The author examines the sources and premises of the idea that free expression has value in part because of the function it performs in checking the abuse of official power (the “checking value”) and explores how this checking value difyers from those values that have dominated First Amendment analysis since 1919. In addition, the author traces in some detail the uneven influence the checking value has had recently in three areas of First Amendment adjudication: civil actions f o r defamution; disputes arising from efforts by journalists to protect or establish relationships with news sources; and claims b y nonjournalists to a constitutional or statutory right to communicate directly to the public over major print or broadcast outlets. The author argues that the checking value must receive open, systematic consideration if it is to play a consistent part in adjudication and speculates on how such consideration of the checking value might help one think about a wide range of additional First Amendment questions.

While social scientists have long advocated the use of statistical methodology in legal analysis, its practical application has not been tested. Statistical models based on social science theories have been used to predict judicial decisions and explain court behavior, but the legal profession has failed to develop statistical models based on traditional legal theories and using data familiar to the lawyer. This article seeks to demonstrate by practical application of statistical methodologies, coupled with traditional legal research methods, that such research can produce important insight into a court's decision making and provide a useful model for predicting the probability of a favorable decision. The zoning amendment decisions of the Connecticut Supreme Court are the data base of this study, which also provides a comprehensive explanation of zoning amendment law in Connecticut as a backdrop against which to evaluate the insights gained by statistical analysis.

At any given time, as many as 15,000 persons are hospitalized for study or treatment regarding their competence to stand trial. Although most of the defendants found incompetent to stand trial “could rapidly be returned to competence and so maintained were the facilities and treatments of modern psychiatry made available to them”, the impact of recent advances in psychiatry—particularly drug therapy—has not been fully absorbed by the legal system. Defendants restored to competence by psychotropic drugs frequently require ongoing medication. Some courts, mistakenly assuming that psychotropic drugs produce a “chemical sanity” that is unacceptable for participation in a trial, have adopted a practice—the “automatic bar rule”—of automatically prohibiting the return for trial of defendants under the influence of such drugs. A lack of statutory, regulatory, or judicial guidance leaves the question largely to the discretion of individual trial judges. This article critically examines the automatic bar rule in light of the effects of various psychotropic drugs and of the consequences of the rule both to defendants and to the state.