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International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers. By Dan Sarooshi. Pp. x, 122. Index. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. $99, £54.95, cloth; $40, £19.99, paper.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

José E. Alvarez
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Type
Recent Books on International Law
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 101 , Issue 3 , July 2007 , pp. 674 - 679
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2007

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References

1 International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Fifty–eighth Session, ch. VII, UN GAOR, 61st Sess.,Supp. No. 10, at246–63, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter ILC draft Articles].

2 See, e.g., Eric, Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AJIL 489 (2001).Google Scholar

3 See, e.g., M v. Germany, App. No. 13258/87 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 9, 1990); Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Feb. 18, 1999); Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 1999); Yusuf v. Council, Case T–306/01 (Eur. Ct. First Instance Sept. 21, 2005); Kadi v. Council, Case T–315/01 (Eur. Ct. First Instance, Sept. 21, 2005).

4 See, e.g., Ruth, W. Grant & Robert, O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 23 (2005)Google Scholar; Robert, O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in Taming Globalization: Frontiers Of Goverance 130 (David, Held & Mathias, Koenig–Archibugi eds., 2003)Google Scholar; Benedict, Kingsbury, Nico, Krisch, & Richard, B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 15 (2005)Google Scholar; Steve, Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 299 (2002)Google Scholar; Richard, H. Steinberg, judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AJIL 247 (2004)Google Scholar.

5 Thus, Sarooshi relies on Schermers and Blokker, as well as other comparable sources, for the proposition that IOs are subject to both customary international law and general principles of law.

6 ILC draft Article 2, see supra note 1, at 253, explains that all subsequent articles apply to all organizations established by treaty and possessing their own “international legal personality.”

7 Compare Article 3(1) of the ILC Draft Articles, supra note 1, at 253 (“Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization entails the international responsibility of the international organization.”).

8 The ILC, as does Sarooshi, relies heavily on the Tin Council cases for this proposition. See ILC, Fourth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, paras. 79–82, UN Doc. A/CN.4/564/Add. 2 (2006).

9 See José, E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Accountability or Responsibility? Address Delivered to the Canadian Council of International Law (Oct. 27, 2006), at <http://www.asil.org/aboutasil/president.html=Google Scholar (to be published by the Canadian Council of International Law in its proceedings of the 2008 annual meeting).

10 ILC draft Articles, supra note 1, Art. 8; International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers ax 109 n.2 (discussing the possibility that IOs might be responsible for some exercises of discretionary power when not necessary or appropriate to achieve the object for which the power was granted).

11 Ralph, Wilde, Enhancing Accountability at the International Level: The Tension Between International Organization and Member State Responsibility and the Underlying Issues at Stake, 12 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 396, 402 (2006).Google Scholar

12 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), paras. 142–84 (Int’l Ct. Justice Feb. 26, 2007) (addressing Serbia’s failure to extradite individuals as showing violation of Genocide Convention).

13 See ILC, Third Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, para. 10, UN Doc. A/CN.4/ 553 (2005).

14 For a view that the Council is bound hy jus cogens, see Yusuf v. Council, Case T–306/01, para. 277 (Eur. Ct. First Instance Sept. 21, 2005). For a survey of these alternatives, see generally Erika De Wet, The Chapter Vii Powers Of The United Nations Security Council (2004).

15 See, e.g., Alexander, Wendt, Constructing International Politics, Int’l Security, Summer 1995, at 71.Google Scholar

16 See, e.g., Daniel, L. Nielson & Michael, J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 Int’l Org. 241 (2003)Google Scholar; Karen, J. Alter,Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, Eur. J. Int’l Rel. (forthcoming), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=622222=.Google ScholarPubMed

17 See, e.g., James McCall, Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts, 54 Int’l Org.137 (2000)Google Scholar; Andrew, T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 303 (2002).Google Scholar

18 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 4.

19 See, e.g., John, O. McGinnis & Mark, L. Movsesian,The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511 (2000).Google Scholar