¹ For a comprehensive bibliography, see Conover, Helen F.,comp., Non-Self-Governing Areas with Special Emphasis on. Mandates and Trusteeships: A Selected List of References,Washington, Library of Congress, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 97–118 Google Scholar. Citations in the present article are limited largely to official documents and to secondary works which have appeared since the publication of Miss Conover’s bibliography. For a brief summary of the role of the United States in this field, together with selected references and documents, see The United States and Non-Self-Governing Territories, Department of State Publication 2812, April 5, 1947. See also articles and documentary material in International Conciliation, No. 435, November 1947.

² Covenant of the League of Nations,Article 22.

³ See Benjamin Gerig, The Open Door and the Mandates System, London, Allen and Unwin, 1930.

⁴ This latter clause has been interpreted in practice to exclude “ C ” mandates from the requirement of commercial equality of opportunity among all League Members.

⁵ For a convenient compilation of the termsof the mandate instruments, see Terms of League of Nations Mandates; republished bythe United Nations, UN doc. A/70, October 1946.

⁶ Article 77 of the Charter was written in terms sufficiently broad to make possible the placing under trusteeship of almost any kind of territory, since clause (c) specifies “territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.” Unofficial suggestions have been made from time to time that such diverse territories as Trieste, the Ruhr, Palestine, and Antarctica should be placed under trusteeship. Recent petitionsofficially brought before the Trusteeship Council have included requests to extend international control, for instance, to the polar regions through an Arctic and an Antarctic Trusteeship. See UN docs. T/Pet/General 15 (4 Oct. 1947); T/Pet/General 16 (4 Oct.1947); T/Pet/General 18 (9 Oct. 1947). Whatever may be the practical considerations involved, there would appear to be no legal barriers to the placing of these, or similarterritories, under trusteeship.

⁷ Charter of the United Nations, Article 81. Administration by more than one state may be politically expedient but can raise issues of great difficulty. The problem of the Ewe people of Africa occupying British and French Togoland illustrates the unhappy complexities and enormous difficultieswhich arise when a single people find themselves divided by political frontiers and administered under differing cultural and colonial systems. In the case of Togoland it is two administering states operating in adjoining but separate trust territories. Nevertheless, since the basic principles and objectives of British colonial policy differ widely from those of French colonial policy and since the two cultures also differ radically, the underlying problem is much the same.

In the petition presented to the United Nations by the “All-Ewe Conference on behalf of the Ewe people of Togoland” dated August 9, 1947 (UN doc. T/Pet. 6/5, 26 August 1947) it is stated (p. 4) :

The permanent Anglo-French frontier cuts indiscriminately though local states, villages and farms, thus separating sections of the people from theirchiefs, relations and farms. In fact, one has the impression that Togoland was Germany’s personal property—a territory taken from her by Britain and France in the Great Warof 1914, and was shared as a booty pure and simple, with little or no consideration for the people who live init. Eweland has since remained three territories, namely, Gold Coast Eweland, British Mandated Togoland and French Mandated Togoland under two fundamentally different administrations, namely, British and French administrations.

8. British policy which we may call the policy of adaptation, aims at educating colonial peoples for self-government, and for that reason, takes due account of indigenous culture and makes provisions for its development. On the other hand, French colonialpolicy, which we may call the policy of assimilation leads in an entirely different direction. The policy of assimilation aims at converting colonial peoples to full citizenship of France, and, for that reason, aims at imbuing the educated community with thebest that French culture can give, rather than developing indigenous culture.

9. It is inimical to the true development of the people of Eweland who are united by the closest ties of kinship, language and culture to be divided between these two totally different administrations.

10. The division of Eweland between these two totally different administrations hastherefore been felt by the Ewe people as unjust, and has led to a widespread dissatisfaction among both the literate and the illiterate.

The problem remains as yet unsolved. At its session in November 1947 the Trusteeship Council examined the Ewe petition; and in the hearing which followed the representatives of the United Kingdom and of France proposed an arrangement to eliminate customs barriers, to develop a common educational program and to take such other steps as can be worked out to ameliorate the present difficulties. The Trusteeship Council approvedthe plan as an initial proposal and intimated its intention to send a visiting Missionto Togoland at the next dry season—probably in January 1949—to give further study to the problem. UN doe. T/109, 18 December 1947, pp. 4–5.

The only trust territory thus far to be placed under multi–state administration is Nauru. In this case the three administering powers, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, possess the same basic culture, language, and colonial policy. In order to overcome difficulties and possible inefficiencies in administration, however,even in this case the actual administration of the territory has been delegated by thethree powers to Australia alone.

⁸ Charter of the United Nations, Article 84.

⁹ Same, Article 82. See below, section 11 of Part II.

¹⁰ Same, Article 7.

¹¹ Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22.

¹² Charter of the United Nations, Article 87(c).

¹³ See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–47, 1947, pp. 11, 29–31, 38–39, 78–81,184–208, 573–589. For United States participation in this work during the past two years, see The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the year 1946, Department of State Publication 2735, 1947: The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947, Department of State Publication 3024, 1948.

¹⁴ No attempt is here made to cite the extensive literature on this subject. However, for an illuminating discussion of the several theories of sovereignty over mandated territories, see Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations, Chicago, 1932, pp. 319 ff.

¹⁵ The Supreme, Council, acting for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers assigned mandatories for the German colonies on May 7, 1919. The Turkish territories were allocated at San Eemo on April 25, 1920. By this latter date the United States had withdrawn from official participation in the Supreme Council.

¹⁶ Article 132, United Kingdom Treaty Series No. 11 (1920) [CMO. 964].

¹⁷ It is noteworthy that the Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed on February 10, 1947, contains the following stipulation (Article40): “Italy hereby renounces all rights, titles and claims deriving from the mandate system or from any undertakings given in connection therewith, and all special rights of the Italian State in respect of any mandated territory.”

¹⁸ See Quincy Wright, op. cit., pp. 121–324fl., and 446–47 and the League documents there cited. For an analysis of particular interest see the report to the Permanent Mandates Commission by M. van Eees on “The System of State Lands in B and C Mandated Territories,” Minutes of the Third Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, pp. 216 ff.

¹⁹ Statement of Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Diet on February 22, 1934.

²⁰ Article 79 of the Charter of the United Nations.

²¹ Below, Section 7.

²² In an explanatory comment on the Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the former Japanese Mandated Islands, the United States Government, in discussing the phrase “integral part” which appeared in the original draft of Article 3 of the proposed trusteeship agreement, declared that this did not “imply sovereignty over the territory.” See Department of State Publication 2784, p. 5.

In the discussions in the General Assembly preceding the approval of the first trusteeship agreements, the Delegate for the United Kingdom declared that the “retention of the words ‘as an integral part’ in the Trusteeship Agreement for Togoland and the Cameroons under British administration did not involve administration as an integral part of the United Kingdom itself and did not imply British sovereignty in these rights.” Report of the Fourth Committee on Trusteeship Agreements, UN doc. A/258, December 12, 1946, p. 6.

The Australian representative in the Trusteeship Subcommittee of Committee 4 at theSecond Part of the First Session of the General Assembly stated that sovereignty over New Guinea was not claimed by Australia. UN doc.A/C.4/Sub. 1/19, November 21, 1946, p.5. The Belgian representative stated to the same body that in using the phrase “as an integral part” it was not the intention of the mandatory powers to imply a decision onthe “incidence of sovereignty.” The French representative supported these remarks. UN doc. A/C.4/Sub. 1/30, November 23, 1946, p. 3.

²³ In support of this contention they argued that Article 77(1) lists mandated territories as one category to which the trusteeship system “shall apply,” and that Article 80(2) states that Article 80(1) “shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system. . . . ” It was further argued that if there were no binding obligation to place the mandated territories under trusteeship, and if they were consequently not placed under trusteeship, the Trusteeship Council, a principal organ of the United Nations, could not have been brought into being—a contingencywhich could not have been contemplated by the drafters of the Charter. See UN docs. A/250, Dec. 11, 1946; A/250/Add. 1/Eev. 1, Dec. 12, 1946; A/250/Add. 2/ Dec. 12, 1946; A/P.V./104, Nov. 1, 1947; A/P.V./105, Nov. 1, 1947.

²⁴ In stating the position of the United States during the debate in the General Assembly on November 1, 1947, the author said: “The United States Government played an active role, both at the Crimea Conference and at the San Francisco Conference, in the formulation of the basic principles of the trusteeship system. It was always of the view that nothing in the Charter could orshould compel the placing of any territory under the trusteeship system. At San Francisco, the United States Delegation was particularly concerned as members of the Assembly will remember,over the disposition of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, and was constitutionally unable in advance to commit the Congress of the United States to the conclusion of a trusteeship agreement for those islands. The United States Delegation therefore necessarily took the position that the conclusion of trusteeship agreements was to be a voluntary, and not a compulsory, process. To this end, it gave the most careful consideration to the wording of Article 77 of the Charter. The question is now an academic one in so far as the former Japanese Mandated Islands are concerned, but it would not be fair for the United States to alter its interpretation of Article 77 merely because its own interests are no longer involved.” See UN doc. A/P.V./104, pp. 57–61.

²⁵ The Resolution recommended to the General Assembly by the Fourth Committee in 1947 recited that “ it is the clear intention of Chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations that all territories previously held under mandate, until granted selfgovernment or independence, shall be brought under the International Trusteeship System.” UN doc. A/422, October 27, 1947. The General Assembly amended the Resolution as proposed by striking out this particularprovision.

²⁶ As phrased in the General Assembly resolution passed on November 1, 1947, the General Assembly “firmly maintains its recommendation that South West Africa be placed under the Trusteeship System,” and “urges the Government of the Union of South Africa to propose for the consideration of the General Assembly a Trusteeship agreement for the territory of South WestAfrica and expresses the hope that the Union Government may find it possible to do so in time to enable theGeneral Assembly to consider the agreement at its third session.” For 1946 resolution see UN doc. A/64/Add.l, Bes. 65(1), January 31, 1947; for 1947 resolution see UN doc. A/429, October 29, 1947, and UN doc. T/52, Bes. 141 (11), November 7, 1947.

The South West African controversy raised another thorny legal problem which remains still unsettled. In spite of the 1946 General Assembly resolution, the South AfricanUnion failed to place South West Africa under trusteeship. During the Assembly and Fourth Committee debates in 1947 the question arose whether, quite apart from the controversy over the interpretation of the Charter language, the South African Union was under an obligation by virtue of the previous Assembly vote to place South West Africa under trusteeship. In other words, does the affirmative vote of the General Assembly embodying a “recommendation” create a definite obligation, legal or otherwise, and, if so,of exactly what character is the obligation? This is a problem of enormous consequence, as yet unsolved.

In the debate in the Security Council on Palestine in February 1948, the United States representative, Mr. Austin, stating the views of the United States, said: “The recommendations of the General Assembly have great moral force which applies to all Members [of the United Nations] regardless of the views they hold or the votes whichthey may have cast on any particular recommendation. Similarly, the Security Council, although not bound under the Charter to accept and carry out General Assembly recommendations, is nevertheless expected to give great weight to them.” U. S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Eelease 394, February 24, 1948, p. 1.

In the recent session of the General Assembly, controversy arose over a draft resolution put forward by the Delegation of India providing that “The General Assembly hopes that Members of the United Nations responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories will propose Trusteeship Agreements under Article 77, 1,c of the Charter of the United Nations for all or some of such territories as are not ready for self-government.” UN doc. A/423, October 27, 1947. The preamble to this resolution declared that it was “the clear intention” of Chapter XII that the territories referred to in Article 77(1) (c) should be placed under trusteeship and that the trusteeship system offered the “surest and quickest” methodfor attainingindependence or self-government. Opposition to the resolution, which was ultimately defeated, was based on the grounds that no such “clear intention” was expressed in the Charter; that there is as yet no proof that trusteeship is the “surest and quickest” path to independence, because six countries containing almost 500 million people have attained, or virtually attained, independence outside the trusteeship system since the Charter was signed; and that it would be illogical for the General Assembly, having dealt with mandated territories, to ignore the detached territories referred to in clause (b) of Article 77(1) and pass to non-self-governing territories in clause (c). For texts of statements by Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States representative, see U. S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Belease 264, October 13, 1947, and UN doc. A/P.V./106, November 1, 1947, pp. 46–66.

²⁷ The Fabian Colonial Bureau, of which Mr. Arthur Creech Jones, now Secretary of State for the Colonies, was, at the time, Chairman, published a pamphlet recommending close international supervision of all dependent territories: Fabian Colonial Bureau,International Action and the Colonies: Reportof a Committee of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (London, Fabian Publications Ltd., 1943). See also address by Mr. Arthur Creech Jones before the Peace Aims Conference of the National Peace Council, Oxford, 1942, reprinted in Freedom for Colonial Peoples (Peace Aims Pamphlet No. 11, London, National Peace Council n.d.). For related British views, consult The Colonies: The Labour Party's Post-War Policy for the African and Pacific Colonies (London, 1943); and An International Colonial Convention (London, Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 1943). Mr. Sumner Welles, formerly Under Secretary of State, proposed a “Superior Agency of an International Trusteeship,” under whose authority would be created regional councils. In cases where dependent peoples at the close of the war would no longer be under the control of an administering power, or where the present colonial power had proved unworthy or incompetent, the International Trusteeship would undertake the administration through its regional councils. Upon the advice of the International Trusteeship, the International Organization “would determine broad policies for the welfare of dependent peoples, and would decide when they are fitted to exercise partial, or completeautonomy.” The Time for Decision (New York, 1944), p. 384.

²⁸ Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, SanFrancisco, 1945, Vol. X, p. 644.Google Scholar

²⁹ At the Crimea Conference it was agreed that the five states which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other on the question of territorial trusteeship prior to the United Nations Conference. This agreement was reached on the understanding that territorial trusteeship would apply only to: (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories to be detached from enemy states after the war; and (c) any other territory that might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship. It was further understood that no discussion of actual territories would be undertaken at the United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and that it would be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories within the three categories would be placed under trusteeship.Protocol of the proceedings of the Crimea Conference (February 1945), Department of State Press Release 239, March 24, 1947.

³⁰ Charter of the United Nations, Article 77.

³¹ Ad Hoe Committee on the Transmission of Information under Article 73(e) of the Charter, Eeport for Submission to the General Assembly. UN doo. A/AC.9/W.34/ Rev. 1, September 15, 1947, p. 5.

³² During the debate in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (1947), the author, as representative of the United States, stated the American position as follows:

Several of those who have spoken here, it has seemed to me, lost sight of the very clear and fundamental distinction which was drawn at San Francisco between Chapter XI of the Charter, on the one hand, and Chapters XII and XIII, on the other. It seems to my Delegation that if we would truly and actually promote the political and economic and social and educational advancement of the non-selfgoverning peoples of the world wemust keep always in mind this wise and sharp distinction made at San Francisco in our Charter.

This distinction is fundamental. It was realized then, and it remains true now, that in many non-self-governing territories sovereignty or jurisdiction vests in the administering states; and nothing was written into the Charter to change this fundamental fact. On the other hand, there are other non-self-governing territories—trust territories—where supervision lies in the hands of the United Nations; and in such territories the United Nations can and should hold the administering power to strict accountability. Chapter XI of the Charter dealt with the former; Chapters XII and XIII, with the latter. . . .

It seems to my Delegation of fundamental importance that this sharp differentiation made in the Charter between territories and peoples under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of an independent state and those which are not should be maintained. Chapters XIIand XIII materially alter the status of the non-self-governing territories coming within their scope. Chapter XI does not. No effort should be made to blur this distinction.

U. S. Mission Press Belease 251, October 6, 1947.

³³ Report of Western Samoa Mission. UN doc.T/46, September 24, 1947, and T/46 Add. 1, September 25, 1947 (Annexes).

³⁴ UN doe. T/62, November 21, 1947. The NewZealand bill embodying this new plan has now become law.

³⁵ The question of whether a Mandatory Power could be removed was a muchdebated point under the Mandates system, particularly in connection with the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations and Japan's apparent violation of the military clauses of the mandate. See also Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations, pp. 520–521.

³⁶ See UN doc. T/43 (11 June 1947), Resolutions adopted by the Trusteeship Council during its first Session. For example: – TheTrusteeship Council noted the United Kingdom assurance that no German is to be repatriated solely on account of his nationality. Those who are to be repatriatedon grounds of enemy activities or sympathies are: persons associated with enemy espionage, sabotage or similar activities; persons who participated in anti-Allied or pro-Nazi activities, such as propaganda or the organization of local German nationalistic associations; and persons whose activities served to maintain German commercial or national interests or influence, whether or not such persons worked directly against Alliedinterests. All these twenty-four persons had mortgaged their properties in Tanganyika to a company which was, like the USAGARA Company, primarily a Nazi organization“ (p. 5).

³⁷ See UN doe. T/P.V./32, December 1, 1947,and T/P.V./41, December 11, 1947.

³⁸ Article 76 reads as follows:

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;

b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards selfgovernment or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

³⁹ See in this connection the interesting and able speech delivered by the United Kingdom’s representative in the discussion on this subject in the Fourth Committee at the Second Session of the General Assembly. As there suggested, the ultimate welfare of dependent peoples can in some cases bebest promoted by immediate independence, in others by self-government in a larger grouping of territories and in still others by remaining under the wing of a colonial power and drawing upon it for educational facilities, technicians, and defense. It is a naive misunderstanding to suppose that “sovereign status is a sovereign remedy for all ills.” UN doc. A/C.4/SR. 36, October 4, 1947, pp. 2–5.

⁴⁰ See Bunche, Ralph J., “Trusteeship andNon-Self-Governing Territories in the Charter of the United Nations,” Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1039 Google Scholar; and The United States and Non-Self-Governing Territories, work cited, p. 11.

⁴¹ It is interesting that while each of the ten trusteeship agreements specifies in some detail the means for promoting political advancement, none specifically amplifies the words “self-government or independence.” Efforts were made during the debates of the General Assembly to obtain such amplification but were rejected by the mandatory powers. A similar effort was made in the Security Council in the discussion of the trusteeship agreement for the Pacific Islands to modify the United States proposal which mentioned only “self-government.” The United States representative, upon the request of the Soviet representative, agreed to the addition of the clause which follows in Article 76(b) of the Charter, but declared that “the United States feels that it must record its opposition not to the principle of independence, to which no people could be more consecrated than the people of the United States, but to the thought that it could possibly be achieved within any foreseeable future in this case.” See UN doc. S/P.V./116, March 7, 1947, p. 47.

⁴² Statement by the author, representing the United States in the Fourth Committee, U. S. Mission Press Release No. 244, October 2, 1947, pp. 1–2.

⁴³ See The Question of Equal Treatment in Economic and Commercial Matters in Trust Territories (Article 76 d) ; Memorandum Prepared by the Secretariat, UN doc. A/C.4/38, November 3, 1946.

⁴⁴ See above, p. 1–3.

⁴⁵ Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Vol. X, p. 644.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Students of this problem may find the phosphate concessions in Nauru and the diamond concessions in Tanganyika worthy of examination.

⁴⁷ UN doc. 8/P.V./124, April 2, 1947, pp. 103–105. A similar statement was madeat the time the draft trusteeship agreementwas placed before the Security Council. See Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, State Department Publication 2784 (1947), p. 8.

⁴⁸ See Some Points of Procedure with Regard to Consideration of Trusteeship Agreements by the General Assembly, UN doc. A/87, September 25, 1946.

⁴⁹ Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, SanFrancisco, 1945, Vol. X, p. 646.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Above, section 1.

⁵¹ The United States and the United Nations: Report of the United States Delegation to the First Part of the First Session ofthe General Assembly of the United Nations, Department of State Publication 2484, 1946.

⁵² U. S. Position on Establishment of Trusteeship System; Statement by Member of the U. S. Delegation, The Department of State Bulletin, December 1, 1946, pp. 991–992.

⁵³ For a summary of the General Assembly's debates on the “states directly concerned” and other trusteeship topics,see Armstrong, Elizabeth H. and Cargo, William I., The Inauguration of the Trusteeship System of the United Nations, The Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1947, pp. 511–521.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session, the General Assembly (63d Plenary Meeting, Dec. 14, 1946), p. 1321.

⁵⁵ Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, Department of State Publication No. 2784, p. 19.

⁵⁶ “The terms of the present agreement shallnot be altered, amended or terminated without the consent of the administeringauthority.”

⁵⁷ For a full discussion of this proposal see S/P.V./124, April 2, 1947.

⁵⁸ In the Fourth Committee of the Second General Assembly, the author, as President of the Trusteeship Council, in reply to the charge of illegality, referred to the previous actions of the General Assembly and the Security Council as justifying the legality of the Council, and concluded with the statement that “quite apart from the fact that there is no possible legal justification for questioning its validity, the time is now past when any justifiable attack can be made upon the Council’s constitutional existence.” United States Mission to the United Nations. Press Eelease No. 238, September 29, 1947. See also UN doc. A/C.4/SE. 34, September 29, 1947, pp. 1–2.

⁵⁹ Same, p. 1.

⁶⁰ UN doc. A/C.4/SC.1/SR. 30, October 6, 1947, pp. 1–4.

⁶¹ Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22, par. 6.

⁶² UN does. A/C.4/Sub. 1/30, November 23, 1949, pp. 1–2; A/C.4/Sub. 1/81, December 3, 1946, pp. 12–13.

⁶³ UN doc. A/C.4/8ub. 1/81, December 3, 1946, pp. 8–12; A/258, December 12, 1946, p. 6.

⁶⁴ UN doc. A/0.4/Sub. 1/71, November 29, 1946, p. 2.

⁶⁵ See Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly (62nd Plenary Meeting, December 13, 1946), pp. 1276–1283.

⁶⁶ UN doc. 8/281, February 17, 1947.

⁶⁷ Security Council Official Record 23, March 7, 1947, p. 473.

⁶⁸ See The Question of Fortifications and Volunteer Forces in Trust Territories (Article 84): Memorandum Prepared by the Secretariat, UN doe. A/C.4/40, November 3, 1946;

⁶⁹ It was further maintained that any military measures taken in this connection would have to be set forth in special agreementsnegotiated on the initiative of the Security Council under Article 43. Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, 1946 (62nd Plenary, Dec. 13, 1946), pp. 1279–1280.

⁷⁰ Same, pp. 1282–1283, 1286.

⁷¹ U N doc. A/420, October 27, 1947.

⁷² A/P.V./104, November 1, 1947, p. 31.

⁷³ The Mandates merely contained a stipulation that their terms could not be modified without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

⁷⁴ League of Nations, Records of the Thirteenth Assembly: Plenary Session, p. 47.

⁷⁵ For text of the Declaration as approved by the League Council on May 19, 1932 and accepted by Iraq on May 30, 1932, see Leagueof Nations Official Journal, 1932, pp. 1347–50.

⁷⁶ It is to be noted that a clause was included in the Charter (Article 78) providing that “The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.”

⁷⁷ Resolution on Non-Self-Governing PeoplesAdopted by the General Assembly on February 9, 1946. UN doc. A/64, p. 13.

⁷⁸ Statement to the General Assembly by Mr.Bevin on behalf of the United Kingdom on January 17, 1946. Journal of the General Assembly, First Part of the First Session, No. 8, p. 177.

⁷⁹ Resolution on Mandates adopted on April 18, 1946. See League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 194, Records of the Twentieth (Conclusion) and Twenty-first Ordinary Sessions of the Assembly, pp. 278–279.

⁸⁰ United Kingdom Treaty Series, No.32 (1946).

⁸¹ Resolution on the Future Government of Palestine [No. 181 (II) ] adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. This resolution contemplates the termination of the Mandate for Palestine by the establishment of an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State, and a City of Jerusalem to be administered by the United Nations Trusteeship Council under a special international regime. The Assembly Plan sets out the text of a Declaration to be made by the provisional government of each of the two proposed States before independence. The similarity of this procedure to that followed by the League of Nations in the case of the independence of Iraq is clear.

⁸² It should be noted that the termination of a trusteeship or mandate does not necessarily require independence. The Charter itselfrefers to “self-government or independence.” (See Section 5 above.) The General Assembly, in dealing with the question of South West Africa, has already considered proposals to terminate a mandate in a direction other than independence.

⁸³ Article 1. For text of draft agreement submitted by the United States to Security Council, see UN doc. S/281, February 17, 1947; for text as approved, see UN doc. S/318, April 2, 1947. See also Bobert E. Bobbins,United States Trusteeship for the Territory of the Pacific Islands in Two Aspects of Trusteeship, Department of State Publication 2850, 1947.

⁸⁴ In laying the draft before the Security Council, the United States representative declared: “The American people are firmly resolved thatthis area shall never again be used as a springboard for aggression against the UnitedStates or any other member of the United Nations. . . . Our purpose is to defend the security of these islands in a manner that will contribute to the building up of genuine, effective, and enforceable collective security for all members of the United Nations.” Department of State Publication 2784 (1947), p. 16.

⁸⁵ Article 13 of the trust agreement is as follows: “The provisions of Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter shall be applicable to the trust territory, provided that the administering authority may determine theextent of their applicability to any areas which may from time to time be specified byit as closed for security reasons.” UN doc. 8/318, April 2, 1947.

⁸⁶ In the consideration by the Security Council of the United States draft agreement, Article 13 came in for relatively little discussion. The United States representative in his speech presenting the agreement to the Security Council stated that “Although this is a strategic area . . . the United States draft agreement goes beyond the requirements of the Charter in strategic areas. It provides that Articles 87 and 88—relating to reports, petitions, visits, and questionnaires in non-strategic trusteeship areas—shall be applicable tothe whole of this trust territory, except that the administering authority may determine the extent of applicability in any areas which may from time to time be specified by the administering authority as closed for security reasons. This exception has been made in recognition of the fact that an administering authority of a strategic trust territory should havethe authority necessary to safeguard the installations establishedin the discharge ofits responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace andsecurity.” UN doe. S/P.V./113, February 26, 1947, pp. 14–16.

⁸⁷ UN doc. 8/599.

⁸⁸ The views of the United States as to these questions were set forth by the American representative in the Committee of Experts. In discussing the respective functions of the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council he said that under Article 83(3), although the Security Council had full and final responsibility, the Security Council was obliged to ask the assistance of the Trusteeship Council in political, economic, social and educational matters. He considered that it would be preferable for the Security Council to give the Trusteeship Council ageneral authority subject to the general supervision of the Security Council exercisedperiodically rather than for the Security Council to ask the assistance of the Trusteeship Council in a “piecemeal” manner in each separate instance. The Trusteeship Council was better qualified to deal with questions relating to the welfare ofthe inhabitants of trust territories. The Trusteeship Council could take action with respect to questionnaires similar to that which it took on behalf of and under the authority of the General Assembly. He emphasized that under Article 13 of the Trust Agreement and Article 83 of the Charter this questionnaire is limited in scope to the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory and that therefore the United Nations had no authority to include questions with respect to fortifications and defenses for military purposes, or any other question of a military nature. The Trusteeship Council should also take appropriate measures as to petitions and visits. The Trusteeship Council should report on any measure it took to the Security Council, which could take any decision it deemed advisable. See Preliminary Report by the Committee of Experts to the Security Council on the Respective Functions of the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council with regard to the Trusteeship System as Applied to Strategic Areas, UN doc. S/642, January 12, 1948, pp. 3–4.

⁸⁹ The recommended resolution goes on to provide “that the Secretary-General be requested to advise the Security Council of all reports and petitions received from or relating to strategic areas under trusteeship, and to send copies thereof, as soon as possible after receipt, to the Trusteeship Council for examination and report to the Security Council,” and “thatthe Trusteeship Council be requested to submit to the Security Council its reports andrecommendations on political, economic and educational matters affecting strategic areas under trusteeship.” Same, p. 9.

⁹⁰ Article 13.

⁹¹ UN doc. S/613, December 2, 1947, p. 1.

⁹² In a commentary prepared by the United States for circulation to the Security Council and released to the press at the time ofthe Security Council’s consideration of the United States draft agreement in February 1947, giving article-by-article explanatory remarks, it was pointed out that “Article 13 of the draft agreement states only that the extent of applicability of Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter may, in ‘closed’ areas, be determined by the administering authority. Hence, even in such areas the Trusteeship Council can, and normally would, be authorized to request and consider reports submitted by the administering authority, to accept petitions and examine them in consultation with theadministering authority, and otherwise to keep itself informed of the political, economic, social, and educational development of the inhabitants.” See Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, State Department Publication 2784 (1947), pp. 11–12.

⁹³ See resolution on South West Africa adopted by the General Assembly on November 1, 1947. UN doe. T/52, November 7, 1947. For discussions on this resolution see UN doc. A/C.4/SB.33, 38, 39 and 40, and A/P.V./105.

⁹⁴ In the course of debate in the Trusteeship Council, Ambassador Liu Chieh, the representative of China, said: “There is no more restriction under the General Assembly Resolution (on South West Africa) than there is under Article 87. I submit, therefore, that in order to carry out the duty which has been entrusted to the Trusteeship Council, we must set out with the same zeal,the same impartiality, the same objectivity, the same care, and the same sense of responsibility as we would display in the examination of reports from other trust territories. . . . I should think that in the examination of a report a representative is not precluded from expressing an opinion on subjects that arise out of the examination of the report if he chooses to refer to information which he derives from other sources. For instance, he may see a figure in the Reporton South West Africa. He may then referto some other figure which he saw in other reports and ask: ‘Why is there such a discrepancy?’ ” UN doc. T/P.V./42, December 12, 1947, p. 17.

⁹⁵ See Resolution on the Future Government of Palestine adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. UN doc. A/516, November 25, 1947.

⁹⁶ Charter of the United Nations, Article 22.

⁹⁷ Covenant of the League, Article 22.

⁹⁸ Charter of the United Nations, Article 86(2).