1 The term “legal” rather than “judicial” is used to characterize the decisions with which we are concerned in order to avoid exclusive reference to courts. In international law, in fact, the term adjudication has been used generally to refer to any process of peaceful dispute settlement. For a classic example, see 1 Moore, International Adjudications xii (1929). Professor Quincy Wright states: “Broadly denned, adjudication includes dispute settlement by a political body such as the United Nations Security Council or a national legislature in whose decision-making political interests are important; … All such bodies, however, are supposed to administer justice and to be guided by considerations of equity when dealing with disputes… . “ Wright “Adjudication,” Dictionary of the Social Sciences 9 (Gould and Kolb eds., compiled by UNESCO, 1964). For a comparable inclination, see Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 292 (1953).

2 ‘ ‘ The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harvard Law Rev. 457, 461 (1897). “ … the law consists of the rules recognized and acted on by courts of justice.” Salmond on Jurisprudence 41 (11th ed., Williams ed., 1957). See also Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 117 (2nd ed., 1921). The legal realist position is not so much incorrect as limited to a particular phase of social development. In a highly organized society, there is a close correlation between what the court says and what, in fact, is done. A court pronouncement “triggers” enforcement; hence, to state that the law is “what the courts say” includes governmental implementation. In international law there is no such correlation, no “automatic triggering.” Thus, what the courts say may have no effect on behavior. For a demonstration of the point, compare the I.C.J. Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, and its subsequent disregard by Members of the United Nations.

3 “ History is replete with societies in which no attempt was made to implement “legislation.” The earliest documented example appears to be Hammurabi's code: see Finkelstein, “Ammisaduqa's Edict and the Babylonian ‘Law Codes,’ “ 15 J. uniform Studies 91 (1961). In 19th-century France, the administration paid no attention to Parliamentary pronouncements: Luethy, France against Herself 40 ff. (1955). Although these societies functioned, they were incapable of adapting to rapid changes and of directing their own fate. In crisis they were paralyzed. Hence they were lawfully ineffective.

4 Root, “The Sanction of International Law,” 1908 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 14, 16-17; Taft's concept of a “conscience of nations,” 1911 ibid. 340-341; Judge Hutcheson's famous “just opinion” in the Ryan claim, 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 14-15 (1940). For a recent invocation of the “compelling moral force” of decisions, see Gormley, “The Status of the Awards of International Tribunals: Possible Avoidance Versus Legal Enforcement,” 10 Howard L.J. 40, 59 (1964).

5 Vattel rested the entire basis of international law upon an internal “law of conscience.“ Friedmann, Legal Theory 34 (2nd ed., 1949), construes this to be a denial of international law. Pound, “Philosophic Theory and International Law,” 1 Bibliotheca Visseriana 71, 76 (1923), suggests that since classical international law was directed personally to individual sovereigns, the idea of personal conscience was not the fictitious concept which the current “state conscience” is. Even the concept of state conscience may be too broad for proper analysis. Since it is ultimately individuals who prescribe and apply international law, their personal ethics and internal demands for rectitude will clearly affect their decisions. See Corbett, Morals, Law and Power in International Relations 11, 14, 15 (1956). It may be conceded that this drive is one factor, but certainly not the only factor in compliance.

6 In the Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1 at 32 (1923), the British, French, Italian and Japanese Governments petitioned the Court, under the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, to find that Germany had wrongfully refused passage through the Kiel Canal to the S.S. Wimbledon. The Court found that Germany had acted wrongly and awarded the French Government damages, but refused to consider contingent punitive interest for delay in payment: “The Court does not award interim interest at a higher rate in the event of the judgment not being complied with at the expiration of the time fixed for compliance. The Court neither can nor should contemplate such a contingency.” (Ibid, at 32.) In the Readaptation phase of Mavrommatis (Judgment No. 10 (Jurisdiction)), P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 11 at 4 (1927), the Greek Government, in its reply to the British preliminary objection, contended that the United Kingdom had disregarded “ i t s international obligations.“ The Court very carefully distinguished this claim from the contention that the U.K. had not complied with its previous Mavrommatis judgment: “ I n these circumstances, the Court does not find it necessary to consider the question whether in certain cases, it might have jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning the non-compliance with the terms of one of its judgments.” (Ibid, at 13-14.) An extremely instructive case in this regard is the advisory opinion, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 229. The three defendant states had refused to appoint national arbitrators to a commission empowered to hear claims of violations of the human rights provisions in the Peace Treaties. In the first phase of the case the Court indicated that the national arbitrators should be appointed, but refused to consider contingent measures in default of appointment, presuming that a state would comply with it treaty obligations. In the interim the three states refused to comply, and in the second phase the Court held that there was no remedy in its power for this breach of international responsibility. [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 229.

7 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (Preliminary Objections), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93, is the most instructive example of this point. In that case, the United Kingdom sought to bring Iran before the Court on the basis of an Iranian declaration of adhesion under Article 36. It was apparent that Iran would not comply with any judgment which might have ensued. By extremely restrictive interpretation, the Court found itself without jurisdiction. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bead observed that some twenty days before the Court had upheld its jurisdiction under a similar adhesion in the Ambatielos Case (Preliminary Objections), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. at 38, “ … notwithstanding that a restrictive construction of the jurisdictional clause would have led, inevitably, to an opposite result.” (Ibid, at 143.) In the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Preliminary Objections), [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 127, in which Israel sought to bring Bulgaria before the Court for downing an Israeli civilian carrier which strayed into Bulgarian airspace, the Court disseised itself of jurisdiction, refusing to construe the Bulgarian declaration of adhesion of 1921 to the P.C.I.J. as operative vis-à-vis the I.C.J., under Art. 36(5) of the Statute. The Declaration of 1921 had been made when Bulgaria was a kingdom. Subsequently Bulgaria became Communist. It was highly improbable that she would have complied with a judgment. In a joint dissent, four judges, among them Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, argued that the Court's construction would cut away a good deal of its jurisdiction. Subsequently, in the Case Concerning Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962—Preliminary Objections), [1964] I.C.J. Rep. 4, the Court seised jurisdiction, overruling the majority opinion in the Aerial Incident case and adopting the minority view. The close relationship between the power of the Court and its willingness to seise jurisdiction has been noted by Schechter, in a comparison with the practice of international administrative courts: “ … the liberal views of jurisdiction taken by the administrative courts … has been taken in an area where practical requirements do not demand an excessive measure of judicial restraint in deciding jurisdictional issues. The infinite delicacies of questions of infringement of state sovereignty and of effectiveness of decisions rendered without prior approval of the judicial mechanism by the state or states concerned have no reference to international administrative problems.” Schechter, Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals 130 (1964); accord, Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court 91, 243 (1958).

8 On restrictive formulations of jurisdictional clauses, see note 7 above. In the Case Concerning Eight of Passage over Indian Territory, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 125; [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 61, a case with admittedly delicate political overtones, the Court found that Portugal had a right of passage in 1955; at the time of decision Goa had already been annexed by India I The decision did little more than confirm the status quo at two points in time. In the Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Preliminary Objections), [1963] I.C.J. Rep. 38, the Court refused to take jurisdiction, saying: ’ ‘ The Court must discharge the duty to which it has already called attention—the duty to safeguard the judicial function.” In the Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Borne in 1943 (Preliminary Question), [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 19, the Court applied an extremely restrictive and not logically exhaustive construction of the Washington Agreement in order to defeat the attachment strategy of the Three Powers (for detailed discussion, see note 73 below). In the Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 221, the Court refused to apply an ut res magis construction to the provisions of the Peace Treaties contemplating the arbitral commissions. It was apparent from comportment following the first phase of the case that the defendant states would not have complied.

9 In the Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266, the Court was asked to determine whether asylum granted to Sr. Haya de la Torre by the Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru, was in accordance with the Havana Convention on Asylum to which both litigants were parties, and, if so, whether Peru was bound to accord safe passage to Haya out of the country. The Court held that Colombia was not qualified to make a unilateral and definitive characterization of Haya's alleged offenses as falling within the purview of the Convention, and that the grant of asylum had been prolonged beyond the period sanctioned in Art. 2(2) of the Convention. On the day on which this judgment was handed down, Colombia, invoking Art. 60 of the Statute of the Court, asked for an interpretation of the judgment: specifically, did the judgment mean that Colombia was obliged to surrender Haya to the Government of Peru. In its judgment on this matter, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 395, the Court refused to interpret, holding that the fact that the decision was obscure to one party, but perfectly clear to the other, did not make a dispute. But the Asylum judgment proved obscure to both parties and, in a subsequent joint submission, they asked how it was to be executed, Haya de la Torre Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 71. The Court held that Colombia must terminate the asylum, but that Colombia was under no obligation to surrender Haya to Peru!

10 Gossett, “The Law: Leader or Laggard in Our Society,” 51 A.B.A.J. 1131 (1965).

11 ‘ ‘ Compliance with law depends on many things … and cardinally in my opinion, on the perceived distance between social reality and the respective legal norm which is designed to order that social reality… . This is why I would submit that it is not enough to ask how to cause compliance of social reality with law, but also how to cause compliance of law with social reality.'’ Triska, ‘ ‘ Different Perceptions of Agreements and Disagreements,” 1964 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 61. The point is well taken, sed quaere if this is the “cardinal” factor in compliance. It is one factor, possibly important in certain contexts. Yet given a “social reality” on a course towards self-decimation, little is gained by rearranging the law so that it sanctions destruction. In those circumstances in which the gap between “ought” and “ is “ is great, the challenge to lawyers and scholars is to secure a measure of compliance notwithstanding. For a reductio of Triska's thesis see Fisher, “The Veto as a Means of Making Third-Party Settlement Acceptable,” ibid. 123. He assumes that enforcement is impossible, hence the alternatives are to have (1) no adjudicative institutions or (2) one subject to a de jure veto. But if, as this article contends, enforcement is not necessarily impossible, the proposed veto deprives enforcement of one potential base of power, the authority of the pronouncement which is to be implemented.

12 For a perspective on the problem, see Roche and Gordon, ‘ ‘ Can Morality be Legislated,” New York Times Magazine, May 22, 1955, reproduced in part in Auerbach (et al.), The Legal Process 311-317 (1961). The primary work in this area, though its authority has diminished, is Sumner, A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores and Morals (1907). For a recent critique and re-analysis of the problem by a sociologist but from the standpoint of the lawyer, see Rose, “Sociological Factors in the Effectiveness of Projected Legislative Remedies,” 11 J. Legal Ed. 470 (1959).

13 Tuneel, Exécution des Décisions de la Cour Internationale de Justice d ‘après la Charte des -Nations Unies 13-16 (1960); Rosenne, The International Court of Justice 74, 77-79 (1957); Deutsch, “Problems of Enforcement of Decrees of International Tribunals,” 50 A.B.A.J. 1134 (1964).

14 Thus, a review of a recent treatise criticized the absence of a discussion of enforcement but added apologetically that “ … the problem of enforcement [is] admittedly a problem of government rather than law… . “ Potter, review of Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), 60 A.J.I.L. 130 (1966). This writer must state that he grasps neither the distinct empirical reference of “law” and “government” in this context nor the relevance of the sought distinction.

15 ”. . . the term ‘political dispute’ may include all disputes, whether or not they involve legal questions, which a State refuses to submit to judicial settlement either in accordance with the lex lata or de lege ferenda. … “ Briggs, The Law of Nations 1043 (2nd ed., 1952). “Any conflict between States as well as between private persons is economic or political in character; but that does not exclude the possibility of treating the dispute as a legal one.” Kelsen, “Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes,” 37 A.J.I.L. 401-402 (1943). See also, Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 478-479 (1950); Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 51 ff. (1933).

16 The traditional Austinian definition of sanctions, ‘ ‘ the evil which will probably be incurred in case a command be disobeyed … “ (Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence 15 (Hart Introduction, 1954)), focusing on the deprivatory effect, tends to limit attention to community treatment of criminal behavior: Lasswell and Arena, In Defense of Public Order 14 (1961); Hart, the Concept of Law 24 (1961). The spectrum of techniques by which a modern J community supports its laws includes indulgences as well as deprivations, the carrot as well as the stick. See Lasswell and Arens, “Toward a General Theory of Sanctions, “ 49 Iowa Law Rev. 233, 234 (1964). The following definitions emphasizing function rather than the specific sanctions used in a given period, tend to assimilate direct and indirect enforcement: “Action taken by members of the international community against an infringement, actual or threatened, of the law.” International Sanctions, a Report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 16 (1938); “Deprivations or indulgences of individual and group norms for the purpose of supporting the primary norms of a public order system… . “ Lasswell and Arens, op. cit. at 14; “ … there are ample sanctions (in international law) if sanctions be defined as implementing techniques or available base values—at the disposal of the general community of states… . “ McDougal, “The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective,” 4 S. Dak. Law Rev. 25, 50-51 (1959). On the principle of “sanction equivalents,” see Dession, “The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law,” 5 Buffalo Law Rev. 22, 32 (1955).

17 In primitive phases of commercial development, irreplaceable value is attached tospecific objects, e.g., a bailment of coins to a money-len?er requires return of precisely those coins. As concepts of value become more sophisticated, scales of equivalence permit substituted performance and, hence, freer commercial flow. Thus, in the development of common law, the trend has been from debt to detinue and from specific performance to substitutive performance.

18 League of Nations Covenant, Art. 16, pars. 1-4; TT.N. Charter, Arts. 41 and 42. In neither document is there express mention of direct means of enforcement, an oversight which appears to stem from anachronistic thinking in this area.

19 Roche and Gordon, loc. cit. note 12 above, at 314.

20 Since enforcement does not take place in a vacuum, but cuts directly into the warp and woof of the social fabric, the anticipated responses of the entire community or of that section of the community affected by the decision are a major factor in choosing direct enforcement or a particular weapon from the “sanction arsenal” in indirect enforcement. See Landis, The Administrative Process 90-91 (1938).

21 See Austin, op. cit. note 16 above, at 12, 127, 142, 201; Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 175-178 (1953).

22 For discussion of the putative rôle of the Security Council under Art. 94(2) of the Charter, see below at p. 14.

23 Brierly, “Sanctions in International Law,” in Lauterpacht and Waldock, The Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers of the Late James Leslie Brierly 212 (1952).

24 '’ Functional'’ is used to refer to the components of the act of enforcement, rather than to the organ which is supposed to perform the act. Due to the absence of a centralized international enforcer, a conventional “organic” approach is of limited utility.

25 To cite the most obvious case, if we assume that nation-state A is capable of enforcing an award or judgment most effectively and economically, we may discover that while A is willing to enforce P's award against D, it is unwilling to enforce it against D₁. This may be because the basis of enforcement is a commercial treaty which does not extend to D₁ or because D₁is a member of the same political bloc. For further discussion of this aspect of enforcement, see below at p. 9.

26 The model may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the enforcement of any other international decision, e.g., arbitral awards, Security Council decisions, etc In a number of senses, an I.C.J, judgment is easier to enforce. The concept of the finality of a res judicata tends to augment the authority of judicial decisions. An arbitral award may be vitiated by a claim of nullity in international law, see Balasko, Causes de Nullité de la Sentence Arbitrale en Droit International Public (1938). Similarly, the decisions of any international organization, operating under the regime of an international treaty, may be challenged for being in excès de pouvoir or ultra vires the instrument: see Certain. Expenses, loc.cit. note 2 above. I.C.J, judgments, on the other hand, are allegedly immune from such lateral attacks. In the Awards of the Administrative Tribunals, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47, the Court stated that the awards of a permanent tribunal, functioning under a special statute and within an organized legal system, were not susceptible to nullity (ibid, at 55-56). This holding would appear to include judgments of the Court. In an individual opinion, Judge Winiarski took exception to this point (ibid, at 65).

27 Within the limits of this article, only a truncated version of the model can be presented. A comprehensive system of functional enforcement would comprise (1) Enforcers and Targets; (2) Their Perspectives; (3) Potential Enforcement Arenas; (4) Bases of Power of both Enforcers and Targets; (5) Strategies of Modalities of Enforcement; (6) Enforcement Outcomes; (7) Post-Outcome Effects, i.e., trends toward or away from the institutionalization and centralization of international enforcement. The four phases which are not discussed expressly in the text have been assimilated to the other three.

28 Thus, the Security Council under U.N. Charter, Art. 94, par. 2, and the Council of the League of Nations under the Covenant, Art. 13, par. 4.

29 Notably the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank. For discussion of their potential enforcement rôle, see below at p. 16.

30 U.N. Charter, Art. 27, par. 3. Rosenne, The International Court of Justice 107- 108 (1957), is of the opinion that the veto will not be used against action under Art. 94(2), for “ … the Security Council is unlikely to set about wilfully destroying the power of the Court… . “ There is little to support this optimism. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that the U.S.S.E., which is doctrinally antipathetic to international adjudication, is anxious to maintain or to extend the power of the Court. After the I.C.J, had indicated interim measures in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 89, the United Kingdom lodged the question of the decision's enforcement on the agenda of the Security Council under Arts. 35 and 94 (U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Supp., 1951, Doc. S/2357). Although the extended procedural discussions were superseded by events, the verbatim record indicates that the U.S.S.E. would have vetoed any enforcement measure against Iran.

31 The phenomenon of state officials acting functionally as international decisionmakers has been termed dédoublemen fonctionnel; for an exposition by the coiner of the term, see Scelle, “Le Phénomène juridique du dédoublement fouctionnel,” in Sehätzel and Schlochauer, Eechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation: Festschrift für Hans Wehberg 324 (1956). For a comparable description, see Kelsen, Principles of International Law 12-14, 21, 25 (1952). For a critique of the doctrine, see Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law 148 (1964). The concept is of utmost importance to a functional system of international enforcement. Coercive acts which would ordinarily be considered delictual become lawful if the community employs them for a valid purpose, e.g., judgment enforcement. If the community has no enforcer and individuals undertake the task, their coercive acts may become lawful since they are employed for a valid community purpose. (This concept is broader than the traditional doctrine of self-help, which is concerned only with the personal aspect rather than the community aspect of the implementation of legal rights.) Thus, for example, if state X refused to honor the immunity of judgment-defaulting state Y and transferred its assets to the judgment creditor, Y could not claim that X had acted unlawfully. This line of reasoning, it is submitted, is sounder than a formulation of ex delicto non oritur jus. The Corfu Channel Case has been adduced as contrary authority. ere, the United Kingdom petitioned the International Mine Clearance Board to sweep the straits after the accident had occurred. The Board ordered a sweep subject to Albanian consent. When Albania refused, the U.K. swept the mines over her protest and subsequently presented them to the Court as evidence. The mines were treated as admissible, but the Court ruled that the U.K. had violated Albanian sovereignty in collecting them. However, the Court refused to sanction the U.K.; the only satisfaction tendered Albania was the declaration of breached sovereignty: The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.

32 See Arts. 41 and 42. Art. 5, dealing with suspension of membership rights of a state against which enforcement action is being taken, is also an instrument of indirect enforcement. Expulsion, a similar instrument (Art. 6), is generally deplored as an inappropriate and ineffective sanction. See Jenks, “Some Constitutional Problems of International Organizations,” 22 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 1 (1945); Sohn, “Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization,” 77 Harvard Law Rev. 1381 (1964). For the minority doctrinal view that suspension and/or expulsion are appropriate sanctions, see Friedmann, op. cit. note 31 above at 88-94.

33 Only the briefest reference can be made to the vexed problem of sovereign immunity in this article. Sovereign immunity generally refers to the self-imposed bar of adomestic court to impleading a foreign state before it. Hence the judicial doctrines developed regarding sovereign immunity do not apply to most of the instances which are discussed in this article. Not only is there no authority against executive attachments, but state practice clearly demonstrates that it is held to be a lawful form of self-help in international law (for citation of instances, see note 74 below). In regard to the bar as applied in courts, it may be noted that it refers to impleading but not to enforcing. Enforcement may be taken against immovable property and commercial property if it is not used for diplomatic or consular purposes: “Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States,” Harvard Research in International Law (Jessup, reporter), 26 A.J.I.L. Supp. 707 (1932), and see the survey of cases and state practice there. This is essentially the jus gestionis —jus imperii test, applied with varying degrees of conformity in most national jurisdictions. See Lauterpacht, “ The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,” 28 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law, 220, 262 (1951); Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law, passim (1959). The doctrine has been given overt application by American courts since the “ Tate Letter “ : Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimicntos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir., 1964). The restrictive construction of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, recommended by the Tate Letter, has been applied to initial jurisdiction and will, presumably, be applied to subsequent enforcement.

34 As in the preceding note, the immunity discussed here is to judgment enforcement rather than to impleading. It is venerable precedent that an unrecognized state, as well as one enjoying de jure or de facto recognition, cannot be impleaded against its will in American courts: Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Government, 142 N.B. 569, 23 N.Y. 150; United States v. New York Trust Co., 108 F. Supp. 766, re-arg. denied, 14 B.F.D. 186, aff'd., C.A., 208 F.2d 624, rev'd on other grounds, 75 S.Ct. 423, 348 U.S. 356. However, there would appear to be no bar to enforcement against an unrecognized state. Such a state is one which, by definition, cannot maintain an accredited embassy or consular mission. Hence, in theory at least, any of its property within the territory of the enforcing state would be subject to judicial attachment. Despite the absence of a formal bar, it is probably good policy to accord a de facto immunity to that property which is actually being used for diplomatic and/or consular purposes, though even this property might be seized if no other were available or if the repudiation of the international judgment were especially gross.

35 In the Preferential Treatment of Claims of Blockading Powers Against Venezuela, 1904 (Germany, Great Britain and Italy v. Venezuela, Belgium, Spain, United States, France, et al.), 9 U.N. Reports of Int. Arb. Awards 99, the Permanent Court of Arbitration upheld the lawfulness of a blockade of Venezuela for non-payment of debts, and gave priority to the costs of the blockade. Even more in point is the Cerruti case, in which Venezuela impugned an award, whereupon Italy bombarded her and Venezuela complied, 11 Ibid. 377. The Porter Convention of 1907 aimed at limiting the use of force in the collection of contract debts. Art. 1 in fine provided, however, that the Convention did not apply “ … when the debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any compromis from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration fails to submit to the award.” Scott, Eeports to the Hague Conferences 1899 and 1907, pp. 489, 491 (1917). Under the League of Nations Covenant, Arts. 12, 13 and 15, resort to war was limited to certain contingencies, but a guerre d'exécution in the face of recalcitrant default was lawful.

36 Art. 2(4) provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” But see Arts. 51 and 52.

37 Professor Waldock argues that Art. 2(4) constitutes an absolute prohibition of the use of force: Waldock, “The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law,” 81 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours 455, 492 (1962). In an illumination of Art. 2(4) on policy grounds, McDougal and Feliciano reach the same conclusion: McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 207-208 (1961). The late Judge Lauterpacht felt that the prohibition did not extend to ‘ ‘ the use of force in fulfillment of the obligation to give effect to the Charter … “ : 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law 154 (1952). Since judgment compliance is an obligation of the Charter (Art. 94(1)), it would appear that Lauterpacht did not rule out use of force to implement I.C.J, decisions. Professor Stone argues that Art. 2(4) prohibits only use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the U.N.” It does not, however, prohibit its use for purposes consonant with the Charter: Stone, Aggression and “World Order 95 (1958). According to Judge Jessup, international law tolerated self-help only because there was no international organization competent to act in an emergency. With the establishment of the U.N., there is such an organization, hence self-help is unlawful: Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 157 (1949). But this assumes an efficacious organ. In fact, as Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 269 (1950), and Judge Fitzmaurice have observed, “The Charter frowns on self-help without … having put anything in its place.” Fitzmaurice, “The Foundation of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement,” 19 Modern Law Rev. 1, 5 (1956). Thus, if Art. 2(4) is construed as an absolute prohibition, it is probable that no force will be used to support international law.

38 See U.N. Charter, Arts. 1, 33, 36, 92.

39 For a general critique of economic sanctions, see Taubenfeld and Taubenfeld, ‘ ‘ The Economic Weapon: The League and the United N a t i o n s , “ 1964 Proceedings, American Society of International Law 183. A more sophisticated, though equally pessimistic treatment is found in Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions,“ 19 World Politics 378 (1966). In neither of these studies, it may be noted, is the objective of economic sanctions stated in a satisfactory manner. Professor Galtung, expressly, and the Taubenfelds, by implication, assume that the objectives of economic sanctions are the disruption of the political organization of the target state. But this is a rather out-dated view of the aims of any coercive strategy: see Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966). Appropriately formulated, the aims of coercive strategies, as of persuasive strategies, are to affect the perspectives of the target elites in such manner that they conform to a desired pattern of behavior. In many circumstances, the instrumental means may not require disruption of political organization; the more modest the necessary means, the more attractive and potentially effective the modality of economic sanctions. An appraisal of the use of economic sanctions against South Africa and the many difficulties involved may be found in the working papers included in Segal (ed.), Sanctions against South Africa (1965)

40 Taubenfeld and Taubenfeld, loc. cit. note 39 above at 189. Galtung, loc. cit. note 39 above, uses GNP and foreign trade statistics as a possible means of developing a scale of vulnerability to economic sanctions. But since his focus comprehends more than the economic features of the target-economy, he concludes that even states which are highest on the vulnerability scale can draw upon other tangible and psychological resources in order to mitigate the effects of the sanctions.

41 Taubenfeld, loc. cit. at 191. For a prediction of a like occurrence in South Africa if sanctions are applied, see Marvin, “Sanctions against South Africa: the Impact and the Aftermath,” in Segal, op. cit. note 39 above, at 234-241.

42 Doc. 2, G/14 (g), WD 41, 13 U.N.C.I.O. 507 (Committee IV/I). The Cuban delegate subsequently amended the proposal but in its amended form it remained substantially the same. The problem of enforcement had originally been raised by the Committee of Jurists in Washington, which had suggested that some provision be made for it in the proposed Charter. 14 U.N.C.I.O. 209, 210, 853.

43 13 ibid. 461.

44 Ibid. The vote was 26-5; the voters are not cited in the record. Subsequently, in the co-ordinating committee, the discretionary, as opposed to mandatory, enforcement rô1e of the Council was reinforced. Ibid.

45 A frequent criticism of Art. 94(2) and one which was raised by supporters of the Cuban amendment, was that the discretionary element in enforcement tended to undermine the authority of the Court. In fact, enforcement agents in any polity must have a wide discretion in choosing which cases to enforce and what means to employ. See note 20 above. Art. 13(4) of the Covenant, it may be noted, fixed a mandatory duty to enforce; the League Council in the Hungarian-Rumanian Optants Case treated the article as discretionary and did not enforce. 8 League of Nations Official Journal 1379 ft. (1927).

46 See U.N. Charter, Ch. 7.

47 Paradoxically, it is the U.S.S.E., adamantly opposed to international adjudication, which has consistently argued that Art. 94(2) is a separate form of action; the United States has construed the article as contingent on a threat to the peace. At the U.N. Conference in 1945, the Russian representative, Golunsky, commenting on the final draft of the provision, said it “ … made a considerable change in the functions of the Security Council. Formerly, the Security Council had jurisdiction only in matters concerned with the maintenance of peace and security. This Article would give the Council authority to deal with matters which might have nothing to do with security.” 17 U.N.C.I.O. 97. The American representative, Dr. Pasvolsky, countered that there was a “ … close connection” between the enforcement provision and what is now Ch. VII, and he wondered if there was a necessity for duplication. Ibid, at 98. Subsequently, as the State Department's representative before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Pasvolsky said in regard to Art. 94(2) that “The Council may proceed, I suppose, to call upon the country concerned to carry out the judgment, but only if the peace of the world is threatened, and if the Council has made a determination to that effect.” Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on the Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., July 9-13, 1945 (Revised) at 286. Green Hackworth took the same position, ibid. at 331-332. The Russian position, as stated by Professor Korovin in 1946, is that “Execution of the decisions of the tribunal are guaranteed by the Security Council with all the means at its disposal.” Korovin, “The Second World War and International Law,” 40 A.J.I.L. 742 (1946).

48 The only instance in which Art. 94(2) was invoked is an interjudicial phase of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case. Pursuant to a request by the United Kingdom, the Court had indicated interim measures, enjoining Iran to postpone implementation of its nationalization until the case was heard on the merits. [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 89. Iran ignored the ruling and proceeded with the nationalization: Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952, p. 277 (1954). The U.K. responded by lodging the matter in the Security Council under Arts. 33, 36 and 94(2). U.N. Security Council, 6th Year, Official Records, Supp., Doc. S/2357 (1951). The prolonged and inconclusive procedural discussion which followed permitted Iran to flout irremediably the prescribed interim measures. Subsequently the U.K. submitted a revised draft resolution, with no direct reference to Art. 94(2). Speaking for the U.K., Sir Gladwyn Jebb said: ” … there is not much point in our now suggesting that the Government of Iran should be called upon ‘ to act in all respects in conformity with the provisional measures by the Court’ … , they have, unfortunately, and to some extent now been over taken by events.” U.N. Security Council, 6th Tear, Official Records, S/P.V. 560,pp. 1-2 (1951).

49 The potential enforcement rô1e of the General Assembly, exercising its ‘ ‘ secondary responsibility” for keeping the peace and acting under the “Uniting for Peace Resolution“ (General Assembly Bes. 377 (V)), requires an examination which is beyond the scope of this paper. Should one of the veto Powers block action under Art. 94(2) in the Council, it is not unlikely that the Assembly will arrogate an enforcement rô1e. For discussion of Assembly jurisdiction in such circumstances, see Reisman, “Revision of the South “West Africa Cases,” 7 Virginia J. Int. Law 4, 26-38 (1966).

50 Art. 48(2) of the Charter envisaged a network with other international agencies for enforcement purposes “ … by including in the agreement with each specialized agency an undertaking to assist the Security Council, upon its request, in the application of measures envisaged in Article 41 of the Charter.” Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, Ch. III , sec. 5(19) (1946). For a discussion of the problems involved in the negotiation of these agreements, see Sharp, “The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: Progress Report I , “ 1 International Organization 460, 467 (1947), and idem, “ Progress Report II , “ 2 ibid. 247 (1948).

51 Thus, the Universal Postal Union wanted no links whatsoever with the U.N. and acceded to a nexus only under strong diplomatic pressure. Codding, Universal Postal Union 218-220 (1964). In a number of other cases, the agency in question succeeded in retaining total discretion as to response to a Security Council directive. Thus, while I.C.A.O. “ … . agrees to cooperate … in rendering such assistance to the Security Council as that Council may request, including assistance in carrying out decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security” (8 U.N. Treaty Series 324, 330), the Special Agreement with the I.M.F. does no more than take note of the obligations of its component members under Art. 48(2) and state that the Fund will “ … have due regard for decisions of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 … “ Art. 6(1), Agreement between the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, 16 U.N. Treaty Series 328, 332 (1948).

52 For example, Art. 7 of the I.C.A.O. Special Agreement, 8 U.N. Treaty Series 324, 330, and Arts. 87 and 88, Convention on International Civil Aviation (T.I.A.S., No. 1591), 15 U.N. Treaty Series 295, 354.

53 See Art. 6(1), Agreement between the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, loo. cit., and Art. 6(1), Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 16 U.N. Treaty Series, 346, 350 (1948). For a textual analysis of the Special Agreements,, see Aufricht, “Suppression of Treaties in International Law,” 37 Cornell Law Q. 691 (1952).

54 See Art. 2(2), (3) and (5), Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (T.I.A.S., No. 1502), 2 TJ.N. Treaty Series 136-138 (1947); Art. 2, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (T.I.A.S., No. 1501), 2 TJ.N. Treaty Series 42 (1947).

55 Thus, under Art. 6(2), Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (loo. cit. at 172), the Bank must repurchase the shares of a withdrawing member.

56 On the possibility of an international interpleader action through the I.C.J., on the analogy of the Monetary Gold Case, see note 73 below.

57 Art. 9(3), and (4), Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, loc.cit. 74; Art. 7(4), Articles of Agreement of the International Bank, loc. cit. 180. For a survey of such immunities in practice, see Jenks, International Immunities (1961).

58 See New York Times, May 3, 1957, p. 1, col. 3; Feb. 27, p. 13, col. 2; March 17, p. 42, col. 5; April 20, p. 8, col. 4; April 30, p. 14, col. 2; May 19, p. 26, col. 5; May 31, p. 6, col. 5. See also “Situation between Honduras and Nicaragua,” 9 Annals of the Organization of American States 264 (1957). For a legal evaluation of the postadjudicative stage, see Fenwick, “Honduras-Nicaragua Boundary Dispute,” 51 A.J.I.L. 761-763 (1957).

59 Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made By The King of Spain 23 December 1906, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 492. For a summary of the events leading to compliance, see New York Times, Nov. 16, 1960, p. 1, col. 6; Nov. 19, p. 1, col. 8; Nov. 27, p. 30, col. 5; Jan. 14, 1961, p. 3, col. 6; Jan. 15, p. 5, col. 1; Jan. 28, p. 3, col. 6; Feb. 19, p. 30, col. 1; May 14, p. 26, col. 1.

60 For background, see Boutros-Ghali, ‘ ‘ The Addis Ababa Charter,'’ 546 International Conciliation (1964); Time, Oct. 25, Nov. 1, 1963; New York Times, Oct. 4, 1963, p. 2, col. 4; Oct. 10, p. 10, col. 2; Oct. 12, p. 4, col. 5; Oct. 15, p. 5, col. 4 and p. 1, col. 8. The “Neutral Declaration” of Oct. 31, 1963, which served as a compromis , may be found in Le Monde, Nov. 1, 1963, p. 2, col. 1. Although it has been stated that the dispute has been resolved, “Racism at the United Nations,” 151 New Republic 9-10 (Dec. 26, 1964), reports that it continues.

61 See U.N. Charter, Arts. 33 and 51-54. The trend toward increasing independence of certain regional organizations from the Security Council has generally been justified by extensive interpretation of the right of self-defense. Although this is a strong legal argument, it tends to minimize the problem of the level of coercion employed in self-defense.

62 Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the Court enumerates as one of the sources of international law “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” In all municipal systems abetting non-compliance is unlawful. In some systems failure to aid enforcers, unaccompanied by an intention to abet non-compliance, is unlawful.

63 2 Moore, International Arbitrations 547 ff. See, in particular, Art. VI—Rules, at 549-550.

64 For text of the award, see Moore, op. cit. at 653-659.

65 On several occasions, the United States did not apply the Monroe Doctrine when Latin American states invoked it against attacking European Powers. Taft Papers on the League of Nations 269. In general, it would appear that mutual defense treaties against acts of aggression would be inoperative in the case of use of force to implement judgments, an a fortiori application of its validity in the collection of contract debts.

66 For a categorical presentation, see Rosenne, The International Court of Justice 87-88 (1957). More guarded statements may be found in Schachter, “The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions,” 54 A.J.I.L. 1, 14 (1960), and Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 709-710 (1964). Such an obligation is eminently logical, but there is, unfortunately, no international authority for the rule. In the Chorz6w Factory (Merits) case, the Permanent Court held that a municipal court did not have the power to invalidate an international judgment. Series A/No. 17 at 33. From this one may infer that a municipal court may not act contrary to an I.C.J, judgment, but it is difficult to deduce that it must act.

67 T Socobelge v. Êtat Hellénique, Belgium, Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles, April 30, 1951. 1951 Int. Law Rep. 3 (1957); 47 A.J.I.L. 508 (1953).

68 Société Commerciale de Belgique, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78.

69 The Court held: “De lege ferenda such an exemption from exequatur seems conceivable or even legitimate. However, at the present time, no international arrangement has introduced such a principle into the Belgian legal system. The plaintiff Company claims that the Permanent Court is not a ‘foreign tribunal,’ but a ‘superior tribunal,' common to all states which have accepted its Statute, and that as such its decisions do not require exequatur. However, in the absence of an independent power of execution belonging to that Court, which would enable litigants before it to execute its decisions de piano, these decisions are not exempt from the servitude imposed on Belgian territory on decisions of other than Belgian tribunals.” Ibid, at 4. A more extreme negative position was taken by the court of appeal of the International Tribunal of Tangier in Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. v. Lal-la Fatma and others, 21 Int. Law Rep. 136 (1954). The plaintiff sought to derive municipal rights from the I.C.J.'s judgment in Bights of United States Nationals in Morocco, [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 176. The Court refused to derive such, holding that “ … such decisions [of the I.C.J.] might at best provide inspiration and guidance, although not because its judgments have any binding force in municipal courts“; ibid, at 137. For a purportedly different municipal treatment of the same case, see Administration des Habous v. Deal, 19 Int. Law Rep. 342 (1952) (Morocco, Court of Appeal).

70 Cf. Tammes, “Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International Law,” 94 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours 265, 286 (1958).

71 In emphasizing the consensual nature of their jurisdiction, both the P.C.I.J. and the I.C.J, have been reluctant to assert jurisdiction in the absence of one of the parties in interest. In the Status of Eastern Carelia case (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5 at 7), the Council of the League requested an advisory opinion on the disputed boundary between the U.S.S.R. and Finland. The TT.S.S.E. was neither a Member of the League nor did it consent to the advisory opinion. Theoretically consent was not necessary in this ease, since the opinion would have constituted no more than an advisory opinion to the Council. Nevertheless, the Court construed the request as a de facto contentious submission and refused to seise jurisdiction in the absence of Russian agreement. In the first phase of the Peace Treaties case ﹛loc. cit. note 8 above), the defendants had sought to invoke Eastern Carelia as a precedent for the rule that there can be no judicial proceeding (contentious or advisory) without the consent of the states involved. The Court rejected this objection, holding that consent was not required in advisory proceedings. Nevertheless, in the second phase of the case, the Court refused to sanction appointment of the national arbitrator by the Secretary General, an outcome which is, in terms of effect, indistinguishable from a denial of jurisdiction. For a discussion of the Monetary Gold case, see note 73 below.

72 This case arose out of an incident in which British warships passing through the Straits of Corfu struck mines, resulting in serious loss of life and damage to the ships. Subsequently the U.K. swept the straits and discovered mines, which had apparently been laid recently. In its decision on the merits, the Court held that Albania was responsible under international law for the loss of life and damages sustained by the British ships, but that in sweeping the straits the U.K. had violated Albanian sovereignty. [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4. In the final phase of the case, the Court rejected Albania's challenge to its jurisdiction to assess damages and awarded the U.K. £843,947. [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 244.

73 Monetary gold, taken from Rome by the Germans in 1943, became part of the Allied Gold Pool. According to the Paris Reparation Agreement of 1946, it was to be distributed to states entitled to it. The Tripartite Commission, created by Part III of the Agreement, could not resolve the competing claims of Albania and Italy to the Roman gold. The Washington Agreement of April 25, 1951, and the accompanying Washington Statement (T.I.A.S., No. 2252) concluded by the Three Powers, referred the claims to an arbitrator and provided that, should he rule in favor of Albania, the gold would be transmitted to the United Kingdom unless either Italy or Albania, within ninety days of the award, requested the I.C.J, to adjudicate its rights. Italy, but not Albania, submitted to the Court, and followed its own submission with an objection to jurisdiction. Italy averred that the suit was directed against Albania, which was not a party before the Court. The Court accepted the Italian objection— incorrectly, it is believed—and disseised itself of jurisdiction. Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question), [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 19.

74 Attachment of assets and freezing foreign assets for future claims is a frequent international occurrence. The Peace Treaties of 1947 gave the Allies the right to seize enemy property in their territory, liquidate it and apply the proceeds to claims brought by them and their nationals against the enemy. See Fitzmaurice, “The Juridical Clauses of the Peace Treaties,” 73 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours 324 (1948). The United States and the United Kingdom froze a total of some $470,000,000 of Egyptian assets after the Suez crisis. Domke, “American Protection against Foreign Expropriation in the Light of the Suez Canal Crisis,” 105 Univ. of Pa. Law Rev. 1033, 1039 (1957). The United States froze and ultimately attached Bulgarian assets, which were allocated to claimants against Bulgaria by the U. S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Lillich, “The United States-Bulgarian Claims Agreement of 1963,” 58 A.J.I.L. 686 (1964). For similar action against Czech assets in this country following a Czech nationalization, see “Completion of Czechoslovakian Claims Program under Title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 as Amended,'' 17 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 140 ff. (1962). For similar action against Cuban assets, see Claims Against Cuba: Public Law 88-666; 78 Stat. 1110, Sees. 501-512. For legislative history as well as for State Department comments touching directly on the lawfulness of such strategies, see 16 U. S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, Nov. 5, 1964, at 5241. In regard to the general lawfulness of these strategies, see Schachter, “The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions,” loc. cit. 7-8: “ … if the successful state is free under international law unilaterally to apply coercive measures against the recalcitrant state … it should be free to seize assets of the debtor state within its control for the purpose of satisfying an award of damages. Even if the award does not call for monetary compensation, it would seem to be open to the winning state to attach assets in order to bring about compliance by the creditor state.“

75 For text of the award, see Domke, “The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration,” 53 A.J.I.L. 787, 800 (1959). For some description of the proceedings, see New York Times, June 20, 1958, p. 1, col. 1. For more detailed description, see Domke, loc. cit., and “Arbitration of State-Trading Relations,” 24 Law and Contemporary Problems 317, 322-324 (1959).

76 For a survey of the reaction of the general and business community as related in the international press, see Domke, “Arbitration of State-Trading Relations,” loc. cit. above, at 324, note 57.

77 See Jenks, “Some Legal Aspects of the Financing of International Institutions,“ 28 Grotius Society Transactions 113-115 (1942).

78 A corollary to principle 3 is that exacerbating enforcement should be avoided. Excessive haste in setting an enforcement program in operation may backfire. The law generally presumes good faith; the manifest intention to enforce implies a suspicion of the bona fides of the loser. The loser may dismiss such a communication as a gross indiscretion. However, resentments may be aroused which will impede compliance or cool subsequent relations. The decision to reveal an enforcement program should be preceded by an assessment of the loser's attitude. If it leans toward compliance or if divulging enforcement intention will strengthen the hands of a domestic anti-compliance faction, the plan should be suppressed. The revelation or suppression of an enforcement plan is, in itself, a strategy and should be employed only when conditions are auspicious.

79 In the Alabama award (loc. cit. note 64 above), the British Government was anxious to comply, but the time lag between judgment and compliance permitted the domestic opposition to goad popular passions against the award. 2 Moore, International Arbitrations 664 ff.

80 McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 173 (1963).

81 But Art. 60 of the Statute, after stating that the “judgment is final and without appeal,” continues: “ I n the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.” One can assume, without violence to the express language of the provision, that many problems in regard to compliance or enforcement would be included here. See, in this regard, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, 1950, in the Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 895, involving a sequence of the dispute in large part concerned with the appropriate manner of execution of a previous judgment. See also Chorzów Factory (Merits) case, A/17, and compare with the jurisdictional phase: A/9. Insofar as one accepts impossibility of performance as a classic ground for revision, Art. 61 of the Statute can be said to serve a parallel function of allowing the Court to intervene in phases subsequent to judgment.

82 See notes 6 and 7 above.

83 In the Corfu Channel Case, the International Court rejected an Albanian objection to jurisdiction to determine damages, by holding that its initial finding of jurisdiction in the first phase of the case extended to all aspects of the adjudication. [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 244, 248. In this regard see also Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Series A/6 at 21, and Series A/7 at 34-35. Note should be taken of any earlier formulatory style in international compromis, which expressly empowered international tribunals to resolve enforcement difficulties. See, in this regard, Art. 9 of the “Agreement Between France, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal for the Arbitration of Claims relating to Religious Properties,” July 13, 1913, 8 A.J.I.L. Supp. 165-168 (1914), and “General Arbitration Treaty Between the Republic of Colombia and the Argentine Republic,” Jan. 20, 1912, ibid. 86-88.

84 Art. 70 provides: ‘ ‘ The Court shall have power to propose such amendments to the present Statute as it may deem necessary, through written communications to the Secretary-General, for consideration in conformity with the provisions of Article 69.“

85 See note 66 above.

86 See note 68 and text there.

87 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N. Treaty Series 158, No. 678; Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 ibid. 302, No. 2096; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N. Treaty Series 38.

88 4 Int. Legal Materials 532 (1965); 60 A.J.I.L. 892 (1966).

89 Consider in this regard Art. 192, Euratom Treaty, 298 U.N. Treaty Series 167, 218, and the corresponding Art. 86 in the E.C.S.C. Treaty, 261 ibid. 140, 173. Citation of the municipal legislative measures concerning forced execution of the judgments of the European Court can be found in Bebr, Judicial Control of the European Communities. 244-245 (1962). A particularly useful example is found in the implementing legislation in the United States for the Arbitral Convention of the International Bank (loc. cit. note 88 above), Sec. 3(a) of which provides: “ A n award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to Chapter IV of the convention shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States … “ P.L. 89-532, 80 Stat. 344. See also House of Representatives, 89^th Cong., 2d Sess., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Hearing at 9-11.