E. O. Laumann, D. Knoke, & J. Kim, An Organizational Approach to Policy Formation: A Comparative Study of Energy and Health Domains, 50 Am. Soc. Rev. 1 (1985).Google Scholar