1 Halleck in his International Law (4th ed.), Vol. II, Chap. 34, sec. 27, p. 530, says: “Complete conquest, by whatever mode it may be perfected, carries with it all the rights of the former government; or, in other words, the conqueror by the completion of his conquest, becomes, as it were, the heir and universal successor of the defunct or extinguished state.” Hall in his International Law (5th ed.), p. 99, says: “ When a state ceases to exist by absorption in another state, the latter in the same way is the inheritor of all local rights, obligations, and property.” Speaking of the case of a territory which has won its independence, he says (p. 92): “ Rights possessed in respect of the lost territory, including . . . obligations contracted with reference to it alone, and property which is within it, and has therefore a local character, transfer themselves to the new state person.” To the same effect Rivier in his Principes du Droit des Gens, Vol. I, p. 70, says: “ Le successeur continue la personalité économique et fiscale de 1’État supprimé, avec ses avantages et ses charges, spécialement avec celle de la dette publique, en conformité des règies connues: ‘ Bona non intelliguntur nisi deducto aere alieno’ et ‘ Res transit cum suo onere.’ ” de Martens, F. in his Traité de Droit International (translation by Leo), Vol. I, sec. 67, p. 368 Google Scholar, says: “ Les conséquences juridiques de l’absorption d’un État par un autre État rappellent les relations qui naissent entre particuliers à l’occasion de I’ouverture d’une succession. L’État qui s’est annexé le territoire d’un autre pays prend la place du, défunt’ et lui succède complètement comme personne juridique. II hérite de ses droits et de ses obligations.” To the same effect are Despagnet, Droit International Public, No. 90; Bluntschli, Droit International, sec. 54; Heffter, Le Droit International, sec. 25, and many others.

2 Keith, Theory of State Succession, pp. 5, 6. Compare Appleton, Des effets des annexions de territoires; Gabba, Questioni di diritto civile; and Gidel, Des effets de Vannexion sur les concessions.

3 ‘For an interesting statement to the effect that any distinction in this branch of the law between universal and partial succession, or between cession and conquest is indefensible, see an article by Pierre Descamps in 15 Revue Générate de Droit International Public, pp. 396, 397. Compare also the Statement of the Transvaal Concessions Commission: “in considering what the attitude of the conqueror should be towards such concessions, we were unable to perceive any sound distinction between a case where a state acquires part of another state by cession and a case where it acquires the whole by annexation.” Report of Transvaal Concessions Commission, British Parliamentary Papers, 1901, So. Africa, Cd. 623.

4 A subsequent paper will deal with the effect of a change of sovereignty upon concessions and franchises.

5 It would, indeed, be possible to crowd land cases also under this second principle by viewing the state’s duty of respecting private dominium and protecting individual owners in their rights of ownership as an obligation incident to the imperium of the ceding state to which the receiving state succeeds. But, it is submitted, the land cases can be considered with far greater clearness under the general principle first suggested; nothing can be gained by a view that seems at once awkward and artificial, as well as needlessly involved.

6 The law of the United States has been selected for this examination, partly because United States decisions of themselves carry influence, but chiefly because it contains more precedents and decisions upon the subject than the law of any other country.

7 The same rule was expressed in the case of Mitchel v. United States (1835), 9 Peters 711, at 733, where the court laid down as definitely settled and established by the United States Supreme Court “that by the law of nations, the inhabitants, citizens or subjects of a conquered or ceded country, territory or province, retain all the rights of property which have not been taken from them by the orders of the conqueror, or the laws of the sovereign who acquires it by cession. . . . That a treaty of cession was a deed or grant by one sovereign to another, which transferred nothing to which he had no right of property, and only such right as he owned and could convey to the grantee.” In Leitensdorfer v. Webb (1857), 20 Howard 176, the court said: “This is the principle of the law of nations, as expounded by the highest authorities. In the case of the Fama, in the 5th of Robinson’s Rep. p. 106, Sir William Scott declares it to be ‘ the settled principle of the law of nations, that the inhabitants of a conquered territory change their allegiance, and their relation to their former sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property not taken from them by the orders of the conqueror, remain undisturbed.’ So, too, it is laid down by Vattel, book 3d, cap. 13, sec. 200, that ‘ the conqueror lays his hands on the possessions of the state, whilst private persons are permitted to retain theirs; they suffer but indirectly by the war, and to them the result is, that they only change masters.’ ”

8 See, for instance, Mutual Assurance Soc. v. Watts (1816), 1 Wheaton 279.

9 Some of the cases citing and following the rule of the Percheman case are: Delassus v. United States, 9 Peters 117, 188; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters 410; Pollard v. Kibbe, 14 Peters 375; United States ». Hanson, 16 Peters 196; United States v. Clarke, 16 Peters 232; United States v. Acosta, 1 Howard 24; United States v. Power, 11 Howard 570; Jones v. McMasters, 20 Howard 20; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 Howard 177; United States v. Anguisola, 1 Wall. 352; Langdeau v. Hanes, 21 Wall. 527; Airhart v. Massieu, 98 U. S. 496; Coffee v. Groover, 123 U. S. 10; More v. Steinbach, 127 U. S. 70; Knight v. United States Land Ass’n., 142 U. S. 184; United States v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 457; Cessna v. United States, 169 U. S. 165; Ely’s Adm. v. United States, 171 U. S. 220, 223; Ainsa v. N. M. & A. R. R., 175 U. S. 79; The John II Estate v. Brown, 235 U. S. 349; Coburn v. United States, 75 Fed. 528 (Cal.); Smyth v. New Orleans Canal & Banking Co., 93 Fed. 921; In re Chavey, 149 Fed. 75; Hall v. Root, 19 Ala. 386; Reynolds v. West, 1 Cal. 326; Vanderslice v. Hanks, 3 Cal. 38; Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 619; Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 22; Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 421; Minturn v. Brower, 20 Cal. 660, 662; MaGee v. Doe, 9 Fla. 392, 395; May v. Specht, 1 Mich. 189; Sanborn v. Vance, 69 Mich. 226; Roussin v. Parks, 8 Mo. 539; Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 479; United States v. Lucero, 1 N. M. 429, 447; Claves v. Whitney, 4 N. M. 181; Catron v. Laughlin, 11 N. M. 630; Hardy v. De Leon, 5 Tex. 234; Corrigan v. State, 42 Texas Civ. 178.

10 The following important treaties made by the United States all contain provisions based on this same general rule: Treaty of peace with Great Britain (1783), Arts. V and VI; Treaty with France for cession of Louisiana (1803), Art. III; Treaty with Spain for cession of Florida (1819), Art. VIII; Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico (1848), Art. VIII; Gadsden Treaty with Mexico (1848), Arts. V and VI; Treaty with Russia for cession of Alaska (1867), Art. I l l ; Treaty of Paris with Spain (1898), Art. IX.

11 United States v. Soulard, 4 Peters 511.

“Independent of treaty stipulation this right [property] would be held sacred. . . . The people change their sovereign; their right to property remains unaffected by the change.” Delassus v. United States, 9 Pet. 117, 133. The cession of California to the United States “did not impair the rights of private property. They were consecrated by the law of nations.” United States v. Moreno, 1 Wall. 400, 404.

Similarly, legislative recognitions of the binding force of the international law of succession in determining the validity of land titles in ceded territory have been accorded by the Congress of the United States. See, for instance, the Act of 1824, providing for a court trial “ to settle and determine the question of the validity of title according to the law of nations, the stipulations of any treaty,” etc. 4 Stat. 53, c. 173, section 2.

For official and diplomatic declarations of the general principle, see 1 Moore’s Digest, section 99.

12 Even though the claimant may have had a valid legal title at the time of cession, the treaty may of course expressly provide for the recognition of private property rights only upon certain conditions; or such property rights may be later lost through long disuse or abandonment. See United States v. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 211.

13 See, for instance, Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters 410, 435, where the court laid it down that “ this court has defined property to be any right, legal or equitable, inceptive, inchoate, or perfect, which, before the treaty with France in 1803, or with Spain in 1819, had so attached to any piece or tract of land, great or small, as to affect the conscience of the former sovereign ‘ with a trust,’ and make him a trustee for an individual, according to the law of nations, of the sovereign himself, the local usage or custom of the colony or district; according to the principles of justice and rules of equity.” The court further asserted that “ the term ‘ grant,’ in a treaty, comprehends not only those which are made in form, but also any concession, warrant, order, or permission to survey, possess or settle, whether evidenced by writing or parol or presumed from possession.” A very common statement of the rule is found in Hornsby v. United States, 10 Wall. 224, 242, where it was said that “by the term ‘property,’ as applied to lands, all titles are embraced, legal or equitable, perfect or imperfect.”

14 In Landes v. Perkins, 12 Mo. 238, the court, speaking of land in the city of St. Louis which had originally constituted part of the territory of Louisiana, said: “ It is a matter of history, of which this court will take judicial notice, that, at the time of the cession of Louisiana to the United States, in that portion of the territory of which this State is composed, nineteen-twentieths of the titles to lands were like that involved in this case prior to its confirmation. There were very few complete grants. Most of the inhabitants were too poor to defray the expenses attending the completion of their titles, but they had faith in their government and rested as quietly under their inchoate titles as though they had been perfect. As early as October, 1804, we find the legislature speaking of freeholders and authorizing executions against lands and tenements. There being so few complete titles, the legislatures, in subjecting lands and tenements generally to execution, must have contemplated a seizure and sale of those incomplete titles which existed under the Spanish Government. At the date of the act above referred to, no titles had been confirmed by the United States. An instance is not recollected in which a question has been made as to the liability of such titles as Glamorgan’s under the Spanish Government to sale under execution. It is believed that such titles have been made the subject of judicial sales without question ever since the change of government.”

15 As Chief Justice Marshall said in Soulard v. United States, 4 Pet. 512: “ When Louisiana was transferred to the United States, very few titles to lands, in the upper part of that province especially, were complete. The practice seems to have prevailed, for the deputy-governor, sometimes the commandants of posts, to place individuals in possession of small tracts, and to protect that possession, without further proceeding. Any intrusion on this possession produced a complaint to the immediate supervising officer of the district or post, who inquired into it, and adjusted the dispute. The people seem to have remained contented with this condition. The colonial government, for some time previous to the cession, appears to have been without funds, and to have been in the habit of remunerating services with land instead of money. Many of these concessions remained incomplete.”

16 As to what constitutes a “future expectation,” the following words, though used in a slightly different connection, are somewhat illuminating: “ Dans le domaine de l’avenir, à côté des intérêts, on rencontre la sphère des expectatives. L’expectative n’est pas un simple intérêt d’avenir, une perspective à laquelle s’attache une espérance. Elle ne constitue pas davantage en soi un droit actuellement subsistant. Elle consiste à proprement parler dans un avantage qui n’est pas encore un droit possédé, mais que l’on a l’espoir autorisé de posséder un jour comme droit. Dans l’état actuel de mobilisation des biens matériels, tout le monde peut espérer devenir riche un jour; c’est là malheureusement une simple perspective, une pure espérance. Voici une autre situation. Usant du droit de prescrire, j’ai commencée une prescription. La prescription terminée me donnerait un droit acquis. La prescription commencée me donne une expectative. De même la jouissance d’un héritage auquel je suis appelé en ordre de succession est un avantage auquel je puis juridiquement prétendre sans que j’aie cependant l’assurance de sa future possession. Le jour ou mon espoir fondé d’obtenir la succession se réalisera, j’aurai l’avantage de posséder, en droit les biens constitutifs de l’héritage. Présentement, j’ai une expectative, qu’il ne faut pas d’ailleurs confondre avec un droit subordonné à une condition suspensive ou résolutoire: car sa réalisation ne me rendra nullement propriétaire de l’héritage a partir du jour où j’ai eu l’expectative. Si le législateur devait s’arrêter déarmé devant toutes les expectatives, les lois nouvelles pourraient se trouver, sans raison suffisante, paralysées dans d’énormes proportions. C’est pourquoi on admet que 1’autorité publique n’est pas liée devant les simples expectatives. Seulement, lorsque ces expectatives ont un caractère particulièrement grave, on voit souvent un sage législateur prendre transitoirement des mesures diverses pour les ménager, bien qu’il n’y soit pas rigoureusement tenu.” Descamps, , La Définition des droits acquis, in 15 R. G. D. I. P., 388 Google Scholar.

17 A legislative statement of what is believed to constitute the true rule of international law on this point will be found in the first provision of Sec. 18 of the Act of March 3, 1891, setting up a board of land commissioners to pass upon claims to land in California by virtue of any Spanish or Mexican grant or concession made prior to the acquisition of the territory by the United States. The enactment reads as follows: “First. No claim shall be allowed that shall not appear to be upon a title lawfully and regularly derived from the Government of Spain or Mexico, or from any of the States of the Republic of Mexico having lawful authority to make grants of land, and one that if not then complete and perfect at the date of the acquisition of the territory by the United States, the claimant would have had a lawful right to make perfect had the territory not been acquired by the United States, and that the United States are bound, upon the principles of public law, or by the provisions of the treaty of cession, to respect and permit to become complete and perfect if the same was not at said date already complete and perfect.”

18 For the text of this act, see the preceding note.

19 In Ainsa v. United States, 161 U. S., 208 at 223, the court said: “ But under the Act of March 3, 1891, it must appear, in order to the confirmation of a grant by the Court of Private Land Claims, not only that the title was lawfully and regularly derived, but that, if the grant were not complete and perfect, the claimant could, by right and not by grace, have demanded that it should be made perfect by the former government, had the territory not been acquired by the United States.”

20 This rule is laid down in many cases. For instance, in Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711, where the question involved lands granted to the claimants by certain Indians and held without legal title, the court at p. 733 says: “But it must be remembered, that the Acts of Congress submit these claims to our adjudication as a court of equity; and, as often and uniformly construed in its repeated decisions, confer the same jurisdiction over imperfect, inchoate and inceptive titles, as legal and perfect ones, and require us to decide by the same rules on all claims submitted to us, whether legal or equitable. Whether, therefore, the title in the present case partakes of the one character or the other, it remains only for us to inquire, whether that of the petitioner is such, in our opinion, that he has, either by the law of nations, the stipulations of any treaty, the laws, usages and customs of Spain, or the province in which the land is situated, the Acts of Congress or proceedings under them, or a treaty, acquired a right which would have been valid, if the territory had remained under the dominion and in possession of Spain.”

21 An example of a treaty expressly allowing the fulfillment of unperformed conditions after cession is the treaty of 1819 between Spain and the United States whereby the former ceded to the latter the territories of East and West Florida. Art. VIII of that treaty says:

“ All the grants of land made before the 24th of January, 1818, by His Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful authorities, in the said territories ceded by His Majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty. But the owners in possession of such lands, who, by reason of the recent circumstances of the Spanish nation, and the revolutions in Europe, have been prevented from fulfilling all the conditions of their grants, shall complete them within the terms limited in the same, respectively, from the date of this treaty; in default of which the said grants shall be null and void.”

22 In United States v. Clarke, 19 Pet. 167, the court confirmed a Spanish grant where the survey, which was necessary in order to confirm the Spanish title, had not been made until after the time of cession, the court affirming that “ a concession on condition becomes absolute when the condition is performed.” This case, however, should be read in the light of Article VIII of the treaty of 1819 between Spain and the United States (quoted in the preceding note). See to the same effect United States v. Hanson, 16 Pet. 194, where the court allowed the claimant to have a public survey of his land made after the cession, where the grant was specific and definite, and contained no conditions which had not been performed.

One must be careful to distinguish this group of cases, where a perfectly definite tract of land has been granted, but the public surveyor has not yet fixed the boundary marks at the time of the cession, from the group of cases, to be next considered, where the grant conveys a specific number of acres or quantity of land without defining or fixing the position of the land, and at the time of cession the land has not yet been selected or surveyed.

23 On p. 744 the court says: “ The condition of settling 200 families on the land has not been complied with in fact; the question is, has it been complied with in law, or has such matter been presented to the court as dispenses with the performance, and divests the grant of that condition? It is an acknowledged rule of law, that if a grant be made on a condition subsequent, and its performance become impossible by the act of the grantor, the grant becomes single. We are not prepared to say that the condition of settling 200 Spanish families in an American territory has been, or is, possible; the condition was not unreasonable or unjust, at the time it was imposed; its performance would probably have been deemed a very fair and adequate consideration for the grant, had Florida remained a Spanish province. Bui; to exact its performance, after its cession to the United States, would be demanding the ‘ summum jus’ indeed, and enforcing a forfeiture on principles which, if not forbidden by the common law, would be utterly inconsistent with its spirit. If the case required it, we might feel ourselves, at all events, justified, if not compelled, to declare, that the performance of this condition had become impossible, by the act of the grantors — the transfer of the territory, the change of government, manners, habits, customs, laws, religion, and all the social and political relations of society and of life. . . . Our decree must be in conformity with the principles of justice, which would, in such a case as this, not only forbid a decree of forfeiture, but impel us to give a final decree in favor of the title conferred by the grant.”

24 The general doctrine of the courts in regard to these indefinite land grants is summed up in United States v. Miranda, 16 Pet. 153, at p. 160 as follows: “ Indeed, the settled doctrine of this court, in respect to these Florida grants, is, that grants for lands embracing a wide extent of country, or within a large area of natural or artificial boundaries, and which granted lands were not surveyed before the 24th of January 1818, and which are without such designations as will give a place of beginning for a survey, are not lands withdrawn from the mass of vacant lands ceded to the United States in the Floridas; and are void, as weE on that account, as for being so uncertain that locality can not be given to them.” Cases to the same effect are United States v. Smith, 10 Pet. 324; United States v. Forbes, 15 Pet. 172; Buyck v. United States, 15 Pet. 214; United States v. Delespine, 15 Pet. 318; Dauterive v. United States, 101 U. S. 700; Ainsa v. United States, 161 U. S. 208; Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co., 68 Fed. 648.

25 It should be remembered, however, that grants made by officers of the ceding state, even after cession, may be valid, if the receiving state authorized or later ratified such action. In Ely’s Adms. v. United States, 171 U. S. 220, at pp. 231, 232, the United States Supreme Court says:

“ It is doubtless true that a change of sovereignty implies a revocation of the authority vested by the prior sovereign in local officers to dispose of the public lands. And yet we think that rule is not controlling in this case, for the new sovereign made an order continuing the functions of the local officers, and one of those local officers making a sale in accordance with the provisions of the prior laws caused the money received there from to be paid into the treasury of the new sovereign, and that sovereign never returned the money thus received nor challenged the validity of the sale thus made. This is not a case in which the local officers attempted to dispose of public lands in satisfaction of obligations created by the former sovereign .but one in which a sale was made for money, and that money passed into the treasury of the new sovereign.

“It would seem not unwarranted and unreasonable to refer to the familiar rule that where an agent, even without express authority, makes a sale of the property of his principal, and the latter with full knowledge receives the money paid on account thereof, his retention of the purchase price is equivalent to a ratification of the sale. We do not mean, however, to state this as a general proposition controlling all municipal and governmental transactions, but as only one of the circumstances tending to strengthen the conclusion that these acts of the intendant were not mere usurpations of authority, but were in the discharge of duties and the exercise of powers conceded to belong to his office.”

26 In the Treaty of Peace of 1783 Great Britain did not grant to the United States its independence, but recognized as valid the Declaration of Independence of 1776, and the consequent sovereignty of the American States as dating from that event. A situation such as this has a very different effect upon the validity of land titles granted during the war from cases where by the treaty of peace the ceding state grants or cedes the territory in question to the receiving state. A case of the latter kind occurred in 1898, when Spain by the definitive treaty of peace with the United States ceded to the latter the Philippine Islands. Here, although Spain failed to win the war, up to the time of the signing of the peace treaty grants of land in the Philippine Islands made by the proper Spanish authorities where no fraud appeared, would be prima fade valid, and those made by the United States occupying forces would be prima facie void. The military occupant is deemed to acquire only a “usufruct” in immovables owned by the invaded state, and should safeguard the capital and administer such property “ in accordance with the rules of usufruct.” See 1907 Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Regulation No. 55.

27 Calvo in his Droit International (5th ed.), Vol. 4, p. 399, sees. 2478, 2479 says: “La conquête, nous l’avons déjà démontré, change les droits politiques des habitants du territoire et transfere au nouveau souverain la propriété du domaine public de son cédant.

“Il n’en est pas de même de la propriété privée, qui demeure incommutable entre les mains de ses legitimes possesseurs. ‘ Ce serait violer un usage qui a acquis force de lois entre les nations modernes,’ dit le juge Marshall à propos de la translation d’un pays d’une souveraineté à une autre,’ ce serait outrager ce sentiment de justice et de droit reconnu par tous les peuples civilisés que d’ériger en règle générale la confiscation de la propriété privée et d’annuler les droits particuliers. Le sol voit se rompre et changer les liens qui l’unissaient à l’ancien souverain; mais les relations mutuelles des citoyens et leurs droits de propriété subsistent intacts.’

“Ce principe de droit international et de haute équité a été sanctionné par tous les tribunaux qui ont été appelés à en faire l’application. C’est qu’en effet la base en est essentiellement rationelle et logique. La conquête définitive du territoire met fin à la situation créée par la guerre pour y substituer les relations de paix et de bonne harmonie; et dès que l’administration militaire a achevé son rôle, l’autorité et le gouvernement civil reprennent le premier rang pour faire prévaloir de nouveau les règies du droit commun. Où l’État puiserait-il done le pouvoir de confisquer la propriété de ses nouveaux sujets, que le fait d’avoir été des ennemis ne peut rendre indéfiniment punissables? Le conquérant n’a pas seulement le devoir strict de respecter les droits acquis; il est encore moralement tenu de chercher par tous les moyens en son pouvoir à en garantir le maintien et à en améliorer ou à en faciliter l’exercice.

“Le jurisconsulte américain Marshall, en traitant cette question spéciale, fait remarquer avec raison que par le mot propriété privée il faut entendre une possession reposant sur un titre entouré de toutes les garanties légales, complètement valide; sanctionnant des droits acquis et des obligations ayant force de loi.”

28 Gidel, in his Des Effets de l’annexion sur les concessions, page 90, says: “La jurisprudence américaine, qui a consacré ce principe de l’inviolabilité de la propriété privée dans une foule de décisions, s’est distinguée par la manière particulièrement large dont elle l’a entendu. ‘Ce serait violer un usage qui a acquis force de loi entre les nations modernes,’ dit le juge Marshall en des termes qui se trpuvent reproduits dans tous les arrêts ultérieurs de la Cour suprême des États-Unis relatifs à la matière, “ce serait outrager ce sentiment de justice et d’équité reconnu par tous les peuples civilisés que d’ériger en règle générale la confiscation de la propriété privée et d’annuler les droits des particuliers. L’aliégeance des sujets se trouve modifiée: leurs rapports avec leur ancien Souverain se trouvent rompus; mais les relations respectives des citoyens entre eux et leurs droits de propriété subsistent intacts.’ Telle fut la doctrine appliquée sans interruption par la Cour suprême à propos des annexions de la Louisiane, de la Floride, de la Californie, du Texas, e’est-à– dire au moment du grand développement territorial de la République américaine.

. . . Les obligations derivant de la seule équité devaient être protégées par le droit international autant que celles que derivaient de titres strictement légaux. . . . La Cour de cassation françise a, elle aussi, entendu dans un sens très libéral l’application de ce principe de l’inviolabilité de la propriété privée. Elle n’a pas sanctio nné seulement les droits de propriété naissant au profit de particuliers de contrats passés entre eux. Elle a formellement reconnu et protégé les droits acquis par des individus sur le domaine public de l’État annexe. . . . Mais les aliénations antérieures a l’annexion, que le Souverain avait le droit de consentir sous la loi alors en vigueur, doivent être respectées après l’annexion. Et les tribunaux doivent respecter les droits acquis sur ce domaine par les particuliers avant l’annexion.” See also an article by Pierre Descamps in 15 R. G. D. I. P., 385, where the above passages are cited and commented upon.

29 The law of Germany is set forth by Huber in his excellent treatise on Staatensuccession: “1st es unbestritten dass die subjektiven Privatrechte, soweit sie wohler worbene Rechte sind, von dem Wechsel der Staatsgewalt nicht betroffen werden” (p. 57). See also references there cited.

30 See Fiore, Droit International (transl. by Antoine), p. 150, sec. 154: “ L’État cessionnaire sera tenu de respecter les droits acquis par les particuliers relativement au territoire cédé et aussi les droits acquis par les fonctionnaires publics en vertu de l’exercice de leurs fonctions sur le territoire cédé.

“ Cette règle est applicable aux droits qui peuvent être considérés comme acquis d’après les principes du droit commun, mais non aux expectatives, ni aux actes de jouissance basés sur l’abus ou sur le consentement implicite de l’État cédant.”