** The following abbreviations will be used in this paper:

CB—Current Background (translations by the United States Consulate General, Hong Kong).

CFYC—Cheng-fa yen-chiu (Studies in Political Science and Law) [Chinese] (Peking: China Political Science and Law Association).

Documents—Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho tui-wai kuan-hsi wen-chien chi (Collection of Documents Eelating to the Foreign Belations of the People's Republic of China) [Chinese] (Peking: Shih-chieh chih-shih ch'u-pan shê [World Knowledge Press]).

KCWTYC—Kuo-chi wen-t'i yen chiu (Studies in International Problems) [Chinese]

(Peking: Institute of International Relations of the Chinese Academy of Sciences).

People's Daily—Jen-min jih-pao (the official newspaper of Communist China).

SCMP'Survey of China Mainland Press (translations by the United States Consulate General, Hong Kong).

Treaties—Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho kuo wai-chiao-pu (ed.), chung-hua jen-min kung-ho kuo t'iao-yiieh chi (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Eepublic of China (ed.), Collection of Treaties of the People's Eepublic of China) [Chinese] (Peking: Fa-lü ch'u-pan sh§ [Law Press]).

1 For a study of political aspects of this subject, see Weng, “Communist China's Changing Attitudes Toward the United Nations,” 21 International Organization 677 (1967).

2 “On the Coalition Government,” 3 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung 255, 306 (English version, Peking, 1965).

3 E.g., Premier Chou En-lai stated in his report on the Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on May 13, 1955, that: ‘ ‘ The Chinese People supported the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.” 3 Documents 262, 271 (1954-1955); English translation in CB, No. 328, at 1, 8 (May 17, 1955). For a study of the attitude of the Republic of China toward the United Nations, see China Institute of International Affairs, China and the United Nations (1959). It may be noted that Art. 141 of the Constitution of the Republic of China provides, inter alia, that “the foreign policy of the Republic of China shall … respect … the Charter of the United Nations… . “ 4 The U.N. Charter was cited with approval in the bilateral friendship treaties concluded by Peking prior to 1960 with the following countries: The Soviet Union (Feb. 14, 1950), 1 Treaties 1 (1949-50), 226 U.N. Treaty Series 3; East Germany (Dec. 25, 1955),

4 Treaties 7 (1955), English translation in SCMP, No. 1198, at 33 (Dec. 30, 1955); Czechoslovakia (March 27, 1957), 6 Treaties 40 (1957), English translation in SCMP, No. 1501, at 15 (April 1, 1957); Hungary (May 6, 1959), 8 Treaties 1 (1959), English translation in SCMP, No. 2010, at 39 (May 11, 1959). Of the thirteen friendship treaties concluded by Peking since early 1960 (two with Communist countries and eleven with non-Communist countries), only one (concluded with Afghanistan on Aug. 26, 1960, 9 Treaties 12 (1960), English translation in SCMP, No. 2399, at 22 (Dec. 16, I960)) cited the U.N. Charter. The non-mention of the Charter since 1960 may be related to the general hardening of Communist China's attitude toward the United Nations in recent years. All friendship treaties concluded by Communist China from its establishment until 1965 were published in a single volume entitled “Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho kuo yu-hao t'iao-yiieh hui-pien” (Collection of Friendship Treaties Concluded by the People's Republic of China) (Peking, 1965).

5 For example, Tung Pi-wu, who had represented the Chinese Communist Party on the Chinese Delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, wrote ten years later that: “Our support for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations is consistent… . In order that the United Nations may work effectively … the Charter of the United Nations must be respected by all nations.” “Tenth Anniversary of the United Nations,” (1955) People's China, No. 14, at 6.

6 In a cablegram to the President of the General Assembly, dated Nov. 18, 1949, Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, stated that his government repudiated the legal status of the Delegation of the National Government of China under Mr. T. F. Tsiang and held that it could not represent China and had no right to speak on behalf of the Chinese people in the United Nations. U.N. Doc. A/1123 (1949). In another cablegram, sent on Jan. 8, 1950, to the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary General, the Foreign Minister demanded the expulsion of delegates of the Republic of China from the Security Council. U.N. Security Council, 5th year, Official Records, 459th Meeting, No. 1, at 2 (Jan. 10, 1950). In a third cablegram, dated Jan. 20, 1950, he informed the Security Council, the Secretary General and the Members of the United Nations that his government had appointed Chang Wen-t'ien as chairman of ite delegation to attend the meetings and to participate in the work of the United Nations, including the meetings and work of the Security Council. He asked when the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) representative would be expelled from the United Nations and from the Security Council, and when the delegation of the People's Republic of China could begin to participate in the work of the United Nations and the Security Council. 1 Documents 91 (1949-50); 1950 U.N. Yearbook 424. Again, in a cablegram, dated Aug. 26, 1950, the Foreign Minister recalled the previous notes sent by his government to the Secretary General and to the General Assembly, calling for the Kuomintang representatives from all U.N. organs. Continued toleration of those representatives by the United Nations was, he declared, a violation of the U.N. Charter and involved disregard of the rightful claims of the People's Republic of China. He requested that the necessary arrangements be made for the delegation of the People's Republic of China to attend the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. U.N. Doc. A/1364 (1950). Similar cablegrams were sent to other U.N. organs, specialized agencies, and some other inter-governmental or non-governmental international organizations. See 1 Documents 96 (ECOSOC—Feb. 2, 1950), 111 (ITU—March 29, 1950), 113 (International Bed Cross Association- April 28, 1950), 114 (ECAFE—April 28, 1950), 114 (UPU—May 5, 1950), 118 (FAO —May 12, 1950), 119 (UNESCO—May 12, 1950), 119 (WHO—May 12, 1950), 120 (WMO—May 12, 1950), 126 (ICAO—May 30, 1950), 127 (Trusteeship Council—May 30, 1950), 128 (ILO—June 5, 1950), 128 (ILC—June 6, 1950), 129 (Allied Control Commission in Japan—June 19, 1950), 137 (ITU Administrative Council—Aug. 26, 1950), 138 (UNICEF—Aug. 26, 1950), 139 (IMF—Aug. 26, 1950), 140 (IBED —Aug. 26, 1950) (1949-50); 2 Documents 1 (UPU—Jan. 9, 1951), 5 (ECAFE— Jan. 18, 1951), 72 (UPU—May 17, 1952), 91 (ITU—Sept. 23, 1952) (1951-53). No such cablegrams have been sent to the United Nations and its specialized agencies since 1952. Moreover, when the Republic of China withdrew from the ICAO in 1953, Communist China failed to seize the opportunity to join that agency; nor did Peking register a public protest when the Republic of China rejoined the ICAO in 1956.

7 In 1950, Communist China sent several cablegrams to the United Nations charging the United States with bombing Chinese territory, and proposing that the Security Council condemn the United States for those acts. E.g., see U.N. Docs. S/1743, 1772 (1950); for a summary of U.N. handling of these complaints, see 1950 U.N. Yearbook 283-287. Also on Aug. 24, 1950, Communist China sent a cablegram to the United Nations charging that the United States had committed aggression by sending the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to prevent the liberation of Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army and stating that Peking considered it the duty of the Security Council to condemn the U. S. aggression. U.N. Doc. S/1715 (1950); for a summary of the U.N. handling of this complaint see 1950 U.N. Yearbook 287-298. Again, in a cablegram of Oct. 10, 1954, the People's Republic of China resubmitted for consideration by the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, its complaint alleging a U. S. invasion of Taiwan, further stating that it was the duty of the General Assembly to urge the Security Council to suppress the United States’ aggression. 3 Documents 169-174 (1954-1955); U.N. Doc. A/2756 (1954). Although the Communist Chinese government has frequently made comments on U.N. activities, no cablegrams have been sent to the United Nations since 1955.

8 See below, pp. 38-40.

9 The Communist Chinese government issued an official statement on Jan. 10, 1965, in support of Indonesia's withdrawal from the U.N., stating among other things that: ” … The United Nations has reached a stage where a reappraisal of it in the light of its actual deeds has become necessary … this so-called world organization needs to be thoroughly remoulded. Some people say that despite its many deficiencies and imperfections, the United Nations is the sole institution in the world permitting the co-operation of all countries and that efforts should be made to strengthen it while all withdrawal is wrong in all circumstances. This argument runs counter to the facts … many important questions of Asia were settled outside the United Nations… . The United Nations is by no means sacred and inviolable. We can live on very well without it . “ People's Daily, Jan. 10, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 3, at 4 (Jan. 15, 1965). On Jan. 24, 1965, Premier Chou En-lai, speaking at a banquet in honour of Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio, said: “The United Nations has committed too many mistakes… . It must be thoroughly reorganized.” People's Daily, Jan. 25, 1965; English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 5, at 5 (Jan. 29, 1965). In a press interview Premier Chou said: “ If the United Nations does not correct its mistakes and make a thorough reorganization, then, to set up a revolutionary United Nations will be the general course of development.” 8 Peking Review, No. 15, at 9 (April 9, 1965). At a press conference on Sept. 29, 1965, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi said: “The U.N. Charter must be reviewed and revised jointly by all the United Nations; and all imperialist puppets should be expelled… . If the task of reforming the United Nations cannot be accomplished, conditions will no doubt ripen for the establishment of a revolutionary United Nations.” People's Daily, Oct. 7, 1965; English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 41, at 9 (Oct. 8, 1965). Recently, however, Communist China seems to be placing somewhat less emphasis upon the possibility of establishing a “revolutionary United Nations.” In a People's Daily editorial on Dec. 2, 1966, for example, it is stated that “ t h e fundamental question now, as it has been in the past, is one of freeing the United Nations from the control of the United States and its collaborators, thoroughly reorganizing it and completely rectifying all the mistakes it has committed.” English translation in 9 Peking Review, No. 50, at 26, 27 (Dec. 9, 1966). However, in Peking on June 24, 1967, Premier Chou En-lai said to the envoys of several African states that, if the goal for reforming the United Nations could not be reached, “ then the possibility would increase daily for the establishment of a new, revolutionary United Nations.” 10 Peking Review, No. 27, at 7 (June 30, 1967).

10 Yang Hsin and Chen Chien, “Expose and Censure the Imperialist's Fallacy Concerning the Question of State Sovereignty,” (1964) CFYC, No. 4, at 6.

11 E.g., a note from Communist China's Foreign Ministry to the Indian Embassy in Peking dated Sept. 26, 1965, states: “All Indian intrusions, harassments and armed provocations against China are major questions involving China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and these accounts will have to be settled.” 8 Peking Review, No. 40, at 19 (Oct. 1, 1965). Communist China supported the Egyptian Government's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on the ground of sovereignty. 4 Documents 96 (1956-1957); English translation in SCMP, No. 1346, at 41 (Aug. 3, 1956).

12 Ying T ‘ao, ‘’ A Criticism of Bourgeois International Law Concerning the Question of State Sovereignty,” (1960) KCWTYC, No. 3, at 47, 52.

13 Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 13 (4th ed., 1952).

14 E.g., see Oppenheim, International Law 122-123 (8th ed. Lauterpacht, 1955); Kelsen, Principles of International Law 108-114 (1952); Brierly, The Law of Nations 46-50 (5th ed., 1954); Korowicz, Introduction to International Law 86-107 (The Hague, 1959).

15 E.g., see Clark and Sohn, “World Peace Through World Law (2d ed., 1960).

16 See Chiang Yang, “Reactionary ‘ Universalistic’ Thinking in American Jurisprudence,“ People's Daily, Dec. 17, 1963.

17 K'ung Meng, “A Criticism of the Bourgeois International Law Theory on Subjects of International Law and the Recognition of States,” (1960) KCWTYC., No. 2, at 44, 50.

18 See Kuo Ch'un, Lien-hokuo (The United Nations) 101-107 (Peking, 1956). Kuo explains the rationale of the veto as follows: “The Security Council undertakes the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is the only organ of the United Nations which has the right not only to express opinions but also to take direct action to prevent and to suppress acts of aggression. In order to guarantee that the Security Council can really perform this important responsibility, actions taken by the Security Council must have the unanimous support of the Five Big Powers, or in other words, must be based upon the principle of the unanimity of big powers… . Once this principle is established, it may prevent certain imperialist big powers from manipulating a superficial voting majority to reach decisions unfavourable to small states or dragging them into participation in aggressive activities. Therefore, the principle of unanimity of big powers protects not only the interests of big powers, but also the sovereignty and interests of all other states.” Ibid. 101. Nevertheless, in characteristic subjective form, Communist China criticizes the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty for conferring a special position on three nuclear Powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. See Observer, “Why the Tripartite Treaty Does Only Harm and Brings No Benefit?” People's Daily, Aug. 10, 1963; English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 33, at 20 (Aug. 16, 1963).

19 Chou Keng-sheng, Trends in the Thought of Modern English and American International Law 68 (Peking, 1963). K'ung Meng also writes: “The object of the recommendations adopted by the [United Nations] Economic and Social Council … and the Declaration of Human Bights adopted by the various member states of the United Nations was to urge states themselves to guarantee human rights. The object was not to have an international organization by-pass states and guarantee the human rights of the citizens of the various states; if it were, it would be intervention in the internal affairs of a state.” Loo. cit. note 17 above, at 50.

20 See Triska and Slusser, The Theory, Laws, and Policy of Soviet Treaties 50-52 (1962).

21 K'ung Meng, loo. cit. note 17 above.

22 Ibid. 50-51. In the Soviet Union Professor Modzhorian maintains a similar theory. But the prevalent Soviet view, as represented by Professor Tunkin, the former Chief of the Treaty and Legal Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is to consider the United Nations as a subject of international law, albeit a restricted and unique one. See Triska and Slusser, op. cit. note 20 above, at 50-52.

23 Art. 7, par. 1, of Rules Governing the Committee of International Organization for the Cooperation of Railroads, Peking, June, 1962, 11 Treaties 141, 155 (1962).

24 259 U.N. Treaty Series 125.

25 In 1966, Communist China withdrew from the Institute. See UPI news release, London, July 13, 1966. China News, July 14, 1966 (Taipei).

26 The Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, was signed by the Commander-in- Chief, United Nations Command; the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army; and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. 4 U. S. Treaties 234; T.I.A.S., No. 2782, U.N. Doc. A/2431 (1953); 47 A.J.I.L. Supp. 186 (1953). It is not clear whether the signature of the “Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command“ can attribute the agreement to the United Nations. For a discussion of this question, see Hungdah Chiu, The Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties and the Special Legal Aspects of the Treaties So Concluded 89-90 (The Hague, 1966); Seyersted, “United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems,” 37 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 351, 415-420 (1961). In Communist China the agreement was included in the appendix to the official treaty series, which usually contains only semi-official agreements. 2 Treaties 382 (1952-1953).

27 See Sloan, “The Binding Force of a ‘Recommendation’ of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” 25 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 1 (1948); Johnson, “ The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations,” 32 ibid. 97 (1955-56).

28 See Triska and Slusser, op. cit. note 20 above, at 29-31.

29 Hsien-tai ying mei kuo-chi fa ti ssuhsiang tung hsiang (Trends in the Thought of Modern English and American International Law) 66 (Peking, 1963); review by Hungdah Chiu in 59 A. J.I.L. 170 (1965). Nonetheless, the resolutions of the U. N. General Assembly have occasionally been cited by Communist Chinese writers to prove or disprove the existence of a rule of international law. For example, Li Hao-pei cites General Assembly Res. 626 (VII) on permanent sovereignty over natural resources as support for the view that no rule of international law requires a nationalizing state to make compensation to dispossessed foreigners. “Nationalization and International Law,” (1958) CFYC, No. 2, at 10. In a Communist Chinese book of selected documents on international law, three documents selected under the heading of sources of international law are: (1) Art. 38 of the I.C.J. Statute; (2) U. N. General Assembly Resolution on Progressive Development of International Law and I t s Codification (Dec. 11, 1946); and (3) U. N. General Assembly Resolution on Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Dec. 11, 1946). Office of Teaching and Research in International Law of the Institute of Diplomacy (ed.), Kuo-chi kung-fa ts'an-k'ao wen-chien hsiian-chi (Selected Reference Documents on Public International Law) 11-12 (Peking, 1958).

30 In a cablegram to the United Nations on Sept. 18, 1950, the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China declared, inter alia, that, should the Fifth Session of the General Assembly be held without the participation of his government's delegation, all the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning China would be illegal, null and void. 1 Documents 146-147 (1949-50); 1950 U.N. Yearbook 425. In a cablegram by Premier Chou En-lai to the United Nations Secretary General dated Feb. 3, 1955, it is stated that “ i t must be pointed out that without the representative of the People's Republic of China participating in the name of China in the discussions of the United Nations Security Council, all decisions taken in the Council on questions concerning China would be illegal and null and void.” (Emphasis added.) 3 Documents 229, 230 (1954-1955); U.N. Doc. S/3358(1955). In two statements issued in 1950 and 1952, respectively, Communist China went so far as to invalidate all U. N. or U.P.U. resolutions passed without the participation of Communist China. Thus, Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, Communist Chinese delegate to the United Nations for the discussion of the “Invasion of Taiwan” case, said before the Security Council on Nov. 28, 1950, that “so long as the United Nations persists in denying admittance to a permanent member of the Security Council representing 475 million people, it cannot make lawful decisions on any major issues or solve any major problems, particularly those which concern Asia … Without the participation of the lawful representatives of the People's Republic of China, the people of China have no reason to recognize any resolutions or decisions of the United Nations.” (Emphasis added.) U. N. Security Council 5th Year, Official Eecords, No. 69, at 2, 4 (Nov. 28, 1950). After Communist China was ousted from the Universal Postal Union, a message from Foreign Minister Chou En-lai to the Universal Postal Union, dated May 17, 1952, said that: “ I f there are no delegates of the People's Republic of China participating in the present congress, all its resolutions will be illegal and thus null and void.“ 2 Documents 72, 73 (1951-1953); English translation in SCMP, No. 338, at 9 (May 18-19, 1952).

31 10 Documents 437, 438 (1963); English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 51, at 20-21 (Dec. 20, 1963). Premier Chou En-lai also stated earlier in his report on the Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on May 13, 1955, that: “Many U.N. resolutions were adopted as a result of the United States manipulations; at the same time, the People's Republic of China has been deprived of its legitimate status in the United Nations. Therefore, we have not assumed any obligations in regard to United Nations resolutions.“ 3 Documents 262, 271 (1954-1955); English translation in CB, No. 328, at 1, 8 (May 17, 1955).

32 Note on the Korean Question delivered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Communist China to the Office of the British Charge d'Affaires in Peking on March 4, 1959. 6 Documents 29 (1959); English translation in 2 Peking Review, No. 10, at 21 (March 10, 1959). See also note 78 below.

33 An official statement issued on Oct. 23, 1959, says: “The discussion of the socalled 'Tibet Question’ by the U.N. has been in complete violation of the U.N. Charter, and the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly is illegal and null and void.” 6 Documents 439 (1959); English translation in 2 Peking Review, No. 43, at 8 (Oct. 27, 1959). See also “China Strongly Protests against Illegal U.N. Resolutions,“ 8 Documents 312 (1961), English translation in 4 Peking Review, No. 52, at 8 (Dec. 29, 1961); “No U.N. Interference in China's Domestic Affairs Allowed,” editorial, People's Daily, Sept. 30, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 41, at 18 (Oct. 8, 1965); “Another Entry in Shameful U.N. Record,” editorial, People's Daily, Dec. 21, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 52, at 16 (Dec. 24, 1965); Chou Keng-sheng, “The United Nations’ Intervention on ‘The Question of Tibet’ Is Illegal,” (1959) CFYC, No. 6, at 8.

34 Both Communist China and the Republic of China have maintained that Tibet is a part of China. But President Chiang Kai-shek said in his address to the joint session of the Supreme National Defense Council and the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee on Aug. 24, 1945, that : “ I solemnly declare that if the Tibetans should at this time express a wish for self-government, our Government would, in conformity with our sincere tradition, accord it a very high degree of autonomy. If in the future they fulfill the economic requirement for independence, the National Government will … help them to gain that status. But Tibet must give proof that it can consolidate its independent position and protect its continuity so as not to become another Korea.” 2 The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 854, 857 (1946). Again in his message to the Tibetan people delivered on March 26, 1959, he promised that after the overthrow of the Communist Chinese regime, Ms government “will assist the Tibetan people to realize their own aspirations in accordance with the principle of self-determination.” 1959-1960 China Yearbook 978.

35 The Charter provisions on human rights are, in the Communist Chinese view, not applicable here. One Communist Chinese writer severely criticized the view of the International Commission of Jurists that the United Nations should intervene, on the ground of human rights, in Communist China's suppression of the rebellion in Tibet. He regards such a view as an imperialist plot to intervene in the domestic affairs of China. See Ch'ien Szu, “ A Criticism on the View of Bourgeois International Law on the Question of the Population,” (1960) KCWTYC, No. 5, at 40, 41-43.

36 “ … only one-third of the population represented in the United Nations voted in favour of this resolution. Can its adoption then be considered legal?” “The Declaration of the Foreign Ministry Opposing the Adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the Resolution to Expand the War of Aggression Against Korea,“ Oct. 10, 1950, 1 Documents 155-156 (1949-1950). But this criterion is not absolute. Communist China has opposed many U. N. resolutions on disarmament, even though those resolutions were adopted by the great majority of Members and the total population of those Members voting for the resolutions exceeded the sum of the populations of the Members voting against the resolutions or abstaining. For example, Communist China denounced General Assembly Res. 2149 (XXI) calling for the achievement ” at the earliest possible time of the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” adopted on Nov. 4, 1966, by 110 votes in favour to 1 against (Albania), with 1 abstention (Cuba). See Observer, “Another Deal Between the Two Nuclear Overlords, the U. S. and the Soviet Union,” People's Daily, Nov. 15, 1966; English Translation in 9 Peking Review, No. 47, at 34 (Nov. 18, 1966). See also Hungdah Chiu, “Communist China's Attitude towards Nuclear Tests,” The China Quarterly, No. 21, at 96 (Jan.-March, 1965) ; Shao-chuan Leng, ‘’ Communist China's Position on Nuclear Arms Control,” 7 Va. J. Int. Law 101 (1966).

37 Premier Chou En-lai stated: “As for those resolutions which violate the U.N. Charter and which are completely unjust, we have always firmly opposed them.” Report on the Bandung Conference, May 13, 1955; 3 Documents 262, 271 (1954-1955); English translation in CB, No. 328, at 1, 8 (May 17, 1955). Cf. the following passage quoted from a Communist Chinese writer: “Another pretext for the United States frustration of the restoration of the legitimate status of China in the United Nations is that China despises the United Nations. However, the world's people see very clearly that, since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, it has firmly carried out a peaceful foreign policy which is fully consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in maintaining peace and security and in promoting the peaceful coexistence of various countries. As to the reasons for the Chinese people's opposition to certain unjust resolutions of the United Nations, it is because those resolutions were adopted by the United Nations in the absence of the Chinese representative and under the coercion of the United States, and they are disadvantageous to the world peace enterprise.” Kuo Ch'un, The United Nations 36 (Peking, 1956).

38 Art. 4, par. 1, of the Charter provides: ‘ ‘ Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.“

39 Made at a press conference held in Peking on June 20, 1964. 7 Peking Review, No. 26, at 6, 7 (June 26, 1964). Professor Chou Keng-sheng expresses the same view couched in standard legal terminology: “China is one of the founders of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council. As a subject of international law, the People's Republic of China, established after the victory of the Chinese People's Revolution, is the continuation of pre-liberation China and therefore is certainly entitled to China's legitimate seat in the United Nations and to all other rights inherent to it. This is a universally acknowledged principle of international law and has been confirmed in the United Nations Charter and in international practice. According to international law, changes in the state power of a country which has gone through a revolution do not affect its international personality. In the United Nations Organization, there are member states in which new regimes were established as a result of coups d'etat or revolutions. Their seats in the United Nations were not affected. Iraq and Cuba are notable examples.” “China's Legitimate Eights in the United Nations Must Be Restored,” People's Daily, Dec. 5, 1961; English translation in Oppose the New U. S. Plots to Create “Two Chinas” 55 (Peking, 1962). A similar view was expressed by another Communist Chinese writer in 1956; see Hsu Tun-chang, “The Question of the Restoration of the Legitimate Eight and Status of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations,” (1956) CFYC, No. 5, at 11, 13-14.

40 Chou, loo. tit. 67-70.

41 Ibid. 70-71. See also Hsu Tun-chang, loo. tit. note 39 above, at 16.

42 Premier Chou En-laIIn a TV interview with British Correspondent Felix Greene, Sept. 5, 1960. 7 Documents 226, 233 (1960).

43 In his speech to the Third Session of the First National People's Congress, delivered on June 28, 1956, Premier Chou En-lai said: “ … certain people are hatching a plot to create ‘two Chinas.’ They are vainly attempting to describe Taiwan as another China or as a separate independent state. But these vain attempts can only be interpreted as a sign of losing one's senses in the face of powerful facts. Taiwan has always been a part of China. Solemn international agreements have also long affirmed that Taiwan belongs to China. Even the Chiang Kai-shek clique also admits that Taiwan belongs to China. All Chinese people, including those on Taiwan, will never tolerate the detachment of Taiwan from their motherland… . It is futile to hope that China will fall into this trap.” 4 Documents 73, 87-88 (1956-1957); English translation in Supplement to People's China, No. 28, at 1, 11. (1956). Vice Premier Ch'en Yi also expressed the same view to a Japanese journalist on June 20, 1964. He said: “Under no circumstances will we barter away principles and sovereignty; any attempt to make the restoration of China's seat in the United Nations a bait for our acceptance of the ‘two Chinas’ scheme is doomed to failure.“ 7 Peking Review, No. 26, at 6, 7 (June 26, 1964). In 1966, Canada advocated before the 21st Session of the U. N. General Assembly a “two Chinas” plan which calls for the seating of Communist China in the Security Council and the concurrent representation of both the Republic of China and Communist China in the General Assembly. New York Times, Nov. 23, 1966. Italy also proposed a resolution (which later became the six-Power resolution) for establishing an Ad Hoc Committee with the mandate of exploring and studying the situation in all its aspects in order to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its 22nd Session. See 3 U. N. Monthly Chronicle, No. 11, at 37 (December, 1966). These two proposals were sharply denounced by a People's Daily editorial on Dec. 2, 1966, entitled “China Asks the United Nations for Nothing.” The editorial said: “Both the ‘six-nation draft resolution' and Canada's ‘three point plan’ were designed to enable the Chiang Kai-shek Gang to hang on in the United Nations, and to pursue the plot for the creation of ‘two Chinas.’ The Italian representative was quite outspoken when he said that ‘the 12 million people of Taiwan […] have a right to self-determination.’ That Chinese should be required to take a vote to determine whether they are Chinese or not is absurd in the extreme. This is a flagrant violation of China's sacred sovereign rights. … Whatever devices are thought up to serve the U. S. policy of aggression and the U. S. plot for the creation of ‘two Chinas', they are doomed to failure.” English translation in 9 Peking Review, No. 50, at 26, 27 (Dec. 9, 1966). See also, Commentator, “The Conspiracy of “Two-Chinas” Is Doomed to Become Bankrupt,” People's Daily, Nov. 25, 1966. For a detailed argument to refute the theory of “two Chinas,“ see Shao Chin-fu, “The Absurd Theory of ‘Two Chinas’ and Principles of International Law,” (1959) KCWTYC, No. 2, at 7; English translation in Oppose the New U. S. Plots to Create “Two Chinas,” 76 (Peking, 1962). The Government of the Republic of China has also always strongly opposed any “two Chinas” proposal in the United Nations. E.g., see China and the United Nations 252-262; Vice President Ch'en Cheng's statement on Chinese representation in the United Nations, New York Herald Tribune, July 6, 1961.

44 Communist China has consistently maintained that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of it. The official attitude was expressed on Aug. 24, 1950, by Premier (and then Foreign Minister) Chou En-laIIn a cablegram to the President of the Security Council shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War and the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. The cablegram reads: “Taiwan is an integral part of China. This is not only a fact based on history, confirmed by the situation since the surrender of Japan, but it is also stipulated in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Communique of 1945 as binding international agreements which the United States Government has pledged itself to respect and observe.” 1 Documents 134 (1949-50); U.N. Doc. S/1715 (1950). Communist Chinese writers have written many articles expounding the view that Taiwan is a part of China. -E.g., see Mei Ju-ao, “Stripping the Aggressor of Its Pretext,” People's Daily, Jan. 31, 1955; English translation in (1955) People's China, No. 5, at 10; Ch'en T'i-ch'iang, “Sovereignty of Taiwan Belongs to China,” People's Daily, Feb. 8, 1955; Shao Chin-fu, loc. ait. note 43, above. The Government of the Republic of China also considers that Taiwan is a part of China. E.g., see President Chiang Kai-shek's address on the international situation, Feb. 8, 1955; English translation in 5 Free China Review, No. 3, at 49, 52-53 (Taipei, March, 1955). See also the following publications written by scholars in the Republic of China: 3 T'ang Wu, Chung-kuo yti kuo-chi fa (China and International Law) 432-440 (Taipei, 1957); Chao Yin-ming, “The Sovereignty of Taiwan from the Viewpoint of International Law,” 13 Cheng-chi p'ing-lun (Political Review), No. 12 (Taipei, 1965); Hungdah Chiu, “The Question of the Legal Status of Formosa and the Pescadores,” in Hsien-tai kuo-chi fa wen-t'i (Selected Problems of Modern International Law) 97 (Taipei, 1966). Both the Republic of China and Communist China hold the view that the United Nations is not competent to consider the “question of Taiwan (Formosa).” The U. S. proposal of Sept. 20, 1950, to have the “Question of Formosa” included in the agenda of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly (U.N. Doc A/1373 (1950)) was strongly opposed by the Republic of China. On Oct. 5, 1950, when the General Committee discussed the question of whether the U. S. proposal should be included in the agenda, the representative of the Republic of China stated: “ It [is] unprecedented in the United Nations for the government of one Member State to question the right of another State to its territorial possessions. In so doing, the United States delegation [has] taken a very grave step. In accordance with the principles laid down by the Charter, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, the Chinese delegation [feels] that it was beyond the competence of the General Assembly to consider the proposed item, and [will] therefore oppose its inclusion in the agenda.” U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, General Committee, 71st meeting, at 11 (A/BUB/ SR.71) (1950). On Nov. 28, 1950, in his statement at the 526th meeting of the Security Council, the Communist Chinese representative, Wu Hsiu-eh'uan, stated that history itself and the situation during the five years following Japan's surrender had long determined the status of Taiwan to be that of an integral part of China. Moreover, he argued, under Art. 107 of the Charter, the United Nations had no right whatsoever to alter that status. U.N. Security Council, 5th Year, Official Records, 527th meeting, No. 69, at 2, 9 (S/P.V. 527) (1950).

45 E.g., in 1960 the China Political Science and Law Association withdrew from the International Law Association in protest against the admission of the Republic of China to the latter association. 3 Peking Review, No. 32, at 24-25 (1960); see also International Law Association, Report of the Forty-Ninth Conference (Hamburg) exeii (1960).

46 Chinese People's Postal Administration Accepts Universal Postal Convention,'' Dee. 5, 1950; 1 Documents 188 (1949-50); English translation in SCMP, No. 24, at 5 (Dec. 6, 1950).

47 ‘’ Chinese Postal Administration Registers Strong Protest With the Universal Postal Union Against Tricks to Oust China,” May 13, 1951; 2 Documents 19 (1951- 1953); English translation in SCMP, No. 104, at 18, 19 (May 13, 1951).

48 Such a position seems to be implied by the Communist Chinese statement in reference to the circular letter sent by the Universal Postal Union to its members: ” … Circular Letter March 8, 1951, mentioning the so-called Postal Administration of the Kuomintang Clique on the same footing with the General Postal Administration of the People's Republic of China … China can never agree to this.” 2 Documents 20; English translation in SCMP, No. 104, at 19.

49 People's Daily, Oct. 7, 1965; English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 41, at 7 (Oct. 8, 1965).

50 There are two problems involved in implementing that part of Art. 32 which concerns the invitation of non-Member states to participate in the United Nations on an ad hoc basis: (1) The Rules of Procedure of the Security Council do not expressly provide for the invitation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations. In practice, such invitations seem to be based on Rule 39, concerning invitations of individuals, which provides: “The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.“ Thus, in the resolution inviting the representative of Communist China, adopted by the Security Council at its 506th meeting on Sept. 29, 1950, it is stated, inter alia, that the Security Council “may in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure, invite representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to provide it with information or assist it in the consideration of these matters… . “ (2) Rule 38 of the Rules of Procedure provides: “Any member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding Rule or in application of Article 32 of the Charter to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council.” It is obvious that Rule 38 refers only to Members of the United Nations invited pursuant to Art. 32 of the Charter and confers only on these Members the right to submit proposals and draft resolutions, and does not confer such right on non-Member states invited pursuant to Art. 32. However, in the case of inviting Communist China's representative, the Security Council did not seem to take into account this technical difference. Thus, when the representative of Communist China submitted a draft resolution (U.N. Doc. S/1921 (1950)) at the 526 th meeting of the Security Council on Nov. 28, 1950, no representative raised this technical question, and the draft resolution, when sponsored by the Soviet Union, was put to a vote. The Council, however, on Nov. 30, 1950, rejected the resolution by 9 votes to one (the Soviet Union) with one Member (India) not participating. U.N. Security Council, 5th Year, Official Records, 529th meeting, 22 (Nov. 30, 1950) (S/P.V. 529). For a survey of the practice of participation of non-Member states in the Security Council, see Repertoire of Practice of the Security Council, 1946-51, at 113-120 (ST/PSCA/1) (1954); 1952-55, at 50-51 (ST/PSCA/1/Add.1) (1956); 1959-63, at 75-76 (ST/PSCA/1/Add. 3) (1965).

51 In cablegrams dated Aug. 28 and 30, 1950, to the U. N. Secretary General, the Foreign Minister of Communist China submitted to the Security Council a complaint accusing the United States of bombing Chinese territory. The President of the Security Council included the item in the provisional agenda of the Council's 493rd meeting on Aug. 31, 1950. See U.N. Docs. S/1772 and 1743 (1950); 1 Documents 140, 143 (1949-1950). In a cablegram to the United Nations dated Sept. 10, 1950, the Foreign Minister of Communist China stated that, as the sole legal government representing the Chinese people and as the accuser in the case, his government had the right and the necessity to send a delegation to attend and participate in the proceedings of the Security Council. U.N. Doc. S/1776 (1950). Nevertheless, on Sept. 11, 1950, the Security Council at its 499th meeting rejected a Soviet proposal to invite a representative of Communist China to participate in the discussion of the case. See TJ.N. Doc. S/1759 (1950); U.N. Security Council, 5th Year, Official Records, 499th Meeting, 19 (Sept. 11, 1950) (S/P.V.499). In the ensuing weeks, Communist China sent several similar cablegrams to the U.N. Security Council requesting participation in the Council's discussion of certain questions relating to China. See cablegrams of Sept. 17, 1950 (U.N. Doc. A/1795), Sept. 24, 1950 (U.N. Doc. A/1415), and Sept. 27, 1950 (U.N. Doc. A/1416).

52 In a cablegram dated Aug. 24, 1950, addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Foreign Minister of Communist China submitted to the Council a complaint charging the United States with invasion of Taiwan, U.N. Doc. S/1715 (1950). The complaint was included in the provisional agenda of the 492nd meeting of the Security Council on Aug. 29. In a cablegram dated Sept. 17, 1950, the Foreign Minister of Communist China stated that, as the sole legal government representing the Chinese people, and being the accuser in the case, his government had the right and necessity to send its delegation to attend and participate in the proceedings of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1795 (1950). On Sept. 29, 1950, the Security Council at its 506th meeting adopted a resolution to invite the representative of Communist China “ to attend the meetings of the Security Council held after November 15, 1950 during the discussion of that government's declaration regarding an armed invasion of the Island of Taiwan (Formosa).” In a cablegram dated October 2, 1950, the Secretary General transmitted the invitation to the Foreign Minister of Communist China. In a cablegram dated Oct. 23, 1950, the government of Communist China accepted the invitation. On Nov. 27, a representative of Communist China took his seat at the Council table. U.N. Security Council, 5th Year, Official Records, 525th meeting, 19-20 (Nov. 27, 1950) (S/P.V. 525).

53 During the discussion at the 506th meeting of the Security Council on Sept. 29, 1950, in regard to the question of inviting a representative of Communist China to participate in the Council's consideration of the agenda item on the “Invasion of Taiwan,” the U. S. representative observed that “the General Assembly … has given its opinion in Resolution 267 (IV) that … decisions under Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure, are procedural in their nature.” The representative of the Republic of China disagreed, saying that: “[i]nsofar as the recommendations of the General Assembly are concerned, I would like to say that no specific point is to be found among the recommendations covering the question at issue, because those recommendations do not cover the question of inviting a second representative from the same country.” U. N. Security Council, 5th Year, Official Records, 506th meeting, p. 13 and 507th meeting, p. 3 (Sept. 29, 1950) (S/P.V. 506 and 507).

54 In a letter to the United Nations dated Sept. 20, 1950, the Soviet Union proposed that the question of U. S. aggression against China should be included in the agenda of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/1375 (1950). At its 285th plenary meeting on Sept. 26, 1950, the General Assembly included the item in its agenda and referred it to the First Committee. In a cablegram to the Secretary General and President of the General Assembly dated Oct. 17, 1950, the Foreign Minister of Communist China declared that, as the sole legal government representing the Chinese people, his government had the right and necessity to send a delegation to attend and participate in the proceedings of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/590 (1950). At the 406th meeting of the Committee on Nov. 24, 1950, a Soviet proposal to invite a representative of Communist China to participate in the Committee's consideration of this agenda item was adopted. U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, 1st Committee, 406th meeting, p. 385 (Nov. 24, 1950) (A/C.1/ SR.406). Foreign Minister Chou En-lai replied by cablegram dated Nov. 26, 1950, accepting the invitation and informing the Secretary General of the appointment of a representative to participate in the discussion of the item in the First Committee, XJ.N. Doc. A/C.1/636 (1950). At the Committee's 407th meeting on Nov. 27, 1950, the chairman invited the representative of Communist China to the Committee table. U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, 1st Committee, 407th meeting, p. 389 (Nov. 27, 1950) (A/C.1/SR.407).

55 Agenda item submitted by New Zealand on Jan. 28, 1955, U.N. Doc. S/3354 (1955). The Soviet Union also proposed on Jan. 30, 1955, that the Security Council should consider the question of acts of aggression committed by the United States against Communist China in the area of Taiwan and other Chinese islands, U.N. Doe. S/3355 (1955). On Jan. 31, 1955, the Council adopted a New Zealand proposal to invite a representative of Communist China to participate in the discussion of the New Zealand item, U.N. Security Council, 10th Year, Official Records, 690th meeting, p. 23 (Jan. 31, 1955) (S/P.V.690).

56 U.N. Doc. S/3358 (1955).

57 For the resolution proposed by the Soviet Union, see note 55 above.

58 But Communist China cited grounds other than the China representation question when, on Nov. 11, 1950, it rejected an invitation to participate in the Security Council's discussion on the Special Report of the XJ. N. Command in Korea, adopted by the Council on Nov. 8, 1950, U.N. Doc. S/1884 (1950). The reasons for rejection were given by the Foreign Minister of Communist China as follows: “We cannot accept the invitation … because … this invitation deprives the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China of the right to discuss in the Security Council the most pressing question to the Chinese people, namely the question of armed intervention in Korea and aggression against China by the United States Government, and limits the right of the Chinese Representative to the discussion of the special report of the so-called United Nations Command which was engendered illegally by the Security Council under manipulation of the United States during the absence of two permanent members, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and whose report is therefore not only one-sided and malicious, but also unlawful, and absolutely cannot be taken as basis for discussion … “ U.N. Doc. S/1898 (1950).

59 See China and the United Nations 42-44 (1959). Tung is currently Vice Chairman of the Central People's Government of Communist China

60 See Ch'en T'i-ch'iang, “The Membership of the United Nations Should Be Universal,“ People's Daily, Nov. 9, 1955; “The Membership of the United Nations Should Be Universal,” editorial, People's Daily, Nov. 21, 1955; Observer's Comment, “Don't Allow the Blocking of the Acceptance of New Members to the United Nations,“ People's Daily, Dec. 11, 1955; Observer's Comment, “The United Nations Should Accept Mongolia and Japan,” People's Daily, Dec. 13, 1956; Ting Liu, “The Question of the Acceptance of New Members by the United Nations,” (1956) CFYC, No. 1, at 32. But in all these arguments in favour of universality of membership in the United Nations, never did Communist China argue that membership should be opened to any state not possessing the qualifications listed in Art. 4 of the Charter. Its main argument has been that many states, particularly the Eastern European Communist states, were fully qualified under Art. 4 of the Charter for U. N. membership but that their admission was being unjustifiably blocked by “American imperialism.“ See also the Joint Statement of Communist China and East Germany, Dec. 25, 1955, which states: “For the promotion of international peace and international cooperation, membership in the United Nations must be universal.” 4 Treaties 9 (1955); 3 Documents 355 (1954-55); English translation in (1956) People's China, No. 2, Supp. at 2.

61 People's Daily, Oct. 7, 1965; English translation in 8 Peking Eeview, No. 41, at 7 (Oct. 8, 1965).

62 7 U.N.C.I.O. Documents 327-329 (1945). When this question was considered in Committee 2 of Commission I of the Conference, the Chinese representative announced that China was opposed to mentioning withdrawal in the Charter. He acknowledged that the power of withdrawal was inherent and suggested that each case of intended withdrawal should be considered on an ad hoc basis. He believed that withdrawal of Members would be detrimental to the organization. Ibid. 264-265. See also China and the United Nations 44 (1959).

63 See letter dated Jan. 20, 1965, to the Secretary General from Indonesia on Withdrawal from the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/5857 (1965). In a telegram sent to the United Nations on Sept. 19, 1966, Indonesia declared its intention to resume full participation in the United Nations, commencing with the opening of the 21st Session of the General Assembly, U.N. Docs. A/6419, S/7498. On Sept. 28, 1966, it did resume full participation in the work of the United Nations. The period of withdrawal was considered by Indonesia and the President of the Assembly as non-participation, so that it still retained its membership status. No Members objected to this view. See 3 U.N. Monthly Chronicle, No. 9, at 11-12 (October, 1966); see also article by Egon Schwelb in 61 A.J.I.L. 661 (1967).

64 See Communist Chinese Government's statement issued on Jan. 10, 1965, supporting President Sukarno's resolute decision to withdraw from the United Nations, People's Daily, Jan. 10, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 3, at 5 (Jan. 15, 1965); Vice Premier Ch'en Yi's statement on Jan. 11, People's Daily, Jan. 12, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 3 at 4; Chairman Liu's statement on Jan. 12, People's Daily, Jan. 13, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 3 at 4; “Indonesia's Bold, Revolutionary Action,” editorial, People's Daily, Jan. 10, 1965; English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 3 at 7; Wen Yao-chin, “Indoensia Pulls Out of the United Nations,” 8 Peking Review, No. 3, at 10; Vice Premier Ch'en Yi's statement on Jan. 26, 1965, People's Daily, Jan. 27, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 5, at 7 (Jan. 29, 1965) ; China-Indonesia Joint Statement of Jan. 28, 1965, People's Daily, Jan. 29, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 6, at 6 (Feb. 5, 1965).

65 See Kuo Ch'un, Chap. XI, “The Principle of the Unanimity of Big Powers and the Problem of Charter Revision,” The United Nations 101-106.

66 Chou Keng-sheng, op. cit. note 19 above at 67-68.

67 Report on the Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 3 Documents 262, 272 (1954-1955).

68 U.N. General Assembly Res. 1991A (XVII) and 1991B (XVIII).

69 U.N. General Assembly, 18th Sess., Official Records, Spec. Pol. Comm., 423rd meeting, p. 257 (Dec. 10, 1963) (A/SPC/SR.423). The Soviet Union voted against these two resolutions. It favoured redistribution of the existing seats in these organs. See ibid. 256-258.

70 10 Documents 437 (1963), English translation in 6 Peking Review, No. 51, at 20-21 (Dee. 20, 1963). Ch'en Yi's public statement of Oct. 2, 1963, was made at the Guinean Embassy's National Day reception in Peking, SCMP, No. 3074, at 36 (Oct. 7, 1963). Thus it is not surprising that the representative of Guinea, at the Special Political Committee's meeting held on Dec. 10, 1963, expressed doubt at the Soviet explanation of the Communist Chinese position. See U.N. General Assembly, 18th Sess., Official Records, Spec. Pol. Comm., 423rd meeting, pp. 257-258 (Dec. 10, 1963) (A/SPC/ SR.423).

71 See the Soviet statement at the 427th meeting held on Dec. 14, 1963, ibid. 270. See also Albania's rebuttal of the Soviet statement at the 428th meeting held on the same day. Ibid. 277. An editorial in the People's Daily on Dee. 18, 1963, severely criticized the Soviet position as follows: “We must express our greatest regret at the improper tactics employed by the Soviet delegate over this issue. Using as a pretext his allegation that China opposed an expansion of U.N. organs, the Soviet delegate refused to support the resolutions for broader Afro-Asian representation in the Security Council and in the Economic and Social Council. Even after the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in a statement on December 12 gave a comprehensive and clear-cut explanation of the position of the Chinese Government, he still stuck to his misrepresentation of the Chinese position in an attempt to apologize for the action of the Soviet Union. This showed that the Soviet delegate was manoeuvring for ulterior motives.” English translation in 6 Peking Review, No. 52, at 14, 15 (Dec. 27, 1963). in his speech at the farewell party for Marshal Montgomery on Sept. 22, 1961, Premier Chou En-lai observed, inter alia, that it is the United States which has tried to link the Chinese representation question with the question of the expansion of certain United Nations organs. 8 Documents 253, 254 (1961).

72 This section is limited to an appraisal of Communist China's general attitude concerning this important function. The author proposes to discuss this question in detail in a separate paper.

73 See Kuo Ch'un, The United Nations 24 (Peking, 1956); Wan Chia-chun, What is the United Nations 7 (Peking, 1957).

74 Cf. the following passage written by a Communist Chinese writer: “ I n November 1950, the United States again in the fifth session of the General Assembly used its mechanical majority to pass a so-called ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution, which totally undermines the principle of the unanimity of the Big Powers and impairs the function of the Security Council, in an attempt to transform the United Nations into an instrument of war. This resolution provides that when the Security Council fails to exercise its … responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, that is to say, when the Soviet Union vetoes any proposal of aggression submitted by the United States in the Security Council, the General Assembly may, at the request of the Security Council on the vote of any seven members of the United Nations, or by vote of the majority, immediately discuss this question and even recommend so-called ‘ collective measures', including the use of force, to organize a United Nations force anytime at the recommendation of the General Assembly. It further provides that 14 states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and others, will organize a ‘Collective Measures Committee’ to study possible measures which may be used for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is obvious that the above resolution practically transfers all the powers of the Security Council to the General Assembly and its subordinate organ—the ‘Collective Measures Committee'… . This American way of openly undermining the Charter of the United Nations not only met the strong opposition of the Soviet Union, but also the opposition of many other states.” Kuo Ch'un, op. cit. note 73 above, at 104-105. In a statement by Communist Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, dated Feb. 3, 1951, denouncing the General Assembly Resolution of Feb. 1, 1951, which declared Communist China to be an aggressor in Korea, it is stated, inter alia, that “since there is now a representative of the Soviet Union in the Security Council to observe the Charter and uphold justice, the United States resolution slandering China was directly submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in an outright, unlawful bypassing of the Security Council and in violation of the principle of unanimity among the great Powers.” 2 Documents 7, 9 (1951-1953); English translation in 1951 Documents of International Affairs 548, 551. “English translation of the editorial in SCMP, No. 1412, at 22 (Nov. 16, 1956). In a Ta kung pao (Impartial Daily) editorial on Nov. 13, 1956, it is stated that the U.N. General Assembly should halt the adventurous activities of the aggressors and exercise its role to defeat all imperialist-inspired intrigues to endanger international peace and security. Reported in ibid. 24. E.g., in a People's Daily editorial on Nov. 13, 1956, it is stated that “What occurred recently in Hungary is exclusively the internal affair of that country in which the United Nations has no right to intervene.” English translation in SCMP, No. 1412, at 22, 23 (Nov. 16, 1956). collective measures', including the use of force, to organize a United Nations force anytime at the recommendation of the General Assembly. It further provides that 14 states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and others, will organize a ‘Collective Measures Committee’ to study possible measures which may be used for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is obvious that the above resolution practically transfers all the powers of the Security Council to the General Assembly and its subordinate organ—the ‘Collective Measures Committee'… . This American way of openly undermining the Charter of the United Nations not only met the strong opposition of the Soviet Union, but also the opposition of many other states.” Kuo Ch'un, op. cit. note 73 above, at 104-105. In a statement by Communist Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, dated Feb. 3, 1951, denouncing the General Assembly Resolution of Feb. 1, 1951, which declared Communist China to be an aggressor in Korea, it is stated, inter alia, that “since there is now a representative of the Soviet Union in the Security Council to observe the Charter and uphold justice, the United States resolution slandering China was directly submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in an outright, unlawful bypassing of the Security Council and in violation of the principle of unanimity among the great Powers.” 2 Documents 7, 9 (1951-1953); English translation in 1951 Documents of International Affairs 548, 551.

75 English translation of the editorial in SCMP, No. 1412, at 22 (Nov. 16, 1956). In a Ta kung pao (Impartial Daily) editorial on Nov. 13, 1956, it is stated that the U.N. General Assembly should halt the adventurous activities of the aggressors and exercise its role to defeat all imperialist-inspired intrigues to endanger international peace and security. Reported in ibid. 24.

76 E.g., in a People's Daily editorial on Nov. 13, 1956, it is stated that “What occurred recently in Hungary is exclusively the internal affair of that country in which the United Nations has no right to intervene.” English translation in SCMP, No. 1412, at 22, 23 (Nov. 16, 1956).

77 Cf. the following passage written by a Communist Chinese writer: ‘ ‘ Colonial countries frequently … make the arbitrary statement that their acts of suppressing national liberation movements in colonies are ‘matters of domestic jurisdiction’ and reject any intervention by the United Nations. However, the acts of suppressing national liberation movements are not a question of a state's internal affairs. Sueh acts violate the fundamental United Nations Charter principles of national selfdetermination and respect for human rights and also threaten the peace and security of the world. Therefore, both the General Assembly and the Security Council have the duty and the authority to handle this matter.” Kuo Ch'un, op. cit. note 73 above, at 15.

78 Ibid. 48.

79 Statement of Communist Chinese Foreign Ministry dated Sept. 28, 1965; People's Daily, Sept. 29, 1965. See also “The United Nations Has No Eight to Discuss Korean Question,” editorial, People's Daily, Dee. 1, 1965, English summary in SCMP, No. 3591, at 26 (Dec. 6, 1965); “The United Nations Is U. S. Imperialism's Tool for Aggression Against Korea,” editorial, People's Daily, Dec. 25, 1965, English summary in 9 Peking Review, No. 1, at 14 (Jan. 1, 1966); “U.N. General Assembly: Provocation Against Korean People,” 10 Peking Review, No. 1, at 28 (Jan. 1, 1967).

80 People's Daily, Aug. 13, 1964, English translation in 7 Peking Review, No. 33, at 8 (Aug. 14, 1964). See also “Seriously Inform U Thant,” editorial, People's Daily, April 12, 1965, English summary in SCMP, No. 3439, at 37 (April 15, 1965); “U.N. Has No Eight Whatsoever to Discuss Vietnam Question,” editorial, People's Daily, Feb. 2, 1966, English translation in 9 Peking Review, No. 6, at 9 (Feb. 4, 1966); “South Vietnam: No U.N. Meddling Allowed,” 9 Peking Review, No. 25, at 38 (June 17, 1966); “The U.N. Has No Eight Whatsoever to Poke Its Nose into the Vietnam Question,” editorial, Sept. 24, 1966, English translation in 9 Peking Review, No. 40, at 29 (Sept. 30, 1966).

81 Wan, op. cit. note 73 above, at 40-41

82 See “Justice Cannot Be Upheld in U.N.,” People's Daily, Jan. 13, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 4, at 13-14 (Jan. 22, 1965). This article briefly discussed 10 cases between 1961 and 1964 in which the United Nations failed to take action deemed necessary by Communist China.

83 See “The United Nations—Tool of U.S. Imperialist Aggression,” People's Daily, Jan. 9, 1965, English translation in 8 Peking Review, No. 3 at 13-14 (Jan. 15, 1965). This article briefly discussed 10 cases between 1951 and 1963 in which the United Nations, in Communist China's opinion served as a tool of U. S. aggression. In a speech delivered on May 20, 1967 (Peking's “Palestine Day“), Kuo Chien, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, denounced the United Nations as the tool of U. S. imperialism on the Palestine question from the very beginning, and pointed out: “The United Nations serves the U.S. aggressors on the Palestine question as it did on the questions of the Congo (L), the Dominican Eepublic, and so on. The U.N. flag is stained with the blood of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America.“ 10 Peking Review, No. 22 at 33 (May 27, 1966).

84 In an editorial in the People's Daily on Dec. 27, 1965, it is stated, inter alia, that: “However, when all is said and done, the United Nations is still a tool in the hands of the United States and it is becoming more and more a place where the Soviet Union and the United States make their political deals. The 20th session was a conference for opposing the revolutionary movements of the oppressed nations and oppressed peoples. It was an anti-China conference which wilfully interfered in the internal affairs of sovereign states and a conference for pursuing the policy of American-Soviet co-operation for the domination of the world.” English translation of the editorial in 9 Peking Review, No. 1, at 13-16 (Jan. 1, 1966). Commenting on the 1967 Middle East crisis, an editorial in the People's Daily on June 6, 1967, said: “The war of aggression unleashed by the U. S. imperialist lackey Israel is in fact the continuation of the neo-colonialist policy of enslavement that U. S. imperialism has been pursuing towards the Arab countries. The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union have now joined hands in a vain attempt to bring the Arab countries to submission by means of war. While provoking a war, they are getting the United Nations to ‘mediate’ so as to enable the big powers to continue their intervention. This lays bare the United Nations as a tool of V. S. Imperialism, a tool of colonialism, a tool of power politics of the big powers, and a tool of the biff powers to cover up their war crimes and carry out political deception.” (Emphasis added.) English translation in IP Peking Eeview, No. 24, at 10, 11 (June 9, 1967).

85 The conflict which is currently taking place at all levels of society, party, and government in Communist China may to some extent have derived from differences of opinion among party leaders as to the proper course for Communist China's international relations. If this is true, it would not be surprising if, after the “cultural revolution” subsides, Communist China were to effect certain changes in its foreign policy. However, in regard to Peking's attitude toward the United Nations, neither official statements nor unofficial articles appearing since the launching of the “cultural revolution” in early 1966 have expressed any views differing essentially from the regime's position as discussed in this paper. The paper does not cover materials appearing after July, 1967.