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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 April 2017
1 Artikel 4. Die allgemein anerkannten Regeln des Völkerrechts gelten als bindende Bestandteile des deutschen Reichsrechts.
2 Preuss, Hugo, Reich und Länder: Bruckstücke eines Kommentars sur Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches. , Berlin, 1928, p. 81 ffGoogle Scholar.
3 On the drafting of Article 4 see Verhandlungen der verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung, Bde. 326, 327, 336 (cited hereafter as “Verhandlungen”); and Preuss, work cited, pp. 80-84; Gustav A. Walz, Völkerrecht und staatliches Recht: Untersuchungen über die Einwirkungen des Völkerrechts auf das innerstaatliche Recht, Stuttgart, 1933, p. 300 ff.; Métall, Rudolf A., Das allgemeine Völkerrecht und das innerstaatliche Verfassungsrecht, in Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht. , Vol. XIV (1928), p. 161 ff.Google Scholar; Verdross, Alfred, Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage der Völkerrechts-verfasêung. , Tübingen, 1923, p. 111 ffGoogle Scholar.
4 Verhandlungen, Bd. 336, p. 406.
5 Dr. Kahl, same, p. 31.
6 Fleischmann, Max, Die Einwirkung auswärtiger Gewalten auf die deutsche Reichsverfassung. , Halle, 1925, p. 23 Google Scholar.
7 Constitution of the Republic of Bavaria, passed by the Constitutional Assembly, Oct. 26, 1946, and ratified by the voters of Bavaria, Dec. 1, 1946; Constitution of the State of Hesse, passed by the Constitutional Assembly, Oct. 26, 1946, and ratified by the voters of Hesse, Dec. 1, 1946; Constitution of Wuerttemberg-Baden, passed by the Constituent Assembly, Oct. 24, 1946, and ratified by the voters of Wuerttemberg-Baden, Nov. 24, 1946. For the German texts, see Constitutions of Bavaria, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-Baden, Office of Military Government (U. S.), 15 February 1947.’ The parallel English translations, prepared by the Civil Administration Division, and quoted in the following paragraph, are not altogether accurate.
8 Same, “Introduction,” p. 1.
9 The Constitution of Bavaria also provides that :
Article 181. The right of the Bavarian State, within the limits of its competence, to conclude State treaties remains unaffected.
(Dos Hecht des Bayerischen States, im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit Staatsverträge abzuschliessen, bleibt unberührt.)
Article 182. The State treaties formerly concluded, especially the treaties with the Christian Churches of 24 January 1925, remain in force.
(Die früher geschlossenen. Staatsverträge, insbesondere die Verträge mit den christlichen, Kirchen vom 94 Januar 1925, bleiben in Kraft.)
10 The Constitution of Hesse also provides that:
Article 69. Hesse declares its attachment to peace, freedom and the comity of nations. War is outlawed.
Every act undertaken with the intention of preparing for war is unconstitutional.
(Hessen bekennt sich zu Frieden, Freiheit, und Völkerverständigung. Der Krieg ist geächtet.
Jede Handlung, die mit der Absicht vorgenommen wird, einen Krieg vorzubereiten, ist verfassungswidrig.)
11 The Constitution of Wuerttemberg-Baden provides also that:
Article 47. Any action undertaken with the intention of disturbing peaceful international cooperation, especially of preparing for war, is unconstitutional.
(Jede Handlung, die mit der Absicht vorgenommen wird, eine friedliehe Zusammenarbeit der Völker zu stören, insbesondere die Führung eines Krieges vorzubereiten, ist verfassungswidrig.)
12 Verhandlungen, Bd. 326, p. 32. Dr. Zweigert, Minister of Justice, considered that Article 4 would be objectionable only if it were construed to mean that express provisions of German law could be abrogated by international law (Völkerrecht bricht Landesrecht). “This result,” he said, “is, however, avoided, since the article is restricted to generally recognized principles of international law. It is obvious that a principle of international law which is contrary to an express provision of German law is not generally recognized.” Same, p. 406.
Preuss‘s own view was not free from ambiguity : “It is not perhaps always possible,” he stated, “to determine with mathematical precision what is ‘generally’ recognized; but there is no doubt that rules of international law which are not recognized by all the Great Powers are not rules of international law. But here also one must not juggle concepts on the point of a needle.” Same, p. 32.
13 Same, p. 1208. Dr. Heintze had suggested that the article be amended to include the phrase das vom Deutsche Reiche anerkannte Recht. Same, Bd. 326, p. 33.
14 Same, p. 406.
15 Same, p. 31. Gustav Stresemann considered that adoption of Article 4 would create “a serious danger that we will be placing a noose about our own necks.”
16 See the authorities collected by Métall, work cited, pp. 168, 169, and Walz, work cited, pp. 308, 309. Walz considers that it would be grotesk to hold that Article 4 gave internal force to principles to which Germany had not agreed. Another writer maintains that “The correctness of this opinion results with absolute necessity from the fact that Germany, not only because of its greatness, but above all because of its political position and cultural significance, belongs to those states which must decisively influence international intercourse. It further results from the peculiar social structure of the international legal community. No state is bound by a principle of international law in the formation of which it has not participated, or which, in so far as it has been established by other states, it has not acknowledged as binding upon itself.” Mohr, Elisabeth, Die Transformation des Völkerrechts in deutsches Reichsrecht, in Internationalrechtliche Abhandlungen. , Bd. 22, Abh., Berlin-Grunewald, 1934, p. 43 Google Scholar.
17 See, for example, Zorn, Albert, Grundzöge des Völkerrechts. , Leipzig, 1903 (2d ed.), p. 7 ffGoogle Scholar.
18 See, for example, Wittmayer, Leo on the Primat eigenstaatlicher Rechtsordnung, in Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht. , Vol. XIII (1924-1926), p. 12 Google Scholar; and Wenzel, Max, Juristische Grundprobleme. , Berlin, 1920, Vol. I, p. 387 Google Scholar, who states: “The norms of international law have as many bases of validity as there are states, and, therefore, legal systems which have participated in their formation.”
19 Entscheidungen des Reichsfinanzhofs, Vol. VII (1921), p. 102.
20 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. XIV (1927-1928), p. 594.
21 Compare West Rand Gold Mining Co., Ltd., v. The King (1905), 2 K. B. 391, 406, 407.
22 Compare with the decisions cited in the preceding paragraph those of the Prussian Kompetenzgerichtshof in the case of Von Hellfeld v. the Russian State, Jan. 25, 1910, in which the court rejected the conception of international law as “external public law” in holding that “the contention of the creditor that international law is applicable only in so far as it has been adopted by German customary law, lacks foundation in law. Such a legal maxim would, moreover, if generally applied, lead to the untenable result that in the intercourse of states with one another, there would not obtain a uniform system—international law—but a series of more or less diverse municipal laws of the individual states.” This Journal, Vol. V (1911), p. 490, 514; Zeitschrift für internationales Recht, Vol. XX (1910), p. 416.
23 Decision of Nov. 1, 1922, Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (cited hereafter as RGZ), Vol. 105, p. 326; Fontes Juris Gentium, Berlin, 1931, Ser. A, Sec. II, T. 1 (cited hereafter as Fontes), pp. 180, 671.
24 See, Reichsgericht decision of March 27, 1924, 54 Juristische Wochenschrift, 1924, p. 1531; Fontes, pp. 1, 721. Also, decision of March 14, 1928, Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen, Vol. 62, p. 65 (cited as RGSt.) ; Fontes, p. 834. This line of cases, some of which are not officially reported, are discussed by Lawrence Preuss, “International Law and German Legislation on Political Crime,” in Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. XX (1934), pp. 93-95.
25 Walz, Völkerrecht und staatliches Recht, p. 391. On National Socialist attitudes, see, for example, Preuss, L., “National Socialist Conceptions of International Law,” in American Political Science Review. , Vol. XXIV (1935), p. 596 ffGoogle Scholar.
26 See Josef L. Kunz, Völkerrechtliche Bemerkungen zur österreichischen Bundesverfassung, in Annalen des Deutschen Reichs, 1921/1922, p. 320 ff., and authorities collected by Walz in work cited, pp. 327-330.
Compare, however, the decision of March 2, 1933, 67 RGSt. 130, in which the Beichsgericht stated : “The view occasionally advanced by writers that even in internal matters the abrogation of provisions contained in international treaties requires an amendment of the Constitution, finds no support in Articles 4 and 45, or elsewhere in the Constitution.”
26a The courts of the Second Reich and the Republic applied the same principles as to conflicts between international law, whether conventional or customary, and statutes as have those of the United States. See, for example, the decisions of the Reichsfinanzhof, Aug. 8, 1928, Entscheidungen des Reichsfinanzhofs, Vol. 24, p. 73; and of the Reichsgericht, 67 BGSt. 130, in which the court, in making a clear distinction between the internal and external validity of international law, stated: “... There is no doubt that treaties with foreign states which relate to matters of German legislation . . . have the force of law not merely as between the states but also directly as regards the internal organs of the state, in particular the courts and administrative authorities. However, this is the case only—just as with any other municipal statute—so long as the legislature has not repealed or limited the validity of the treaty by a new statutory provision, which must be decisive as regards the organs of the state and individuals. As Germany alone, in virtue of her internal sovereignty, can decide what belongs to the generally recognized rules of international law within the meaning of Article 4 of the Constitution, so it lies within her discretion to promulgate legislation conflicting with the provisions of a treaty.”
27 To a limited extent the same object may be attained by Article 61 (1, 2) of the Constitution of Bavaria, which provides: “The Constitutional Court (Staatsgerichtshof) renders decision on charges brought against a member of the Cabinet. . . . The charge against a member of the Cabinet is that he has intentionally violated the Constitution or a law (including a generally recognized principle of international law declared by Art. 84 to be a valid part of domestic law).”
28 See note 10, above. Articles 91 and 92 of the Constitution of Wuerttemberg-Baden also establish a Staatsgerichtshof with a power of judicial review over statutes, ordinances, administrative decrees, and administrative acts.
29 See especially the Zeigner and von Ossietsky cases, discussed by L. Preuss, as cited in note 24, above.
Article 68 of the Constitution of Hesse, which provides that “No one may be called to account for pointing out facts that constitute an infringement of obligations under international law,” appears to have been enacted for the purpose of preventing such decisions as those cited in the preceding note. See the decision of March 14, 1928, 62 EGSt. 65, Fontes, p. 834, in which the Reichsgericht affirmed the conviction of an editor charged with revealing information concerning secret rearming. The court rejected the contention of the appellant that the exposure of illegal acts could not be deemed prejudicial to the welfare of the Reich, since the interests of the state are confined to the realization of its legal will. Such a dostrine, the court said, could not be accepted without qualification, especially in cases involving foreign relations and state security. In any event, the appellant could not derive any right directly from a treaty.
30 See the statement by Dr. von Simson, Verhandlungen, Bd. 326, p. 407. Dr. Hausemann had introduced before the Constitutional Committee a counter-proposal which provided that “State treaties and generally recognized principles of international law shall be operative in the relations of the German Reich to foreign states. ...” He withdrew his amendment when it was pointed out in an article by Alfred Verdross (Beichsrecht und internationales Recht: eine Lanze für Artikel 3 des Regierungsentwurfes der deutschen Verfassung, in Deutsehe Juristen-Zeitung, Vol. XXIV (1919), cols. 291, 292) that the phrasing of the proposal would defeat the purpose of making international law directly binding upon individuals. Same, p. 406.
31 Same, p. 31.
32 Same, p. 32.
33 Reieh und Länder, pp. 94, 95.
34 See, for example, the decision of the Reichsfinanzhof, June 28, 1926, in which the court entered into a lengthy discussion of Monismus versus Dualismus in holding invalid an ordinance of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission. Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. XIV (1928), p. 440.
35 “It follows exclusively from the substantive content of the norm of international law whether an intermediate state act is required in order to bind state organs and individuals legally—to confer on them rights and duties, or whether this legal obligation is imposed directly by the norm of international law itself.” Hugo Preuss, work cited, p. 92.
36 122 RGZ 7; Fontes, pp. 147, 836. Also decision of May 2, 1929, 124 RGZ p. 204; Fontes, pp. 23, 859. Compare the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig case, Publications of the Court, Series B, No. 15 ; Hudson, , World Court Reports. , Vol. II, p. 237 Google Scholar.
Writing in terms with which a dualist might agree, Hans Kelsen has stated: “Certainly there are norms of international law which are not intended for direct application by the judicial and administrative organs of the State. An international treaty to the effect that a State has to treat a minority in a particular manner can, for instance, have the meaning only that the State has to enact, through its legislative organ, an adequate statute which is to be applied by its courts and administrative organs. But the treaty may be formulated in such a way that it can be applied directly by the courts and administrative organs. Then transformation of international law into national law—by a legislative act of the State—is superfluous. ...” General Theory of Law and the State, Cambridge, Mass., 1945, p. 379.
37 Walz, in Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. XIII (1924-1926), p. 172.
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